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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine different conceptions of 
decoherence and their significance within interpretations of quantum 
mechanics. I set out three different conceptions of decoherence found in 
the literature and examine the relations between them. I argue that only 
the weakest of these conceptions is empirically well supported, and that 
the other two rely on claims about the structure of the histories (robust 
patterns within the wavefunction) which we occupy which require 
justification. 
I also examine the ways in which conceptions of decoherence are used to 
solve aspects of the quantum measurement problem and support modern 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. I focus particularly on Wallace's 
Everettian interpretation of quantum mechanics. I argue that while 
decoherence is generally successful in supporting this interpretation in a 
variety of ways, the very strong conception of decoherence on which he 
relies is itself difficult to justify. 
I consider a variety of possible approaches to justifying the use of this 
strong conception of decoherence and argue that many of them are either 
unconvincing, or rely on controversial cosmological claims. Finally, I suggest 
that the best way to justify the use of this strong conception of 
decoherence is by appealing directly to its indispensability to an otherwise 
very attractive interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The aim of this thesis is to carefully consider what is meant by decoherence 
as the term is used within the existing literature concerning the 
foundations and philosophy of quantum mechanics, and to examine the 
role played by different conceptions of decoherence within specific 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. 
Chapters 2 and 3 will carefully develop and examine three different 
conceptions of decoherence found in the existing literature, and why it is 
thought to be useful in attempts to solve the quantum measurement 
problem. Chapters 4 and 5 will look at a number of concerns relating to the 
use of decoherence for this purpose and argue that these concerns, at least 
as commonly presented, need not worry us particularly. 
In chapter 6 I will set out what I believe to be a serious problem with the 
conception of decoherence which is commonly used within particular 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, which is called medium 
decoherence. I will argue that this conception (which is the strongest 
conception I will consider in this thesis) is stronger than our empirical 
evidence can support, and it is far from clear that any other form of 
justification for this conception can be provided. 
Where possible in this thesis, I endeavour to provide an account of the 
significance of different conceptions of decoherence and the problems 
which they solve and produce, while remaining neutral between all 
interpretations which do not introduce a collapse postulate. Where this is 
not possible, I focus on Wallace's formulation of the Everett interpretation 
of quantum mechanics as set out at length in Wallace 2012. I focus on this 
interpretation because it is a conceptually well-developed and widely 
respected interpretation which very clearly and explicitly relies on, and 
defends, a clear conception of decoherence, unlike many others. In 
chapters 7 and 8, I abandon all attempts at interpretation neutrality, and 
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focus purely on the support for this strong conception of decoherence 
which can be offered by Wallace's Everettian interpretation. In chapter 7, I 
consider a proposal by Wallace that the assumptions which underlie 
medium decoherence could be treated as Humean laws of nature. I will 
argue that this approach is undermined by the difficulty of reconciling a 
Humean account of laws with the metaphysics of Wallace’s project. In 
chapter 8, I look at some of the major problems produced for Wallace’s 
project if the medium decoherence assumption is dropped, and suggest 
that this could offer an argument from explanatory indispensability capable 
of supporting this assumption. 
The concluding chapter will return to other interpretations, and argue that 
more research is needed to understand how these interpretations can best 
respond to the issue for decoherence presented in chapter 6. 
Before turning to decoherence and the technical issues related to it, 
however, this chapter will provide a very brief introduction to textbook 
quantum mechanics, as well as the quantum measurement problem, and 
three popular modern interpretations which aim to solve it. This is 
intended to make clear the broader nature of the philosophical problems 
which decoherence is thought to help with, and to motivate interest in 
these problems. If the reader is interested in a more extended presentation 
of textbook quantum mechanics and its technical aspects, then I 
recommend Rae 2008 as a clear and direct textbook. For a clear and 
extended presentation of the philosophical issues associated with quantum 
mechanics and a range of interpretive responses I recommend Lewis 2016. 
 
1.1 A Short Introduction to Linear Quantum Mechanics 
The fundamental mathematics of text book quantum mechanics can be 
expressed quite simply. The central equation responsible for the normal 
dynamical evolution of a particle is Schrödinger's equation: 
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𝑖ℏ
𝜕
𝜕𝑡
𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡) = ?̂?𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡) 
Where ?̂? is the Hamiltonian energy operator, ℏ is a constant, 𝑖 is the 
square root of −1, and 𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡) is the wavefunction of the particle in terms 
of particle position and time. 
The wavefunction is a function which represents all possible information 
about the results of measurements which could be made on the particle. In 
the basis of a particular observable, such as position, the wavefunction can 
be represented as a sum of the wavefunctions which would represent the 
state corresponding to different possible measurement outcomes 
multiplied by a complex coefficient1. In a position basis: 
𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡) =∑𝛼𝑛𝜙𝑛
𝑛
 
Where 𝛼𝑛 is the complex coefficient, and 𝜙𝑛 is the n
th position 
eigenfunction. Given that 𝜙𝑛 is a position eigenfunction, the position 
operator ?̂?, applied to this function, will yield: 
?̂?𝜙𝑛 = 𝒓𝑛𝜙𝑛 
Where 𝒓𝑛 is the n
th position vector of the particle. Thus, the wavefunction 
can be thought of as a sum of states each of which corresponds to a 
particular measured value. There are many observables in terms of which 
this decomposition into eigenfunctions can be made, and they will not all 
share the same eigenfunctions. 
A distinctive feature of quantum mechanics is that the wavefunction 
representing a state of the particle will very often be a sum of multiple 
position eigenfunctions, each of which corresponds to a different position 
eigenvalue. This does not mean that there are multiple particles at 
different positions. Rather, the wavefunction which describes the state of a 
single particle includes components which correspond to multiple 
                                                          
1 For it to be possible to decompose a wavefunction like this, the measurement involved 
must have eigenstates which form a complete orthonormal basis. 
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classically incompatible positions. This distinctively quantum state of affairs 
is known as a superposition. The real physical state of affairs which a 
superposition wavefunction represents is a matter of much disagreement, 
as will be seen later in this chapter when I present a range of different 
interpretative strategies. 
It is important to note that a superposition is defined by reference to a 
particular set of basis eigenfunctions. A particle may for example be in a 
superposition of position eigenstates, while occupying a single energy 
eigenstate. 
The Hamiltonian ?̂? is the energy operator, and has energy eigenfunctions 
and eigenvalues in a similar way. Unlike other measurement operators, 
however, it appears within Schrödinger's equation, and is of central 
importance to the evolution of the wavefunction over time, as given by 
that equation. This equation is linear and deterministic. 
If the Hamiltonian of the particle is known between times j and k, then the 
progressive changes to the wavefunction as a result of that Hamiltonian 
can be encapsulated in a single operator 𝑈𝑗?̂? such that: 
𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡 = 𝑘) = 𝑈𝑗?̂? 𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡 = 𝑗) 
Where: 
𝑈𝑗?̂? = exp (
−𝑖(𝑡𝑘 − 𝑡𝑗)?̂?
ℏ
) 
Clearly, given the one-to-one relationship between the state of the 
wavefunction at different times given in these equations, the dynamics of 
the Schrödinger equation which gives rise to these operators is entirely 
deterministic without any innately probabilistic dynamics. 
A common way of representing this form of deterministic wavefunction 
evolution is with an arrow e.g.: 
𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡 = 𝑘) ⇒ 𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡 = 𝑗) 
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The linearity of these Schrödinger dynamics means that the time evolution 
operators have the following property: 
?̂?𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡) =∑𝛼𝑛?̂?𝜙𝑛
𝑛
 
Where: 
𝜓(𝒓, 𝑡) =∑𝛼𝑛𝜙𝑛
𝑛
 
In other words, the effect of the time evolution operator on a 
wavefunction is the same as the sum of the effect of that operator on the 
components of that wavefunction, each multiplied by its complex 
coefficient. E.g.: 
1
√2
𝜓1(𝑡 = 𝑗) +
1
√2
𝜓2(𝑡 = 𝑗) ⇒
1
√2
𝜓1(𝑡 = 𝑘) +
1
√2
𝜓2(𝑡 = 𝑘) 
In the case of a particle in a superposition of two position states at time j, 
this means that the state of that system at a later time k is the sum of the 
state to be expected at k, given the two initial positions, each multiplied by 
their respective coefficients. It is important to note that both the 
coefficients and the functions themselves may be complex, as this is what 
gives rise to distinctively quantum interference phenomena, in which 
components in the final wavefunction arising from the two initial positions 
when added together may subtract from one another, rather than adding 
together. This phenomenon will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. 
For now, though, it is just important to understand that interference is a 
distinctively quantum phenomenon, which cannot be understood or 
modelled without the linear evolution of complex wavefunctions. 
So far, then, all the dynamics I have presented are linear and deterministic. 
Superposition states evolve and interfere with one another to produce 
other states at other times, all of which can be decomposed in terms of 
bases of measurement eigenfunctions which (in some sense) correspond to 
particular measurement outcomes. What is missing however is any rule to 
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tell us which of these measurement outcomes we are to expect when we 
come to actually measure the system. The answer lies in the Born rule and 
the projection postulate, which describe dynamics fundamentally different 
to those given by Schrödinger's equation. 
 
1.2 Born's rule and the projection postulate 
The probability of a particular measurement outcome is given by the Born 
rule. For a position measurement with the eigenstates given above, the 
probability of measuring a particular position is as follows: 
𝑃(𝒓𝑛) = |𝛼𝑛|
𝟐 
That is, the probability of a particular measurement eigenvalue is equal to 
the modulus squared of the coefficient of the eigenfunction which 
corresponds to that eigenvalue. 
The Born rule offers a means of obtaining measurement probabilities from 
a linearly evolving wavefunction. Performing such measurements, 
however, does not leave that wavefunction undisturbed. The projection 
postulate (also sometimes referred to as the collapse postulate, for reasons 
which will become clear later in this chapter) says that, after the 
measurement is made, the wavefunction of the system will become equal 
to the eigenfunction associated with the eigenvalue which was measured. 
This postulate is of great importance to the empirical adequacy of standard 
textbook quantum mechanics. Without it, there is no reason to suppose 
that a measured property of a system will be the measured property of 
that system if the measurement is immediately repeated. Nonetheless, this 
postulate is at the heart of much controversy about the fundamental 
nature of quantum mechanics as a theory. 
The projection postulate is radically different not only to the Schrödinger 
dynamics presented in the previous section, but to all our other 
fundamental physical theories. It is fundamentally stochastic, unlike the 
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deterministic unitary Schrödinger dynamics. It is also strikingly abrupt and 
discontinuous, so much so that Dirac describes it as “…a jump in the state 
of the dynamical system.” (1935, pp. 36), as the wavefunction suddenly 
transitions from the superposition of many eigenstates to the single 
measured state. Most troubling of all, however, is the question of just 
when this abrupt quantum jump takes place. 
The projection postulate is tied to Born’s rule for the probabilities of 
measurement outcomes. In consequence, the projection postulate seems 
to come into play just in cases where observable features of the system are 
measured. This raises two concerns: 
Firstly, if measurement is taken here in the usual sense of just the process 
of a human being examining the system and recording information about 
it, then the situations in which the projection postulate apply seem to be 
determined by the presence or absence of a human observer. This 
anthropocentrism seems out of place in one of our most empirically 
successful scientific theories. Whether or not this anthropocentric 
conception of measurement is really what was intended by authors such as 
Dirac 1935 and von Neumann 1932 when they introduced this postulate, 
and what other conception they might have preferred, is somewhat 
unclear (Myrvold 2018). 
Second, then, is the question of just when measurement should be 
considered as having taken place. Again, the lack of clarity as to what 
constitutes a measurement makes the answer unclear. This leads to the 
troubling situation that the evolution of quantum systems appears to be 
governed by two radically different dynamical rules, but we have no clear 
answer to the question of which of these rules applies in which cases. 
One possible solution to this problem is to abandon the idea that the 
wavefunction really describes the state of the system at all, and instead to 
treat it as a representation of our knowledge of the system rather than the 
system itself. This would give some justification for measurements having 
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such a direct and drastic effect on the state of the wavefunction. The basic 
question that it would leave unanswered, however, is just what the 
physical reality underlying the wavefunction could be. 
It seems, then, there is something unsatisfactory about adding the 
projection postulate. To clarify this point further, I will now turn to look at 
what happens if we consider a measurement apparatus as a quantum 
mechanical system purely subject to the linear deterministic Schrödinger 
dynamics without any discontinuous quantum jumps. Before doing that, 
however, it will be necessary to introduce the notion of quantum 
entanglement, and a different way of representing quantum states known 
as Dirac notation. Both of these will be of great importance throughout the 
rest of this thesis. 
 
1.3 Dirac Notation 
The central equations of quantum mechanics can be represented in two 
main ways. The first is to treat the state of the system as a wavefunction, 
as I have done so far in this chapter. The wavefunction is a sinusoidal 
function of the variables of the system such as particle position and time. 
As discussed, applying operators to the wavefunction can evolve it in time 
or obtain probabilities of particular measurement outcomes. 
The second way in which quantum mechanics can be expressed is in terms 
of a state vector rather than a wavefunction. This formalism will be 
explained in chapter 2, but in essence the different eigenfunctions of a 
particular measurement are each assigned an element within a vector, and 
the complex coefficients of different eigenfunctions form the contents of 
the vector. This produces a vector of the type: 
[𝜓] = (
𝛼1
𝛼2
⋮
𝛼𝑛
) 
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Matrices are then used to represent operators. 
Both of these formalisms are mathematically equivalent, but significantly 
different in their structures and representation. Dirac notation is designed 
as a means of specifying system states and operations performed on them, 
which can be applied equivalently using either the state vector or 
wavefunction formalism. In the same eigenbasis used above, the quantum 
state of a system would then be represented as: 
|𝜓⟩ = 𝛼1|𝜙1⟩ + 𝛼2|𝜙2⟩ + ⋯𝛼𝑛|𝜙𝑛⟩ 
The bracket with which |𝜓⟩ is written is called ket, and indicates that this 
term is a wavefunction/state-vector. Here, |𝜓⟩ is represented as a sum of 
other eigenbasis kets, but it could also perfectly well be treated either as a 
state vector within vector formalism, or as a sum of eigenfunctions within a 
wave formalism. 
The second aspect that must be understood regarding these 
representations is how they deal with probabilities, and the measure of 
overlap between different states. This quickly becomes a more 
complicated and technical issue than can be clearly explained within this 
introduction. Rae 2008, chapter 6, gives a clear account of the relations 
between operations presented in the different formalisms. Here I will 
simply give a very brief account of the significance of an inverted ket, such 
as ⟨𝜓|, which is known as a bra. This denotes the complex conjugate of a 
wavefunction, or the Hermitian conjugate of a state vector: 
⟨𝜓| = 𝜓∗ 
⟨𝜓| = [𝜓†] = (𝛼1
∗ 𝛼2
∗ … 𝛼𝑛
∗ ) 
This conjugate form of a system state is important in a variety of 
operations a few of which will be seen in chapters 2 and 3. 
Dirac notation will be the default notation for quantum states throughout 
the remainder of this thesis. 
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1.4 Entanglement 
As I have already implied, quantum mechanics can be applied not just to 
single particles, but to a vast range of systems (any systems at all on some 
interpretations). Two systems, with state vectors independent of one 
another, jointly compose a composite system of which they are both parts, 
which will have its own state vector: 
|Ψ⟩ = |Φ⟩|Θ⟩ = [Φ]⨂[Θ] 
Where, |Φ⟩ and |Θ⟩ are the state vectors of the two independent 
subsystems, and |Ψ⟩ is the composite system which jointly compose. 
In quantum mechanics, however, the states of two different systems are 
not always independent of one another. In terms of basis vectors of the 
subsystem {|ϕi⟩} and {|θi⟩} respectively, the state of the composite system 
might for example be: 
|Ψ⟩ = 𝛼|ϕ1⟩|θ1⟩ + 𝛽|ϕ2⟩|θ2⟩ 
If the state of the composite system is of this form, then there will be direct 
correlations between measurements made on the two subsystems. In this 
case, if the eigenvalue associated with |ϕ1⟩ is measured in the first system, 
then the eigenvalue associated with |θ1⟩ will always be measured in the 
second. If, on the other hand, the eigenvalue associated with |ϕ2⟩ is 
measured in the first system, then the eigenvalue associated with |θ2⟩ will 
always be measured in the second. This interdependence of system states 
is known as entanglement. 
Entanglement is possible between spatially separated systems. The 
correlations between spatially separated measurement results in 
entangled systems are what give rise to claims that quantum mechanics is 
incompatible with special relativity (For more on these claims, and various 
possible responses see Berkovitz 2017.) Special relativity relies on the 
principle of locality, which says that no signal can travel faster than the 
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speed of light. With a carefully designed experimental apparatus, it is 
possible to produce correlations which are difficult to explain without 
some form of superluminal signal between parts of the system. I will not go 
into details of these experiments, originally conceived by Einstein, Podolsky 
& Rosen 1935 and extensively developed by Bell 1964. For an overview of 
these experiments see Shimony 2017. 
If two systems are entangled, then it will generally not be possible to 
express the state of the individual systems as a wavefunction. The 
composite system will have a wavefunction but, as with |Ψ⟩, it will not be a 
state which can be expressed as a product state of separate wavefunctions 
for the two subsystems. In the next chapter I will present a way in which 
we can attempt to express quantum states for the two individual 
subsystems using a piece of mathematics called a reduced density matrix. 
As I will discuss, this is effective for understanding the behaviour of 
subsystems in many cases, but is still very different to the individual 
subsystems possessing their own independent wavefunctions. 
Before moving on, I will give a very brief, very superficial, characterisation 
of what is meant by the word decoherence. The next two chapters will be 
taken up with setting out and discussing three different technical 
conceptions of decoherence. For this chapter though, a far more basic and 
general conception will suffice. 
Decoherence is the process of the state of a quantum system becoming 
entangled within its environment by a particular system property. After 
this has occurred, operations performed just on the original system will 
display little or no interference phenomena under operations affecting the 
entangled system property. 
A great deal more will be said about this process, but a basic conception of 
what the word decoherence means will be useful for understanding the 
way different interpretations respond to the quantum measurement 
problem. 
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1.5 Von Neumann Measurement 
Now I turn to look at the effect of quantum measurement if we drop the 
projection postulate, and assume that the linear quantum formalism can 
be applied to any system or any process (including the state of a human 
observer). Von Neumann 1932 developed a scheme for modelling 
measurements in this way, taking measurement in the most generic sense 
possible. 
Von Neumann characterises a measurement apparatus |𝑎⟩ as one that 
fulfils the following requirement: 
|𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦⟩|𝜙𝑖⟩ ⇒ |𝑎𝑖⟩|𝜙𝑖⟩ 
That is, for a measurement apparatus designed to measure the state of a 
physical system, where the set of eigenstates of the measurement being 
performed is {|𝜙
𝑖
⟩}, the apparatus will, if brought into contact with that system 
in one of those eigenstates, when in a state ready for measurement, then evolve 
to a state |𝑎𝑖⟩ corresponding to the eigenstate of the measured system. In other 
words, if the system to be measured initially occupies eigenstate 1, then when it is 
brought into contact with the system, a measurement apparatus will transition to 
a state of its own which corresponds to state 1 of the measured system. 
If a putative measurement apparatus failed to behave in this way, then it 
does not seem that it could reasonably be described as being a 
measurement apparatus. 
Now, though, let us look at what happens when an apparatus of this kind 
comes into contact with a system initially in a superposition of 
measurement eigenstates 𝛼|𝜙
1
⟩ + 𝛽|𝜙
2
⟩. In this case, due to the linearity 
of quantum dynamics in the absence of the projection postulate, the effect 
of the measurement will be: 
|𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦⟩(𝛼|𝜙1⟩ + 𝛽|𝜙2⟩) ⇒ 𝛼|𝑎1⟩|𝜙1⟩ + 𝛽|𝑎2⟩|𝜙2⟩ 
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That is, rather than reaching a single determinate measurement outcome 
state, the measurement apparatus has become entangled to the quantum 
superposition state of the measured system. The composite system of 
measurement apparatus and measured system is now in a superposition 
state. This is clearly not what we expect by way of a measurement 
outcome. 
The problem with this outcome is sometimes said to be that it contradicts 
our observations, as we do not observe macroscopic measuring 
apparatuses in such entangled superposition states. Myrvold 2018 points 
out that this way of phrasing the problem is misleading. As there is no 
obviously sensible way to interpret a measurement apparatus occupying a 
state like this, it does not seem that we could establish what it would be 
like to see such a state, or that our experiences are really contrary to such 
predictions. 
Nonetheless, we are left with a clear interpretational problem of how to 
reconcile the linear quantum mechanics, which predicts such bizarre 
superposition states on the macroscopic scale, with our observed everyday 
experience. This tension between linear quantum mechanics and our 
everyday experience is referred to as the quantum measurement problem. 
Quantum mechanics is an extremely well confirmed theory, and relies on 
notions like superposition to account for interference phenomena. If this 
theory is treated as a complete description of reality and applied 
universally, however, then superposition states will arise for the 
macroscopic world around us, and it is very unclear how we should 
interpret these. 
There are many different formulations and subdivisions of the precise 
nature of this problem, and the next chapter will introduce a more 
technical presentation of the problem, and a subdivision which is useful for 
understanding the importance of decoherence. For now, though, I wish to 
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give an overview of four responses to this problem, and the 
interpretational strategies which arise from them. 
1. Antirealist interpretations. Wavefunction states, though 
predictively powerful, do not really represent the unobservable 
world, and so we should not expect to directly observe such states. 
2. Collapse interpretations. Wavefunction states subject to the linear 
Schrödinger dynamics are not universal, and cannot reasonably be 
extended to the macroscopic world of everyday experience. These 
approaches rely on some form of collapse dynamics such as I have 
already touched on. 
3. Hidden variables interpretations. The wavefunction is real and 
universal, but is not a complete description of the world. This 
response adds additional variables to the physical theory which give 
rise to particular measurement outcomes for measured properties 
on macroscopic scales, which are what we see in the macroscopic 
world. 
4. Everettian interpretations. The wavefunction is real, universal and 
complete. On these views, our belief that macroscopic objects such 
as the ones we interact with in day-to-day life always have 
determinate states, and do not enter superpositions, is dropped. 
The next four sections will examine each of these interpretational 
approaches in turn, and give a brief overview of how they work and the 
issues which they face. 
 
1.6 Antirealist Interpretations 
The main antirealist interpretations of quantum mechanics are the QBist or 
quantum Bayesian approach of Fuchs, Mermin & Schack 2014, and the 
pragmatist approaches of Healey 2012 and Friederich 2015. All of these 
approaches agree that the wavefunction does not represent any physical 
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part of the world. They differ however in what they take the significance of 
the wavefunction to be. 
The quantum Bayesian approach regards the wavefunction as having a 
purely subjective epistemic role. On this view, the wavefunction is simply a 
representation of an agent’s degrees of belief regarding the outcomes of 
measurements made on a particular system. The degrees of belief 
regarding a system, and consequently the wavefunction attributed to the 
system, may differ between two agents without either agent being either 
irrational or mistaken. 
On a pragmatist view, on the other hand, the wavefunction is objective but 
not representational. On this view, the ascription of quantum states is 
subject to particular rules. To ascribe a wavefunction in a way that breaks 
these rules is to be mistaken in one’s state ascription. If the rules of 
quantum mechanics are followed, both in the ascription of quantum states 
and their subsequent evolution, then the result will be that we are able to 
ascribe reliable probabilities to non-quantum measurement claims. 
A significant question for this interpretation is that of just when 
nonrepresentational distinctively quantum states turn into 
representational non-quantum measurement claims. This form of problem, 
of identifying just when the quantum mechanical gives way to the 
macroscopic world of our everyday experience, is a challenge faced by all 
interpretations which regard the dynamics of the quantum mechanical 
world as fundamentally different to the world of our everyday experience. 
In order to distinguish nonrepresentational claims about quantum states 
from non-quantum measurement claims which are seen as 
representational, pragmatist interpretations appeal to decoherence. This 
distinction allows pragmatist interpretations to take an antirealist view of 
claims about quantum states while allowing for the possibility of a realist 
view regarding scientific theories of the macroscopic world around us. I 
think there is work to be done making clear precisely the sense of 
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decoherence being used here, and understanding precisely what it 
achieves. This work however is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
1.7 Collapse Interpretations 
It has already been mentioned that the projection postulate by which the 
wavefunction of the system changes to the measured eigenstate following 
a measurement is also known as the collapse postulate. Collapse is a word 
used to describe this physical transition from a wavefunction that is a 
superposition of many measurement eigenstates to a wavefunction which 
is aligned to just one of these eigenstates. 
I noted that there are significant difficulties in identifying the point at 
which measurement counts as having occurred, and consequently a 
significant difficulty saying just when this change to the system’s 
wavefunction takes place. Since the first appearance of wavefunction 
collapse within the literature on quantum mechanics, a number of 
interpretations have arisen which attempt to give a more precise account 
of the process of collapse and so solve this problem. For an overview of 
these approaches and some of the issues which they face see Ghirardi 
2018. 
Modern collapse views all stem from ideas set out in Ghirardi, Rimini & 
Weber 1986, and consequently are generally referred to as GRW 
interpretations. These interpretations differ substantially from the original 
notion of wavefunction collapse brought about by measurement. In 
particular, measurement as such is no longer thought to be a direct cause 
of wavefunction collapse. Thus, the tricky questions of how to characterise 
measurement, and what its physical significance could be, are avoided. 
Instead, the form of collapse used is random and spontaneous. Ghirardi 
2018 writes “The key assumption of [Quantum Mechanics with 
Spontaneous Localizations] is the following: each elementary constituent of 
any physical system is subjected, at random times, to random and 
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spontaneous localization processes (which we will call hittings) around 
appropriate positions.” It should be noted that the word localisation here 
means localisation in a position basis. GRW interpretations treat position as 
fundamentally different to other observables in quantum mechanics, and it 
is particle position alone which is subject to collapse. 
Collapse takes the form of multiplying the existing wavefunction in a 
position basis by a Gaussian function centred on a particular point. The 
wavefunction is not replaced by an entirely determinate position, but by a 
new wavefunction tightly centred on a particular position. The position to 
which the wavefunction localises is a fundamentally probabilistic function 
of the initial wavefunction. 
The typical time periods for such spontaneous localisations, and the 
parameters of the Gaussian function of the localisation, are parameters 
which on the GRW view have yet to be empirically identified, though there 
are various estimates. In principle, it should also be possible to empirically 
test the GRW interpretation as its dynamics differ from standard quantum 
mechanics in (in principle) measurable ways. Such tests, however, remain 
beyond our technical capabilities. These issues, as well as conceptual 
concerns relating to the primitive ontology of this interpretation, continue 
to be debated amongst its advocates. 
On this interpretation, though wavefunctions and the rules governing them 
are universally applicable, the linear Schrödinger dynamics are not. These 
dynamics apply only for short periods of time in between spontaneous 
particle localisations. 
 
1.8 Hidden Variables Interpretations 
Hidden variables interpretations seek to solve the quantum measurement 
problem by adding additional variables to the Schrödinger wavefunction 
dynamics. By far the most popular interpretation of this kind is the de 
Broglie-Bohm interpretation, also known as Bohmian mechanics, which 
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was developed independently by de Broglie 1927 and Bohm 1952. For an 
overview of this interpretation see Goldstein 2013. 
Like the GRW interpretations just discussed, Bohmian mechanics regards 
particle position as a fundamentally different observable to other 
observables within quantum mechanics. As Bell puts it: 
“[I]n physics the only observations we must consider are position 
observations, if only the positions of instrument pointers. It is a 
great merit of the de Broglie-Bohm picture to force us to consider 
this fact. If you make axioms, rather than definitions and theorems, 
about the "measurement" of anything else, then you commit 
redundancy and risk inconsistency.” (Bell 1982 pp. 166.) 
For reasons which will become clear in the next chapter, it is not possible 
to have a hidden variables theory of quantum mechanics in which all 
observable variables have definite values at all times. This appeal to the 
primary role of measurement, within the physics experiments which 
underlie quantum mechanics, is intended as justification for taking particle 
position as a preferred observable with its own additional dynamics. 
The fundamental Bohmian ontology is made up of particles which always 
have definite (but generally unknown) positions. These particle positions 
are in addition to linear Schrödinger quantum mechanics which applies 
universally in Bohmian quantum mechanics. Bohmian mechanics resolves 
the tension between our everyday experience of objects occupying single 
particular local positions, and linear quantum mechanics which predicts 
that they should enter superposition states of many positions, by 
identifying the objects of our everyday experience with arranged 
collections of Bohmian particles. 
Superficially, this interpretation may appear very traditional in its ontology, 
as we are used to the idea of the world around us being made up of 
particles. The particles of Bohmian mechanics, however, are profoundly 
different to our general understanding of the particles which make up our 
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world. As already mentioned, it is only position which is treated as a 
preferred variable in Bohmian mechanics. This means that the only 
definitive properties which Bohmian particles possess are position and 
mass. All other properties such as energy, electrostatic charge, and spin (a 
property which will be explained further in the next chapter) are not 
intrinsic properties of Bohmian particles. Instead, all these properties are 
contained within the wavefunction, and its influence on the trajectories of 
the Bohmian particles. It is also the wavefunction, and its direct influence 
on the trajectories of Bohmian particles, which gives rise to interference 
phenomena on the Bohmian interpretation. 
The wavefunction is entirely responsible for determining the trajectories of 
all Bohmian particles (though not their initial positions). The influence of 
the wavefunction on Bohmian particles can be expressed either in terms of 
a guiding equation, or quantum potential. These representations are 
mathematically equivalent, but give different impressions of the nature of 
the influence of the wavefunction on particle trajectories. 
The Bohmian guiding equation gives the changes of position of a particle k 
initially in position 𝑹𝑘 is expressed in the wave formalism as follows: 
𝑑𝑹𝑘
𝑑𝑡
=
ℏ
𝑚𝑘
𝐼𝑚 (
𝜓∗𝛁k𝜓
𝜓∗𝜓
) 
Where 𝛁k is a spatial differential of the position of particle k, 𝑚𝑘 is the 
mass of particle k, and the function 𝐼𝑚 returns just the imaginary part. 
It should be noted that this equation gives the velocity of particle K rather 
than its position. The positions of Bohmian particles are not directly 
determined by the wavefunction. In Bohmian mechanics, particles begin in 
definite but unknown positions. It is this ignorance of the initial positions of 
Bohmian particles which is the origin of quantum mechanical probabilities 
within the Bohmian interpretation. Both the evolution of the wavefunction, 
and the trajectories of Bohmian particles, are entirely deterministic. 
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These dynamics are applied universally so that there is not fundamentally 
any split between the quantum world of the very small, and the world of 
our everyday experience. The question therefore arises of why the 
distinctively quantum interference phenomena, seen in isolated 
interferometer experiments, cease to be observed once a measurement of 
the system is made. 
The answer to this question is typically expressed (e.g. Dürr, Goldstein, & 
Zanghì 1992) in terms of a local effective wavefunction which governs the 
behaviour of particles within a particular subsystem. Goldstein 2013, 
however, points out that the justification for this use of an effective 
wavefunction (presented originally by Bohm 1952) amounts to what is now 
commonly known as decoherence. Interference suppression from 
environmental decoherence is a direct consequence of the linear 
Schrödinger dynamics, and as these dynamics are a universally applicable 
feature of Bohmian mechanics, it accounts for interference suppression in 
these cases entirely independently of any specific features of the Bohmian 
interpretation. 
 
1.9 Everettian Interpretations 
I now turn to the family of interpretations about which I will have most to 
say in this thesis. These interpretations are characterised by the view that 
the evolution of the wavefunction described by linear Schrödinger 
quantum mechanics is a universally appropriate and complete description 
of the world. These interpretations, of which there are many variants, all 
stem from the doctoral work of Everett 1957. For a clear presentation of 
many of these variants see Barrett 1999. 
At first glance it may seem unclear how an interpretation of quantum 
mechanics which simply endorses the universality of linear Schrödinger 
dynamics could possibly solve the measurement problem, and be 
reconciled with our everyday experience. 
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To understand Everett's key insight into this question, consider the final 
state of the measurement process modelled by linear quantum mechanics 
which was considered earlier: 
|𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦⟩(𝛼|𝜙1⟩ + 𝛽|𝜙2⟩) ⇒ 𝛼|𝑎1⟩|𝜙1⟩ + 𝛽|𝑎2⟩|𝜙2⟩ 
Now consider a further measurement operation, this one to discover 
whether or not the measurement apparatus has made a successful 
measurement: 
|𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡? ⟩|𝑎1⟩ ⇒ |𝑌𝑒𝑠⟩|𝑎1⟩ 
|𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡? ⟩|𝑎2⟩ ⇒ |𝑌𝑒𝑠⟩|𝑎2⟩ 
When this operation is applied the result is as follows: 
|𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡? ⟩(𝛼|𝑎1⟩|𝜙1⟩ + 𝛽|𝑎2⟩|𝜙2⟩) ⇒ 𝛼|𝑌𝑒𝑠⟩|𝑎1⟩|𝜙1⟩ + 𝛽|𝑌𝑒𝑠⟩|𝑎2⟩|𝜙2⟩ 
𝛼|𝑌𝑒𝑠⟩|𝑎1⟩|𝜙1⟩ + 𝛽|𝑌𝑒𝑠⟩|𝑎2⟩|𝜙2⟩ = |𝑌𝑒𝑠⟩(𝛼|𝑎1⟩|𝜙1⟩ + 𝛽|𝑎2⟩|𝜙2⟩) 
That is, when applied to the superposition state which is reached as the 
final stage of the original quantum measurement, our measurement of 
whether or not a determinate measurement has taken place determinately 
yields the answer yes. One way of thinking of this measurement would be 
for a scientist, after having made their original quantum measurement, to 
record on a piece of paper whether or not they had made a determinate 
measurement. What this result shows is that, as the scientist writing the 
word “yes” is the product of the linear evolution of both of each of the 
superposed states which the scientist occupies, they will determinately 
write the word “yes”. Indeed, under the vast majority of operations that 
could be performed on the scientist, they will behave just as if they had 
indeed made a determinate measurement, rather than entering a peculiar 
superposition state. 
This result is central to undermining the assumption that linear quantum 
mechanics is really at odds with our everyday experience in a way which 
requires some alteration or suspension of linear quantum mechanics in the 
case of this experience. This opens the door to interpretations of quantum 
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mechanics which feature only the universal wavefunction as their 
fundamental ontology. 
Interpretations of this type face a variety of challenges, to which they must 
respond. These include the problem of the preferred basis (which will be 
discussed further in the next chapter) and the problem of the origin of 
probability (which will be discussed further in chapters 4 and 8). In 
response to these challenges a wide variety of approaches have been 
developed. These include the many minds view set out by Albert and 
Loewer 1988, the many histories view originally developed by Griffiths 
1984, and the many worlds interpretation, the first example of which does 
not seem to be widely agreed upon. The situation is further complicated as, 
even within these broad groupings, particular authors differ considerably in 
their positions. An example of this will be seen in chapter 3, where I will set 
out some of the detailed technical disagreements between the different 
developers of the many histories interpretation. 
I cannot do justice to these many, varied and technical approaches to 
Everettian quantum mechanics in this introduction. Instead, I will just 
outline the basic points of the form of the many worlds interpretation 
recently developed in Wallace 2012, as this is the Everettian interpretation 
which will receive most attention in this thesis. 
Like all Everettian interpretations, Wallace’s interpretation takes, as its 
representation of the fundamental ontology of the universe, the universal 
wavefunction. All other ontology on Wallace's view is made up of robustly 
persistent patterns within the universal wavefunction. Worlds are defined 
as persistent patterns within that wavefunction which fulfil certain 
technical criteria. Within the portion of the universal wavefunction which 
constitutes a particular world, particular objects are also identified with 
patterns. 
On Wallace's view, these patterns can be identified as the objects of our 
everyday experience, because they approximate the classical dynamics of 
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medium-sized dry goods subject to classical equations of motion with such 
a high level of accuracy. For this reason, these objects and their dynamics 
are often referred to as quasi-classical. 
Wallace regards these patterns as emergent objects, in a very weak sense 
of emergence2, which he attributes to Dennett: 
“Dennett’s Criterion: a macro object is a pattern and the existence 
of a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness -- in 
particular the explanatory power and predictive reliability -- of 
theories which admit that pattern in their ontology.” (Wallace 2012, 
pp. 50). 
Thus, apples feature in Wallace’s emergent ontology because there are 
robust patterns within the linearly evolving wavefunction which play the 
functional role of apples, as described in our theories of biology and 
Newtonian mechanics, and these theories prove useful to us for their 
explanatory power and predictive reliability. All ontology of Wallace’s 
interpretation, other than the wavefunction itself, is emergent in this 
sense. Worlds, and the quasi-classical entities within them, are nothing 
more than robustly persistent patterns within the wavefunction. 
The existence of patterns which robustly fulfil these criteria is directly 
related to decoherence. As this phenomenon is (at least in its simplest 
form) just a product of linear Schrödinger dynamics for particular types of 
system, it does not constitute any addition to, or change of, linear quantum 
mechanics. Understanding just how this works and the issues it raises 
requires a far more technical examination of this connection which will be 
undertaken over the next two chapters. 
As a result of this direct connection to linear Schrödinger quantum 
mechanics, Wallace often describes his interpretation as being nothing 
                                                          
2 There are many different conceptions of emergence within the philosophical literature. 
For an overview see O’Connor & Wong 2015. In this thesis, the only conception with which 
I will be concerned is that used by Wallace. 
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more than the theory of quantum mechanics itself taken seriously. He 
writes: 
“This, in short, is the Everett interpretation. It consists of two very 
different parts: a contingent physical postulate, that the state of the 
universe is faithfully represented by a unitarily evolving quantum 
state; and an a priori claim about that quantum state, that if it is 
interpreted realistically it must be understood as describing a 
multiplicity of approximately classical, approximately non-
interacting regions which look very much like the ‘classical-world’.” 
(Wallace 2012 pp. 38). 
As will become clear later in this thesis, I believe that Wallace is profoundly 
mistaken in believing this to be an a priori claim. In essence this is because, 
while the simplest conception of environment induced decoherence can be 
seen as a direct consequence of the unitarily evolving quantum state, a 
stronger conception is needed in order to produce the approximately non-
interacting worlds of Wallace's interpretation. This direct reading of linear 
quantum mechanics is definitely the intention of Wallace’s project, 
however. In chapter 3 I will identify an implicit premise in Wallace's 
characterisation of worlds which does not seem as though it can possibly 
be established a priori. First, though, it will be necessary to look at a more 
technical formulation of decoherence and the quantum measurement 
problem. 
 
1.10 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented a generic understanding of the basic form 
of the quantum measurement problem, and four types of interpretational 
responses which have been given to it. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the role of decoherence within 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. Environment induced decoherence 
is a feature of linear Schrödinger quantum mechanics. It will arise, 
30 
 
therefore, in any interpretation which uses these dynamics. All 
interpretations that I have discussed use these dynamics in some form at 
least some of the time. They vary however in when and how they are used. 
In this thesis I limit my focus to those interpretations which regard the 
linearly evolving wavefunction as describing features of the world and 
universal. That is, I will limit my focus to Everettian and Bohmian 
interpretations. As I noted in this chapter, the role of decoherence in 
interpretations of quantum mechanics is not limited to just Bohmian and 
Everettian interpretations. Other interpretations, however, take a 
significantly different view of decoherence, as a consequence of the 
different view they take of the linear Schrödinger dynamics. As a result, I 
have decided to leave consideration of them out of this thesis. 
The next two chapters will look at conceptions of decoherence which are 
applicable to all Everettian and Bohmian interpretations. Chapter 6 will 
also focus on generic features of the unitarily and continuously evolving 
wavefunction, and so should be applicable to all Everettian and Bohmian 
interpretations. 
Chapters 4 and 5 respond to criticisms of decoherence-based approaches 
to the interpretation of quantum mechanics, which are primarily intended 
as objections to Everettian many worlds interpretations. As a result, they 
are principally relevant to Everettian many worlds interpretations. 
In chapters 7 and 8, I turn to focus purely on Wallace’s Everettian 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, and look at how it could respond to 
problems regarding the way decoherence is used within this interpretation, 
which are developed over the course of the thesis. 
In the next chapter I will develop a more technical conception of the 
measurement problem and a definition of environment-induced 
decoherence. These will be essential ground work for two more technical 
conceptions of decoherence developed in chapter 3. I will argue over the 
course of this thesis that the reduced density matrix conception of 
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decoherence, which I set out in the next chapter, has the clearest and 
strongest connection with direct empirical evidence, while also being the 
weakest. Medium decoherence, on the other hand, is a far stronger 
conception, of significant use in interpretations of quantum mechanics, but 
far more difficult to connect to any direct empirical evidence. 
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2 Decoherence and the Quantum Measurement 
Problem 
 
In the last chapter, I presented a general overview of the quantum 
measurement problem, and a number of interpretations which have been 
developed in response to it. I noted that the suppression of interference 
phenomena as a result of interaction with the environment played a role in 
several of these interpretations, and that this phenomenon was known as 
decoherence. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to introduce a more mathematically 
rigorous conception of this phenomenon, and examine its significance in 
solving aspects of the quantum measurement problem. In order to do this, 
a more mathematically sophisticated conception of quantum 
measurement, and a useful subdivision of the quantum measurement 
problem will first be introduced. 
 
2.1 Quantum Measurement 
In this section I will examine the process of quantum measurement and 
seek to set out the main difficulties of understanding probabilities within 
quantum mechanics. To make the problems posed as clear as possible, 
they will be related to the behaviour of particles passed through a series of 
Stern-Gerlach (S-G) devices. I will then outline a useful subdivision of these 
problems introduced by Schlosshauer 2007. 
2.1.1 The Stern-Gerlach Apparatus 
A Stern-Gerlach device uses an inhomogeneous magnetic field to separate 
a beam of particles according to a physical property called spin, as shown 
in figure 1. The particles are deflected from the path according to their spin 
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property and the direction and gradient of the magnetic field. Spin is a 
quantised property, and when measured (e.g. by adding particle detectors 
to see where particles arrive after passing through the Stern-Gerlach 
device), the particles will always be found to possess a spin value of either 
+
1
2
, or −
1
2
. (Feynman 1964 Vol II, 35-2) 
 
For ease of representation, 
the details of the apparatus 
will be omitted hereafter, 
and instead represented as 
shown in figure 2. 
 These two beams will have intensities which vary depending on the state 
of the particles in the beam incident to the apparatus. This can be most 
easily expressed using Dirac notation. In this notation, the spin properties 
of the particles incident to the apparatus can be expressed as: 
|𝜓⟩ = 𝛼|↑𝑧⟩ + 𝛽|↓𝑧⟩ 
Where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are complex numbers such that |𝛼|2 + |𝛽|2 = 1. |↑𝑧⟩, and 
|↓𝑧⟩ represent the states of particles with properties spin up and spin down 
in the z direction. These are known as z-spin eigenstates. The values that 
these states yield, when measured by a z-spin measuring apparatus (+
1
2
, 
and −
1
2
 respectively), are called eigenvalues. 
z-direction 
y-direction 
N 
S 
Beam of spin 
½ particles 
Magnets 
Stern Gerlach 
apparatus orientated 
in the z direction 
z-spin +½  
particles 
z-spin -½  
particles 
Particle 
detector 
screen 
Figure 1. The practical arrangement of a Stern-Gerlach apparatus, and its 
effect on spin ½ particles 
SGz 
Figure 2. The abbreviated representation of 
a Stern-Gerlach apparatus used hereafter. 
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The relative intensities of the two beams will then be: 
𝐼↑ ∝ |𝛼|
2 
𝐼↓ ∝ |𝛽|
2 
These relative intensities become probabilities when the beam is reduced 
so as to allow only 1 particle to pass through the apparatus at a time. The 
probabilities of the particle being measured to have each spin value are 
then given by Born’s rule: 𝑃↑ = |𝛼|
2, 𝑃↓ = |𝛽|
2. 
This is the simplest case of probabilities in quantum mechanics. The 
probabilities examined here do not appear to present any particular 
difficulties of interpretation. A simple epistemic interpretation of these 
probabilities is adequate. That is, we have no reason to think that these 
probabilities represent anything more than our ignorance of the particles 
true state. There is no reason, so far, to doubt that there is a measurement 
independent z-spin property, the probabilities of which, given our 
knowledge of the system, are given by our theory of quantum mechanics. 
This would closely resemble the understanding of probability as used in 
many special sciences. The main problem with taking 𝛼 and 𝛽 to simply 
represent our epistemic uncertainties about the particle in this way is 
interference. 
2.1.2 Non- Commuting Variables 
To understand interference we first need to understand non-commuting 
variables. The most famous case of non-commuting variables is that of 
position and momentum, summarised in Heisenberg’s famous uncertainty 
principle: ∆𝑥∆𝑝 ≥
ℏ
2
. That is, that the uncertainty about the position of a 
particle multiplied by the uncertainty about its momentum must always be 
greater than a particular (very small) value.  
Though sobering about our epistemic position within the world, it might be 
thought that these limitations on our knowledge do not present conceptual 
difficulties. Measurement uncertainties have always plagued the empirical 
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sciences, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that there might be limits 
to how far these could, even in principle, be reduced. The only ways in 
which this differs from usual measurement uncertainties, are that it seems 
extremely likely that this is an in principle limitation, which technological 
advances could not overcome, and that this uncertainty relates to two 
quantities rather than one. In short it could reasonably be supposed that 
this kind of uncertainty principle arises simply from the process of 
accurately measuring one variable, necessarily having a random effect on 
the other variable, meaning that no two measurements could ever identify 
two such variables beyond a certain level of accuracy. In fact, though, as 
we shall see by examining further arrangements of S-G devices, this 
interpretation is quite inadequate to account for the appearance (and non-
appearance) of interference phenomena observed empirically. Non-
commuting variables bear no such straightforward interpretation, and 
understanding these relationships is a major challenge for any 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
Returning to our Stern-Gerlach apparatus we find that here too our particle 
has observables the measurement of any one of which will disrupt the 
value of another. So far, we have measured the z-spin of a beam of 
particles by passing them through a magnetic field orientated in the z-
direction, as shown in figure 1. We will now introduce a new observable, x-
spin, which can be found, similarly to z-spin, by passing the particles 
through a magnetic field orientated in the x-direction. 
We will now consider the surprising results obtained when we pass our 
particles through a series of x-spin, and z-spin measurements. 
Figure 3. A series of Stern-Gerlach measurement arrangements, 
orientated in the z-direction and x-direction, with the intensities 
of the different beams labelled for further consideration. 
SGz SGx SGz 
𝐼0 
𝐼2 𝐼4 
𝐼1 𝐼3 
𝐼6 
𝐼5 
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If we assume that the intensity of the particle beam entering the first 
apparatus 𝐼0 is known, we can easily calculate the intensity of the 
unobserved beams, 𝐼2, and 𝐼4, by simply deducting the intensity of the 
beams which have separated off, 𝐼1, and 𝐼3. We therefore know the 
intensity of all the labelled beams, either by direct measurement or by 
deduction. 
The experimental results obtained for such an apparatus are that exactly 
half of the z-spin up particles contained in beam 2, are found to have x-spin 
down, and are detected when beam 3 is measured. More surprisingly, half 
of the x-spin up particles contained in beam 4 are measured to have z-spin 
down following the final S-G apparatus. That is, half of the particles which 
were in beam 2, having been measured to have z-spin up, now have z-spin 
down in beam 6. Seemingly something in the intervening process has 
caused half of these particles to change their z-spin value. As mentioned, 
though, we shall see that this intuitively appealing understanding is not 
ultimately viable. 
One issue which this result highlights is that quantum mechanics appears 
to be unavoidably probabilistic. As in the previous case, the intensities here 
become probabilities when the particle flow rate is slowed to allow just 1 
particle to pass through the system at a time. The probability of a particle 
from beam 2 ending up in beam 6 does not appear amenable to an 
epistemic interpretation of the kind usually attributed to probabilities. It 
seems to be an inherently unpredictable event, as particles, which have 
apparently undergone an identical process, seem then to behave in 
significantly differing ways. Though certainly surprising given the 
deterministic nature of other physical laws thought to be fundamental, this 
is not necessarily a problem. There is, after all, no obvious guarantee that 
the fundamental laws of nature must all be deterministic. 
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Now, however, we come to the truly peculiar results, the understanding of 
which has been the main goal of the philosophy of quantum physics. 
To do this a new component will be needed. This 
component is a beam recombiner. It uses magnetic 
fields to recombine beams of particles of known 
spin state into a single beam. 
Using a recombiner to merge the beams of particles separated by the SGx 
apparatus we find that the resultant beam of particles, beam 5, retain the 
spin-z properties they were measured to have prior to the SGx gate. This is 
a very strange result. We have seen that the process of measuring a 
particle’s x-spin state disrupts its z-spin value. The most obvious cause of 
this change is the magnetic field used to split these particles according to 
their x-spin state. Here though, particles which have passed through this 
field seem, nonetheless, to have retained their z-spin value. 
The obvious solution to this problem is to suppose that the magnetic fields 
used to recombine the beams have in some way reversed the effect of the 
SGx apparatus’ magnetic field. This would not be without problems as a 
solution, as it raises serious questions about how the z-spin particle state is 
recorded as the particle moves from SGx to R, given that any particle in 
beams 3 and 4 would, if measured, have a 50:50 chance of having either 
observed z-spin value, but this problem might not be insurmountable. 
Figure 5. After passing through a SGx apparatus to split the particles into 2 
beams according to x-spin value, these beams are recombined, with the 
result that no effective measurement has taken place. Surprisingly the z-spin 
value is retained in this case. 
SGz SGx SGz R 
0 1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
Figure 4. The 
schematic 
representation of a 
beam recombiner. 
R 
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In fact however, this solution is not workable. As shown in figure 6, 
inserting a particle detector to count particles in beam 4 results in a return 
to the 50:50 mix z-spin measurements seen in figure 3. This apparently 
means that a single particle, initially z-spin up in beam 1, which leaves the 
SGx gate in beam 3 with an x-spin up state, has its trajectory altered by 
another magnetic field, and is then subjected to a z-spin measurement, will 
either certainly be measured to have z-spin up, or have a 50:50 chance of 
either outcome depending on whether there is an obstruction on a path 
which this particle did not in fact take! 
This is such peculiar behaviour that a radically new conceptual framework 
is needed to account for it. In particular the usual assumptions, accepted 
until now, that particles have determinate trajectories independent of 
measurement, and that they have determinate spin properties 
independent of measurement, need careful examination. 
In fact, as noted in the previous chapter, at least one of these premises is 
now rejected by the three main modern interpretations of quantum 
mechanics. We will now return to the formalism needed to account for this 
behaviour (introduced earlier in the Dirac notation). The predictive 
reliability of this formalism is recognised by adherents of all 
interpretations, though Bohmian and modal interpretations believe it to be 
incomplete as a description of quantum processes. 
R SGz SGx SGz 
Figure 6. When a detector is inserted into beam 4, effectively measuring the x-
spin state of particles in beams 3 and 4, the z-spin property of particles in 
beam 3 is lost between beams 1 and 6/7, as in figure 4. This is difficult to 
understand given that the path of particles which pass through beam 3 is 
identical to that in figure 5, which behave very differently. 
0 
1 
4 
3 5 
7 
6 
2 
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2.1.3 The Dirac Notation 
Earlier we saw how the action of an SGx apparatus on a beam of particles is 
represented using Dirac notation. There the beam was represented as a 
superposition of z-spin state components: 
|𝜓⟩ = 𝛼|↑𝑧⟩ + 𝛽|↓𝑧⟩ 
The reader may have wondered why there were no terms referring to x-
spin states, and how measurement outcome probabilities could be 
calculated for x-spin measurements. The answer can be deduced from 
what happens when a beam of particles measured to be z-spin up is 
subjected to an x-spin measurement. There is an equal probability of 
obtaining each x-spin measurement. This is represented in Dirac notation 
by identifying z-spin states with equal superpositions of x-spin states. 
|↑𝑧⟩ =
1
√2
(|↑𝑥⟩ + |↓𝑥⟩) 
|↓𝑧⟩ =
1
√2
(|↑𝑥⟩ − |↓𝑥⟩) 
With this relationship in mind, let us 
consider the states as represented in Dirac 
notation of particles in different beams in 
figure 5. 
The beam entering our first apparatus has not been measured, so we 
attribute a general state: 
|𝜓0⟩ = 𝛼|↑𝑧⟩ + 𝛽|↓𝑧⟩ 
This will always hold true for any coherent beam, for some values of 𝛼, and 
𝛽. 
After passing through the SGz apparatus this beam is split into 1, and 2 as 
follows: 
|𝜓1⟩ = 𝛼|↑𝑧⟩ 
Figure 7. A graphical 
representation of the 
relationships between x-
spin and z-spin eigenstates. 
|↑𝑥⟩ 
|↓𝑧⟩ 
|↑𝑧⟩ 
|↓𝑥⟩ 
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|𝜓2⟩ = 𝛽|↓𝑧⟩ 
(For reasons of clarity the beam states will not be renormalized.) 
To understand the effect of the SGx gate we use the relationships between 
x-spin and z-spin states mentioned earlier: 
|𝜓1⟩ = 𝛼|↑𝑧⟩ =
𝛼
√2
(|↑𝑥⟩ + |↓𝑥⟩) 
Applying the SGx apparatus to this superposition of x-spin states yields two 
beams: 
|𝜓3⟩ =
𝛼
√2
|↑𝑥⟩ 
|𝜓4⟩ =
𝛼
√2
|↓𝑥⟩ 
These beams are then recombined to recover the former state: 
|𝜓5⟩ = |𝜓3⟩ + |𝜓4⟩ =
𝛼
√2
(|↑𝑥⟩ + |↓𝑥⟩) = 𝛼|↑𝑧⟩ 
Which of course passes straight through the final SGz apparatus without 
any state change: 
|𝜓6⟩ = |𝜓5⟩ = 𝛼|↑𝑧⟩ 
Meaning that all particles not detected in beam 2, will be detected in beam 
6. 
It should be noted that the above analysis applies as much for a single 
particle passing through this system, as for a beam. This seems to imply 
that a single particle travels simultaneously along both path 3, and path 4. 
This may seem an incredible assertion, but all interpretations of quantum 
mechanics, except for Bohmian and some modal interpretations, would 
accept it, and even these would acknowledge that there is something 
associated with the particles, which follows both paths. Moreover, we 
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should remember the truly extraordinary experimental results which led to 
formation of this view. 
To emphasise this point, now let us consider the change produced if we 
introduce a detector to path 4 as seen in figure 6. 
Just as before, the states of particles on paths 3 and 4 are: 
|𝜓3⟩ =
𝛼
√2
|↑𝑥⟩ 
|𝜓4⟩ =
𝛼
√2
|↓𝑥⟩ 
Now, though, path 4 is blocked by a detector. As a result only path 3 leads 
to the recombiner. The state of beam 5 is therefore different: 
|𝜓5⟩ = |𝜓3⟩ =
𝛼
√2
|↑𝑥⟩ 
Again, using the relations between x-spin and z-spin, this becomes: 
|𝜓5⟩ =
𝛼
√2
(
1
√2
(|↑𝑧⟩ + |↓𝑧⟩)) =
𝛼
2
(|↑𝑧⟩ + |↓𝑧⟩) 
This, of course, yields 2 beams when passed through the final SGz 
apparatus, rather than the 1 seen for the figure 5 arrangement. 
|𝜓6⟩ =
𝛼
2
|↑𝑧⟩ 
|𝜓7⟩ =
𝛼
2
|↓𝑧⟩ 
For a particle entering the figure 6 arrangement therefore the 
measurement probabilities are as follows: 
The probability of being detected in beam 2 is |𝛽|2. 
The probability of being detected in beam 4 is 
|𝛼|2
2
. 
The probability of being detected in beam 6 is 
|𝛼|2
4
. 
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The probability of being detected in beam 7 is 
|𝛼|2
4
 
Whereas for a particle entering the arrangement shown in figure 5: 
The probability of being detected in beam 2 is |𝛽|2. 
The probability of being detected in beam 6 is |𝛼|2 
It is the ability of this quantum mechanical formalism to make predictions 
in such intuitively baffling cases, and the exceptional predictive reliability of 
these predictions, which has led to a conceptually very peculiar formalism 
becoming widely accepted. 
For all its predictive accuracy, however, this formalism does little or 
nothing to resolve the conceptual puzzles presented by quantum 
mechanics. The most obvious of these in the present context is “But which 
path(s) does the particle actually follow?”. 
It might be acceptable to believe that particles can follow 2 different paths 
simultaneously, but if this were the case you would expect to see a fraction 
of a particle detected on path 4, every time a particle passes through the 
system in figure 6. In fact, however, the experimental evidence indicates 
that an entire particle will be detected on path 4 with a particular 
probability. Even if we are willing to accept that particles can be in two 
places at once, we might baulk at ‘particles can be in two places at once 
but you’ll only find them in 1 place if you look’. 
We have seen that it is only the interference between beam 3, and beam 4 
when recombined, that accounts for the preservation of z-spin state in 
figure 5. But, if a particle passing through this system must follow both 
paths, why don’t we see it on both paths when we insert detectors? On the 
other hand, if the particle only follows 1 path, but must have information 
as to whether there is a detector on the other, to determine its future 
behaviour, how is that information communicated? 
This is an example of the range of conceptual difficulties, generally referred 
to as ‘The Measurement Problem’. Before we can properly examine 
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possible solutions to these problems, we need a more complete set of the 
problems in question. To understand these problems as simply as possible, 
we will move to a more idealised Von Neumann measurement framework. 
But before we do this, we need to introduce one more concept, which has 
been obscured so far by the mechanics of the measurement system used. 
2.1.4 The Projection Postulate 
Put simply, the projection postulate says that following the measurement 
of a particle, the quantum state describing the measured property 
becomes the state guaranteed to produce the result that was observed 
(the measurement eigenstate). As a result performing the same 
measurement successively 
for a particle will produce 
the same result, as shown 
in figure 8. 
In the case of the S-G systems considered in this chapter, this is ensured by 
the way in which measurements are performed by splitting beams 
according to particular properties. In fact, though, this is a very general 
phenomenon which seems to apply for all quantum measurements. As 
such, it will be a feature of the maximally general von Neumann 
characterisation of measurement presented in the next section. 
2.1.5 Von Neumann Measurements 
Given that, as we have seen, particles seem to follow 1 path when 
measured, but behave as if they have followed both when the path they 
follow is left unmeasured, it seems as if there must be something 
important about the process of measurement, which in some way 
profoundly influences the behaviour of the particles. It therefore seems 
reasonable to examine in detail every stage of the measurement processes 
that lead us to possess evidence for this apparently inconsistent particle 
behaviour, focussing in particular on how records of behaviour are created. 
Figure 8. Successive measurements of the 
same property yield the same measured result. 
SGz SGz 
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Up until this point we have looked at measured particles, and the basic 
structure of the apparatus through which they are measured. We have not 
so far paid any attention to the process of recording measurement results. 
We have noted that the particles we have discussed end up at a receptor 
plate where they produce a detectable reaction, and presumably this 
reaction is recorded, by an experimental physicist, or a recording computer 
system or similar. But no consideration has been given to the quantum 
mechanical state of the observer, or the results record. 
Of course it is not usual to think of a macroscopic results record as having a 
quantum state, but as quantum mechanics is supposed to be a theory 
capable of adequately modelling the microscopic world (and it is extremely 
successful in this) then it should be capable of modelling the macroscopic 
world which those many microscopic systems constitute. 
To examine this process 
von Neumann came up 
with an idealised 
measurement model, for 
the connections formed 
between measured 
particle and measurement 
apparatus. Because of the 
extreme generality of this 
model, the measurement apparatus can be taken to be anything from the 
state of a small area of receptor plate, to an entire team of experimental 
physicists and supercomputers. The only assumption, made by von 
Neumann, was that the linear unitary dynamics encapsulated in 
Schrödinger’s equation obtain throughout, reasoning, as mentioned, that 
even human beings should be describable in quantum mechanical terms. 
In order for our idealised measurement apparatus to be a functional 
measurement apparatus, it must have at least as many possible states as 
A B System in state 
 |𝑠𝐴⟩ 
A B System in state 
 |𝑠𝐴⟩ 
Figure 9. A simple diagrammatic 
representation of the idealised measurement 
process which von Neumann sought to model. 
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the possible distinguishable states of the system it seeks to measure, in 
order to be able to record any possible system state. These record states 
can be defined as the set {|𝑎𝑖⟩}, each state of which will correspond to a 
state in the set of possible system states {|𝑠𝑖⟩}; finally a state is needed for 
the apparatus in which it is not recording a result, but ready to record one: 
we define this state to be |𝑎𝑟⟩. (Schlosshauer 2007, p51) 
With these states defined, we can, using von Neumann’s scheme, 
represent quantum measurements amazingly simply: 
|𝑎𝑟⟩|𝑠𝑖⟩ ⇒ |𝑎𝑖⟩|𝑠𝑖⟩ 
Or in other words, a prepared measurement apparatus coming into contact 
with a system in its ith eigenstate, will transition to the ith record state, 
thereby recording the state of the system, while the state of the system 
remains constant. 
It seems reasonable to assert that the process described here must apply 
for any measurement apparatus of any kind. A measurement apparatus 
which failed to follow this pattern would have failed to make an adequate 
record of the system state, and would in fact, therefore, not be a 
measurement apparatus at all. 
Though this may all seem obvious and trivial, it leads to far less intuitive 
conclusions when the von Neumann scheme is applied to the 
measurement of a system whose state is a superposition of the eigenstates 
measurable by the apparatus. Consider for example, a von Neumann x-spin 
measurement for a particle initially in state z-spin up. 
|↑𝑧⟩ =
1
√2
(|↑𝑥⟩ + |↓𝑥⟩) 
|𝑎𝑟⟩ (
1
√2
(|↑𝑥⟩+ |↓𝑥⟩)) ⇒
1
√2
(|𝑎↑⟩|↑𝑥⟩+ |𝑎↓⟩|↓𝑥⟩) 
This appears to show that the measurement apparatus itself enters a 
superposition state matching that of the measured particle, so that the 
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composite system of particle and apparatus ends up in a superposition of 
accurate x-spin up measurement, and accurate x-spin down measurement. 
Of course this is a deeply peculiar result, but that is not in itself a major 
problem. Quantum mechanics is intended to predict deeply peculiar 
results, such as the baffling behaviour of particles in an S-G apparatus 
discussed earlier. The problem with this analysis is far more fundamental; it 
simply appears to be wrong. When a scientist looks at the receptor in 
figure 3, they don’t see a plate in a superposition of two apparently 
contradictory measurement results (what indeed would that look like?). 
The scientist sees only 1 state of the receptor plate, which we cannot 
predict in advance. 
The situation then is this: 
• In order to account for interference phenomena we must accept a 
mathematical formalism according to which particles are 
represented as if they possessed multiple incompatible properties 
simultaneously, such as position in the S-G arrangements discussed. 
• This theoretical framework moreover proves to be the basis for a 
spectacularly successful theory of microscopic phenomena. 
• A mysterious (though predicted) feature of this formalism is that, 
while particles seem to follow multiple incompatible trajectories 
simultaneously, upon measurement they are only ever found on 
one. 
• In order to try and solve this mystery, we have examined the 
measurement process using von Neumann’s analysis, which 
assumes that quantum mechanics is capable of describing the 
macroscopic world. 
• This analysis leads to the conclusion that the macroscopic world is 
given to precisely the same baffling behaviour as the microscopic, 
and macroscopic objects routinely enter superpositions, and might 
consequently display interference phenomena! 
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Given that these behaviours are not generally observed in the macroscopic 
world, it seems that either our everyday experience, one of our most 
successful scientific theories, or this analysis must be wrong. 
Before accepting this uncomfortable choice, however, we should pin down 
just what (aside from bafflement) the problem we seek to solve is. This will 
occupy the next section. Having clearly categorised the problem, we shall 
examine the substantial contribution decoherence makes towards solving 
these problems. 
2.1.6 The Measurement Problem(s) 
The phrase “the Quantum Measurement Problem” is frequently used in 
literature relating to foundations and interpretations of quantum 
mechanics. However, authors vary significantly in what they take the 
problem to be. In fact, the Quantum Measurement Problem seems to have 
come to refer to a set of several problems relating to the quantum 
measurement process, which as we have seen proves mysterious. The 
basic common feature of these problems is that they all relate to 
difficulties “in accounting for the fact that measurements have any 
outcomes at all” (Saunders 2001). In this section I will focus on the division 
of these problems presented by Schlosshauer (Schlosshauer 2007, pp. 50). 
The component problems identified by Schlosshauer are: 
1. The Problem of the Preferred Basis 
2. The Problem of the Non-Observability of Interference 
3. The Problem of Outcomes 
To understand these problems, each will be related to the quantum 
measurements discussed earlier. I will return to discuss these problems in 
more detail at the end of the chapter. 
First let us consider (2), the non-observability of interference. This problem 
came to light in the last section, when it became apparent that quantum 
states of the kind that describe interference phenomena among 
microscopic particles are seemingly also applicable to macroscopic objects. 
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Recall the Stern-Gerlach based interference experiments already discussed. 
There we saw how destructive interference phenomena between 
combining beams of particles could lead to the number of particles in the 
resulting beam being far lower than in the incident beams. This is generally 
assumed to be a phenomenon which applies only to the microscopic. But if 
the linear Schrödinger dynamics really describe the world we live in, then 
this raises the question of why we do not observe distinctively quantum 
phenomena like interference in our day to day lives. More generally, the 
problem of the non-observability of interference is the problem of 
explaining when and why interference phenomena will, or will not be, 
displayed. 
It is actually surprisingly difficult to find an intuitively natural example of a 
macroscopic state of affairs in which interference phenomena might be 
expected. This difficulty is partly due to systems with many degrees of 
freedom making large-scale equivalents of a recombination of beams, with 
sufficient precision to allow interference, seem implausible. And partly 
because a necessary pre-condition for interference phenomena is 
superposition states, and macroscopic superposition states are themselves 
very counterintuitive. This brings us on to (3): The problem of outcomes. 
Simply put, the problem of outcomes is the problem of how we obtain the 
measurement outcomes we do, or indeed any at all, given that, if quantum 
mechanics holds for all scales, no single determinate measurement result is 
ever reached. 
Schlosshauer argues that this problem can be separated into two parts, 
which might be termed the generic and the specific. The generic is the 
question of why we perceive a definite measurement, rather than a 
peculiar superposition state, when examining the measurement apparatus. 
In other words, why is it that a scientist examining the apparatus in figure 3 
will perceive a determinate measurement rather than a superposition 
state? (This is sometimes referred to as the problem of the preferred basis, 
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but for clarity I will follow Schlosshauer 2007 and Crull 2013 in 
distinguishing this from other aspects of that problem.) 
The specific problem is why we perceive the specific result which we in fact 
perceive. That is, why does a scientist examining the apparatus in figure 3 
perceive the measurement result spin up rather than spin down? 
Finally let us consider (1) the problem of the preferred basis. The problem 
of the preferred basis, as set out by Schlosshauer (2007, pp. 53-55), is the 
question of why the measurement interaction gives rise to states in which 
the state of one particular property of the target system is preserved, while 
the state of other non-commuting variables is changed. To understand this 
problem, consider von Neumann’s ideal measuring device performing a 
measurement on the x-spin state of a particle, initially in the state 𝛼|↑𝑥⟩ +
𝛽|↓𝑥⟩: 
|𝑎𝑟⟩(𝛼 |↑𝑥⟩+ 𝛽|↓𝑥⟩) ⇒ 𝛼|𝑎𝑥↑⟩|↑𝑥⟩+ 𝛽|𝑎𝑥↓⟩|↓𝑥⟩ 
The concern is that by a simple basis transformation it is possible to obtain 
from this final state a description of the system state in a basis of non-
commuting variables, such as 𝑧 spin state: 
𝛼|𝑎𝑥↑⟩|↑𝑥⟩ + 𝛽|𝑎𝑥↓⟩|↓𝑥⟩
= 𝛼(|𝑎𝑧↑⟩|↑𝑧⟩ + |𝑎𝑧↓⟩|↓𝑧⟩) + 𝛽(|𝑎↑⟩|↑𝑧⟩ − |𝑎𝑧↓⟩|↓𝑧⟩) 
= (𝛼 + 𝛽)|𝑎𝑧↑⟩|↑𝑧⟩ + (𝛼 − 𝛽)|𝑎𝑧↓⟩|↓𝑧⟩ 
(Eigenvector transformations from Rae 2008 pp. 126) 
The measurement device therefore seems to have entered a state 
simultaneously representing both the 𝑥-spin and the 𝑧-spin states 
simultaneously. Given that these observables are non-commuting, this 
appears to violate the uncertainty principle, by which two non-commuting 
observables cannot be measured simultaneously with precision, and more 
importantly fails to correspond to observed measurements, in which the 
measurement of 𝑥 spin renders both 𝑧-spin states equi-probable. 
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These are problems which have occupied the attentions of those seeking to 
understand quantum mechanics for most of the last century. Recently 
however significant progress has been made in resolving some of these 
problems. The breakthrough which has allowed this progress is the 
realisation that decoherence has wide implications. We are now in a 
position to understand how decoherence contributes to the resolution of 
these problems, and this will be the aim of the next few sections. First, 
though, a more mathematically rigorous formulation of quantum 
mechanics is needed. 
 
2.2 Decoherence 
2.2.1 Matrix Formalism 
Matrix mechanics is essentially equivalent to the Dirac formalism used up 
to this point. It is often used by physicists because it is easier to use for 
mathematical, and particularly computational, purposes. In the matrix 
formalism, all possible states (superposition or otherwise) are represented 
as vectors of unit length. To understand how this can be done consider the 
relationships between x-spin and z-spin eigenstates introduced earlier. 
|↑𝑧⟩ =
1
√2
(|↑𝑥⟩ + |↓𝑥⟩) 
|↓𝑧⟩ =
1
√2
(|↑𝑥⟩ − |↓𝑥⟩) 
Figure 10 shows the relations between 
the x-spin and z-spin eigenstates, and 
another arbitrary state |𝜓⟩. 
Represented like this, it is easy to see 
that |𝜓⟩ can be represented as a 
combination of the vectors assigned to either set of eigenstates: 
|𝜓⟩ = 𝑎|↑𝑥⟩ + 𝑏|↓𝑥⟩ 
Figure 10. A graphical 
representation of state quantum 
states as vectors of unit length. 
|↑𝑥⟩ 
|↓𝑧⟩ 
|↑𝑧⟩ 
|↓𝑥⟩ 
|𝜓⟩ 
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|𝜓⟩ = 𝑐|↑𝑧⟩ + 𝑑|↓𝑧⟩ 
Once these relations have been established, it is easy to see how |𝜓⟩ can be 
represented as a vector in terms of an eigenstate basis. So that in the x-
spin basis: 
|𝜓⟩ = 𝑎|↑𝑥⟩ + 𝑏|↓𝑥⟩ = (
𝑎
𝑏
)
𝑥
 
And in the z-spin basis: 
|𝜓⟩ = 𝑐|↑𝑧⟩ + 𝑑|↓𝑧⟩ = (
𝑐
𝑑
)
𝑧
 
Note that these 2 vectors express precisely the same state, just in terms of 
different bases. 
The reader may have noticed that the 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑 can be either positive or 
negative. In fact, for reasons that will now be explained, these numbers can 
also be complex (include imaginary components). That this is necessary 
becomes clear if it is considered that there is a third direction in which a 
particle’s spin can be measured. The relation of these spin eigenstates to x-
spin and z-spin eigenstates is exactly like that which x-spin and z-spin 
eigenstates bear to one another. This cannot be represented on the circle 
of real unit vectors in figure 10, as it requires the incorporation of complex 
numbers. 
|↑𝑦⟩ =
1
√2
(|↑𝑧⟩ + 𝑖|↓𝑧⟩) 
|↓𝑦⟩ =
1
√2
(|↑𝑧⟩ − 𝑖|↓𝑧⟩) 
The eigenvectors of the states discussed so far, expressed in the z-spin 
basis, are: 
|↑𝑥⟩ =
1
√2
(
1
1
)
𝑧
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|↓𝑥⟩ =
1
√2
(
1
−1
)
𝑧
 
|↑𝑦⟩ =
1
√2
(
1
𝑖
)
𝑧
 
|↓𝑦⟩ =
1
√2
(
1
−𝑖
)
𝑧
 
|↑𝑧⟩ = (
1
0
)
𝑧
 
|↓𝑧⟩ = (
0
1
)
𝑧
 
2.2.2 Density Matrices 
Density matrices are an extension of the usual vector state formalism, 
which is capable of capturing the probabilities of different measurement 
outcomes for a mixed state, that is, the state of a system in which the state 
vector itself is not known with certainty. This is important, as it is often 
practically difficult to ensure a pure beam of particles with the desired 
state vector, and no other. To understand how a density matrix does this, 
we will first examine a density matrix for a pure state, and then look at 
how this is expanded to deal with the case of mixed states. 
For a system with 2 degrees of freedom, such as a particle’s spin, with a 
state vector 
|𝜓⟩ = (
𝑎
𝑏
) 
the density matrix is: 
𝜌 = |𝜓⟩⟨𝜓| = (
𝑎
𝑏
) (𝑎∗ 𝑏∗) = (
|𝑎|2 𝑎𝑏∗
𝑎∗𝑏 |𝑏|2
) 
The first thing to notice about this matrix is that the diagonal elements, 
|𝑎|2, and |𝑏|2, are equal to the probabilities, as specified by the Born rule, 
of each of the measurement outcomes which define the basis. The other 
two, so called off-diagonal elements, carry the information relevant for 
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interference effects, in which as we have seen probabilities of combined 
beams are not simply added together. These will prove very important to 
the theoretical understanding of decoherence. 
If there is epistemic uncertainty as to the state vector of the system (e.g. 
because the state preparation apparatus is unreliable), such as between 
the state vectors |𝜓1⟩ = (
𝑎
𝑏
) or |𝜓2⟩ = (
𝐴
𝐵
), the general definition of a 
density matrix is: 
𝜌 =∑𝑝𝑖|𝜓𝑖⟩⟨𝜓𝑖|
𝑖
= 𝑝1|𝜓1⟩⟨𝜓1| + 𝑝2|𝜓2⟩⟨𝜓2|
= (
𝑝1|𝑎|
2 + 𝑝2|𝐴|
2 𝑝1𝑎𝑏
∗ + 𝑝2𝐴𝐵
∗
𝑝1𝑎
∗𝑏 + 𝑝2𝐴
∗𝐵 𝑝1|𝑏|
2 + 𝑝2|𝐵|
2) 
It should be noted that, considering the Born rule, the diagonal elements of 
this matrix remain equal to the probability of particular measurement 
outcomes. 
To understand decoherence we will need to introduce reduced density 
matrices, which can be used to predict measurement outcomes for a 
particular subsystem of a quantum system. We will see that these matrices 
seem in some cases to resemble classical behaviour. This may represent 
substantial progress in understanding how it is possible to model the 
macroscopic world quantum mechanically, and thereby resolve some of 
the measurement problems listed above. Before we do this, however, we 
will examine the effects of off-diagonal matrix elements more closely, in 
the case of classical and quantum uncertainties. 
2.2.3 Off-Diagonal Density Matrix Elements 
Nonzero off-diagonal elements occur within density matrices when one or 
more of the constituent (single state vector) density matrices has more 
than one nonzero element. Consider for example a two-state system of x-
direction spin states: 
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If there is a purely classical uncertainty as to which of two basis 
states the system occupies, the density matrix will be, 
𝜌 =∑𝑝𝑖|𝜓𝑖⟩⟨𝜓𝑖|
𝑖
= 𝑝𝑥↑|𝜓𝑥↑⟩⟨𝜓𝑥↑| + 𝑝𝑥↓|𝜓𝑥↓⟩⟨𝜓𝑥↓| = (
𝑝𝑥↑ 0
0 𝑝𝑥↓
) 
Whereas, in the case of a pure state vector corresponding to a 
superposition of the two states, it will be, 
𝜌 =∑𝑝𝑖|𝜓𝑖⟩⟨𝜓𝑖|
𝑖
= |𝜓𝑥⟩⟨𝜓𝑥| = (
𝛼
𝛽) (𝛼
∗ 𝛽∗) = (
|𝛼|2 𝛼𝛽∗
𝛼∗𝛽 |𝛽|2
) 
In both density matrices the diagonal elements of the matrix will 
correspond to measurement probabilities if the state of the system is 
measured. However, the off-diagonal elements in the second matrix may 
produce different results when linear operations are performed on the 
system. These linear operations are typically used in quantum mechanics 
to model the effects of a physical process acting on the system. A simple 
example would be the effect of passing a particle through an S-G apparatus 
as seen previously. 
Suppose an operation is performed on the system whose effect when 
applied to the basis states is to produce uneven superpositions, for 
example: 
(
1
0
) ⇒
1
2
(√3
1
) 
And, 
(
0
1
) ⇒
1
2
(
−1
√3
) 
Which can be achieved with the matrix operator, 
1
2
(√3 −1
1 √3
) 
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The effect of the unitary operator on the density matrix can be calculated 
as, 
𝜌′ = 𝑈𝜌𝑈† 
Applying this operator to the mixed density matrix yields, 
𝜌′ =
1
4
(√3 −1
1 √3
) (
𝑝𝑥↑ 0
0 𝑝𝑥↓
) (√3 1
−1 √3
) 
=
1
4
(
3𝑝𝑥↑ + 𝑝𝑥↓ √3(𝑝𝑥↑ − 𝑝𝑥↓)
√3(𝑝𝑥↓ − 𝑝𝑥↑) 3𝑝𝑥↓ + 𝑝𝑥↑
) 
The diagonal elements of this matrix show that a diagonalised initial 
density matrix will always yield a state in which the observation 
probabilities produced arise as a linear weighted addition of the 
probabilities for each pure state. 
For the pure density matrix describing a superposition, however, 
𝜌′ =
1
4
(√3 −1
1 √3
) (
|𝛼|2 𝛼𝛽∗
𝛼∗𝛽 |𝛽|2
) (√3 1
−1 √3
) 
=
1
4
(
3|𝛼|2 + |𝛽|2 − √3(𝛼∗𝛽 + 𝛼𝛽∗) √3(|𝛼|2 + |𝛽|2) − 𝛼∗𝛽 + 3𝛼𝛽∗
√3(|𝛼|2 + |𝛽|2) + 3𝛼∗𝛽 − 𝛼𝛽∗ 3|𝛽|2 + |𝛼|2 + √3(𝛼∗𝛽 + 𝛼𝛽∗)
) 
Now, in addition to the weighted addition of |𝛼|2, and |𝛽|2, there is an 
additional term in the diagonal elements (highlighted). This additional term 
can be either positive or negative depending on the relative phases of 𝛼, 
and 𝛽 (but will always be real) and depending on its value, will shift the 
probabilities probability between the possible spin values. These 
interference effects are a major feature that distinguishes quantum 
mechanical uncertainties from classical probabilities, and will not occur if 
the off-diagonal elements of the initial density matrix are zero. 
Note that the structure of the density matrix is basis-dependent. So, if we 
changed our basis states from |𝜓𝑥↑⟩, and |𝜓𝑥↓⟩, to |𝜓𝑧↑⟩, and |𝜓𝑧↓⟩, the 
mixed state considered above would no longer be described by a 
diagonalised matrix. That is, if the operation on the system first considered 
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were modelled in the z-spin basis, the starting density matrix would not be 
diagonalised and the resulting matrix would show interference effects in 
the diagonal elements. 
2.2.4 Reduced Density Matrices 
Consider 2 spin-half particles described by state vectors: 
|𝜓1⟩ = (
𝑎
𝑏
) 
|𝜓2⟩ = (
𝐴
𝐵
) 
These 2 systems themselves constitute a larger quantum system: 
|Ψ⟩ = |𝜓1⟩⨂|𝜓2⟩ = (
𝑎𝐴
𝑎𝐵
𝑏𝐴
𝑏𝐵
) 
If, however, these 2 particles do not have their own independent states, 
but are entangled so that they are in a superposition of e.g. both being 
spin-up and both being spin-down, the vector state of the composite 
system will have non-zero elements only for the 1st and 4th, e.g.: 
|Ψ⟩ =
1
5
(
3
0
0
4
) 
This state cannot be produced by any pair of independent particle states. 
There is no longer a state vector capable of describing either of the 
particles individually, but only a vector capable of describing the entangled 
pair. 
This would seem to rule out the possibility of there being any density 
matrix capable of describing particle 1 individually. After all, the definition 
given of a density matrix is given in terms of the system’s possible state 
vectors, and no possible vector for the particle is consistent with the state 
of the total system. Strictly speaking it does indeed rule out any such 
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matrix, but as we shall see something called a reduced density matrix has 
been developed specifically to try and capture many of the valuable 
features of a density matrix for this sort of quantum subsystem. 
Consider the density matrix for the composite system |Ψ⟩ 
𝜌Ψ = |Ψ⟩⟨Ψ| =
1
25
(
9 0
0 0
0 12
0 0
0 0
12 0
0 0
0 16
) 
It is of course impossible to say what the state vector of any subsystem 
should be. On the other hand it is possible to make predictions about the 
outcomes of measurements. Looking at the matrix diagonal shows us for 
instance, that for particle 2 the Born rule probability of measuring the 
particle to be spin-up is 0.36, and the probability of measuring it to be spin 
down is 0.64. It therefore seems as if it should indeed be possible to 
provide density matrices for component subsystems. After all, for each 
known state of particle 2 there is a corresponding well-defined state vector 
for particle 1. 
The density matrix of particle 1 should therefore have the diagonal 
elements: 
𝜌ψ1 = (
0.36  
 0.64
) 
This, however, is not really any help without the other elements. If we wish 
to know anything about the behaviour of the subsystem under subsequent 
operations, the off-diagonal elements are essential. The crucial clue to 
being able to fill in the elements is the fact that quantum systems perfectly 
entangled to an external system will not display interference phenomena. 
The absence of these phenomena has been established, both empirically 
and by examining the density matrix for the total system. To see this, 
consider the generic form of the operations discussed earlier: 
(
1
0
) ⇒ (
𝛼
𝛽) 
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And, 
(
0
1
) ⇒ (
𝛽
𝛼
) 
With associated matrix operator: 
𝑈 = (
𝛼 𝛽∗
𝛽 𝛼
) 
Suppose this operator is to act only on particle 1. It should then be possible 
to find the appropriate off-diagonal elements for the reduced density 
matrix, by looking at the difference between the weighted sum of probable 
outcomes (as in the case where the eigenstate is determinate but 
unknown), and the outcome probabilities actually obtained. 
We shall move to consider the generic state vector for these two entangled 
systems: 
|Ψ⟩ = (
𝐴
0
0
𝐵
) 
Which specifies only that the particles are entangled such that they will be 
found on measurement to be both spin up, or to be both spin down. The 
associated density matrix will be: 
𝜌Ψ = (
|𝐴|2 0
0 0
0 𝐴𝐵∗
0 0
0 0
𝐴∗𝐵 0
0 0
0 |𝐵|2
) 
The matrix operator 𝑈 in this basis will become: 
𝑈′ = (
𝛼 0
0 𝛼
𝛽∗ 0
0 𝛽∗
𝛽 0
0 𝛽
𝛼 0
0 𝛼
) 
Using this, we can accurately find the predicted probabilities of each state 
of particle 1 following this operation. This relies on nothing beyond the 
standard formalism of quantum mechanics employed so far. 
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If no interference effects are displayed, the resulting probabilities for the 
state of particle 1 will be: 
𝑃(↑) = 𝑃(↑ | ↑0)𝑃(↑0) + 𝑃(↑ | ↓0)𝑃(↓0) = |𝛼|
2|𝐴|2 + |𝛽|2|𝐵|2 
𝑃(↓) = 𝑃(↓ | ↑0)𝑃(↑0) + 𝑃(↓ | ↓0)𝑃(↓0) = |𝛼|
2|𝐵|2 + |𝛽|2|𝐴|2 
We have then only to obtain the result in the quantum mechanical case 
and compare the results to establish the degree to which interference 
phenomena are displayed. 
𝜌Ψ final = 𝑈
′𝜌Ψ𝑈
′∗ 
𝜌Ψ final = (
𝛼 0
0 𝛼
𝛽∗ 0
0 𝛽∗
𝛽 0
0 𝛽
𝛼 0
0 𝛼
)(
|𝐴|2 0
0 0
0 𝐴𝐵∗
0 0
0 0
𝐴∗𝐵 0
0 0
0 |𝐵|2
)(
𝛼∗ 0
0 𝛼∗
𝛽 0
0 𝛽
𝛽∗ 0
0 𝛽∗
𝛼∗ 0
0 𝛼∗
) 
𝜌Ψ final =
(
 
 
|𝛼𝐴|2 𝛼𝛽∗𝐴𝐵∗
𝛼𝛽∗𝐴∗𝐵 |𝛽𝐵|2
𝛼𝛽∗|𝐴|2 |𝛼|2𝐴𝐵∗
|𝛽|2𝐴∗𝐵 𝛼∗𝛽|𝐵|2
𝛼∗𝛽|𝐴|2 |𝛽|2𝐴𝐵∗
|𝛼|2𝐴∗𝐵 𝛼𝛽∗|𝐵|2
|𝛽𝐴|2 𝛼∗𝛽𝐴𝐵∗
𝛼𝛽∗𝐴∗𝐵 |𝛼𝐵|2 )
 
 
 
Looking to the central diagonal, we see that for particle 1 the 
measurement probabilities have become: 
𝑃(↑) = |𝛼𝐴|2 + |𝛽𝐵|2 
𝑃(↓) = |𝛽𝐴|2 + |𝛼𝐵|2 
These are exactly the results expected in the absence of interference, and 
show that for operations performed on a quantum system that is perfectly 
entangled to an external system, no interference effects will be displayed. 
These results will be obtained from the reduced density matrix only if the 
off-diagonal elements are taken as zero. 
This phenomenon, that quantum systems entangled to an external system 
display diminished interference effects to an extent which is (in fact) 
proportional to their degree of entanglement, is what is known as 
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decoherence. This result has been confirmed both in theory and in 
experiment. The reduced density matrix formalism captures this by 
introducing a ⟨𝐸𝑖|𝐸𝑗⟩ term in the off-diagonal elements, where the set 
{|𝐸𝑖⟩} represent the states of the external system that would be brought 
about by particular target system states. If these have a high degree of 
overlap, the systems are weakly entangled and interference phenomena 
will be largely unaffected. If they have little or no overlap, the systems are 
highly entangled, and interference will be heavily damped. 
The reduced density matrix captures these behaviours and gives a great 
deal of useful information about entangled quantum systems. Its great 
virtue is the huge saving of computational power made by using this, 
rather than the – often very large – density matrix associated with the full 
set of entangled systems. It can be obtained from the total density matrix 
and is formally defined as: 3 
𝜌𝑥 = 𝑇𝑟𝑦(𝜌𝑥𝑦) 
There are, however, two issues which should be noted. First, the reduced 
density matrix relies on the assumption that operations are performed only 
on the subsystem to which it corresponds, and have no dependence on the 
other entangled system. If this is untrue, the reduced density matrix will 
not give reliable predictions. It is quite possible, for instance, that, although 
a system is perfectly entangled to another system, it will still display 
interference phenomena if an operator acts on both systems. 
Second, although it is easy to see why the reduced density matrix proves 
practically useful, its connection to the linear quantum formalism is a 
subject of controversy (see Zeh 2003 pp. 35-37). Some work has been done 
on the subject of how the use of the reduced density matrix can be 
grounded in the formalism (e.g. d’Espagnat 1976, pp. 56-71), but these 
                                                          
3 The role of partial trace here, is essentially to average over Born rule weighted states of 
the environment to give a density matrix which gives the best measurement predictions 
possible in a description of just the local sub-system of interest. See Zeh pp. 35 for details. 
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accounts are sometimes hard to reconcile with specific interpretational 
frameworks. 
One possible derivation of its use, mentioned by Zeh (2003), is to apply the 
Born rule to the total state vector, to obtain probabilities for possible 
eigenstates of the environmental system. As each eigenstate of the 
environment is associated with a well-defined state vector of the target 
system, this would seemingly provide a set of possible density matrices for 
the target system, and their associated probabilities. From this set it would 
then be easy to produce a density matrix for the target system as set out in 
section 2.2.3, using the Born rule probability of the environment to weight 
the component density matrices. 
Zeh acknowledges, however, that this application of the Born rule is 
completely unjustified in the absence of some further interpretation. The 
Born rule in textbook quantum mechanics is only a reliable guide to the 
probabilities of particular measurement outcomes, and here we do not 
assume that any measurement is taking place. Whether and how the Born 
rule can be used to derive reduced density matrices from linear quantum 
mechanics will depend on how the Born rule is understood, and so will be 
interpretation-dependent. 
Zeh makes no real attempt to derive the reduced density matrix, and 
confines himself to a discussion of the resulting theory if it is accepted. 
Schlosshauer does not offer any kind of derivation either, but offers a proof 
that the diagonal elements of a reduced density matrix correspond to 
accurate probabilities of particular measurement results, assuming the 
Born rule (Schlosshauer 2007 pp. 45-46). This does not extend, however, to 
the off-diagonal elements which, as we have seen, are crucial to a 
theoretical understanding of decoherence. Schlosshauer also cites the 
envariance scheme proposed by Zurek 2005, which will be discussed in 
chapter 4. For now, though, we shall push on to examine some of the uses 
to which this framework is put by Schlosshauer amongst others. As I shall 
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discuss, if this conception of decoherence is accepted, a large part of the 
quantum measurement problem, as set out, is apparently resolved. 
2.2.5 Decoherence 
We have seen, then, that the entanglement of a quantum system to 
external systems suppresses interference effects for the target system, and 
this is termed decoherence. Of course, for quantum systems to become 
entangled with their environment is very common, and essential in the 
measurement process. Decoherence is therefore extremely common, and 
appears to have a particular relevance in the case of measurement. Recent 
years have seen efforts to understand and test the effects of decoherence 
(e.g. Joos et al. 2003; Zeh 1970; Zurek 1991; 2005; 2014; Yoon-Ho et al. 
2000), as well as several interpretations of quantum mechanics in which 
decoherence plays a very prominent role, as noted in the previous chapter. 
The effect of decoherence, for a system interacting with an idealised, 
initially unentangled environment, is to cause the off-diagonal elements of 
the density matrix to tend to zero as 𝑒−Λ𝑡 where 𝑡 is the time for which the 
system has been in contact with the environment, and Λ is a constant 
(Adler 2002 pp. 8). The rate and degree of entanglement is in most cases 
extremely fast, and Joos & Zeh (1985) argued that it would be orders of 
magnitude faster than the time taken for a measurement to be performed. 
This means that, after a significant period of contact with the environment, 
the density matrix describing the system in a quantum superposition state 
will closely approximate a density matrix that would correspond to a state 
of purely classical uncertainty as to the state of the system. In the limit in 
which off-diagonal elements reach zero, the system will develop under 
locally applied immediate operations completely without interference 
effects, and behave mathematically and empirically as if there were a 
purely classical uncertainty as to which of the possible states actually 
obtained. 
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It is important to note, however, that though the off-diagonal elements 
tend to zero, they never actually reach it. Concerns have been raised, 
therefore, that, as decoherence never actually recovers classicality, it 
cannot solve the measurement problem. Together with the difficulties of 
establishing the physical significance of reduced density matrices, it 
becomes clear that, while this reasoning accounts for the disappearance of 
distinctively quantum phenomena in practice, and to a large extent, in 
some sense it doesn’t really recover the classical world of everyday 
experience. The for all practical purposes nature of this interference 
suppression will be discussed further in chapter 4. 
For now, though, we shall look at the contribution that this theoretical 
notion of decoherence apparently makes to the resolution of the quantum 
measurement problem(s). 
2.2.6 How Does Decoherence Contribute to Resolving Problems of 
Quantum Measurement? 
Earlier in this chapter, I introduced 3 aspects of the quantum measurement 
problem distinguished by Schlosshauer 2007. Schlosshauer goes on to argue that 
the RDM conception of decoherence just developed is of direct relevance to 
resolving these problems. I will now discuss these problems and the 
interpretations to which they are relevant in more detail, and explain how 
Schlosshauer uses RDM decoherence to resolve (most of) the problems. 
2.2.6.1 The Problem of the Non-Observability of Interference 
Interference phenomena lie at the very heart of quantum mechanics. The 
behaviour of a particle passing through an interference experiment (e.g. a 
double slit apparatus) cannot be accurately predicted if it is assumed to 
always have a determinate position, without the addition of a Bohmian 
quantum potential or an equivalent. The occurrence of these phenomena 
is precisely what led to the development of quantum theory and the 
suspension of so many classical intuitions. 
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A key aspect of the measurement problem, however, is not the frequent 
occurrence of interference phenomena, but just how rarely they are 
actually observed. If quantum mechanics is supposed to be a fundamental 
theory, describing the behaviour of fundamental particles that make up our 
world, why are these quantum dynamics observed only by skilled scientists 
under very carefully prepared conditions? If Schrödinger's cat can really be 
described as a quantum mechanical object, then why isn't it possible to use 
cats in interference experiments rather than particles? 
For realist interpretations of quantum mechanics that do not invoke 
wavefunction collapse, the answer to these questions (as set out by 
Schlosshauer) is decoherence. A quantum system, whose state becomes 
encoded within its environment by some variable, will after that point 
behave, under operations affecting only that system, in a way that is 
empirically and mathematically indistinguishable from a system in an 
unknown but determinate eigenstate of that variable (i.e. it will not display 
interference phenomena). Thus, one reason that it would be impossible to 
perform an interference experiment on Schrödinger's cat is because the 
live cat and dead cat states entail different positions for parts of the cat, 
and these positions will extremely rapidly become encoded within the cat's 
environment. Interference experiments performed on the cat’s mortality 
state will therefore fail to display any distinctively quantum interference 
phenomena. This should not be confused with wavefunction collapse. 
Decoherence of the cat’s mortality state does not mean that the cat is in a 
determinate state, and an interference experiment would still in principle 
be possible if it could be performed, not only on the cat, but on all features 
of the environment to which the cat has become entangled. 
To take a more practical example, decoherence is probably the largest 
difficulty facing the developing field of quantum computation. The problem 
is that, in order to produce a quantum computer, you need to be able to 
produce particular quantum states that can be easily operated on, and that 
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display interference phenomena. This requires that the quantum bits4 
encoding your state should not decohere with respect to the environment. 
It is extremely difficult to keep such states from decohering for any length 
of time. 
If a quantum bit (e.g. the spin state of a spin half particle) becomes 
entangled to its environment by a particular degree of freedom (e.g. its z-
spin state) then the RDM characteristics just shown ensure that the particle 
will not display interference phenomena in its Z spin state under 
operations performed on it. Or mathematically: 
⟨↓𝑧 |?̂?| ↑𝑧⟩ = ⟨↑𝑧 |?̂?| ↓𝑧⟩ = 0 
This result is obtained by assuming linear unitary evolution of the 
Schrödinger equation without any form of collapse dynamics. The result 
therefore certainly holds for those interpretations which take a realist view 
of these dynamics. These include Everettian approaches, which take the 
wavefunction as the primary component in their ontology, and de Broglie-
Bohm approaches, which include particles within their primary ontology 
but also reserve a fundamental role for the wavefunction, either as an 
object in its own right or as a law or disposition relating to particle 
dynamics. 
This means that environment-induced decoherence (as captured by 
reduced density matrices) offers a clear solution to the problem of the non-
observability of interference for these interpretations, seemingly without 
invoking any form of collapse postulate. 
It is unclear whether the result is important to approaches which invoke 
collapse, such as GRW approaches. These approaches interrupt the linear 
Schrödinger dynamics with wavefunction collapses of one kind or another. 
                                                          
4 Quantum bits (known as Q-bits) are similar to bits as used in classical computing. 
However, whereas a classical bit occupies either state 1 or state 0, a Qbit may occupy a 
superposition state 𝛼|0⟩ + 𝛽|1⟩. This allows quantum computers to make use of 
interference phenomena in their processing. For more information see Rae 2008 chapter 
12. 
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Whether or not the wavefunction would continue to develop linearly for 
periods longer than the timescales required for effective decoherence 
remains unclear and will depend on particular details of collapse dynamics 
within specific approaches (see Bub 1997 and Zurek 1993). GRW 
approaches consequently rely the least on decoherence and will not be 
discussed further in this chapter. 
2.2.6.2 The Problem of the Preferred Basis 
To explain the problem of the preferred basis and the role of decoherence 
in resolving it, I will present a variant on a Wigner’s friend thought 
experiment, in which two non-commuting variables appear to be measured 
simultaneously. This closely resembles a similar thought experiment by 
(Vaidman, 1998). 
Consider a physics lab in an impermeable box. Within the physics lab, Bob 
is performing an x-spin measurement on a spin half particle initially in a 
superposition state, using a Stern-Gerlach apparatus. The state of the lab 
immediately before measurement can be represented as: 
(𝛼|0𝑥⟩𝑆𝑝𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒 + 𝛽|1𝑥⟩𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑛 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒) |"𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦"⟩𝐵𝑜𝑏|𝑡 = 0⟩𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 
Where the environment is taken to include all degrees of freedom within 
the lab, which are not degrees of freedom of the particle spin state or of 
Bob. (Hereafter, the ket descriptions will be abbreviated to a single letter.) 
When the measurement takes place the state of the lab evolves as follows: 
(𝛼|0𝑥⟩𝑆 + 𝛽|1𝑥⟩𝑆) |"𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦"⟩𝐵|𝑡 = 0⟩𝐸
→ 𝛼|0𝑥⟩𝑆 |0𝑥⟩𝐵|𝑡 = 10𝑥⟩𝐸 + 𝛽
|1𝑥⟩𝑆 |1𝑥⟩𝐵|𝑡 = 11𝑥⟩𝐸 
Thus the states of both Bob, and the environment become entangled with 
the x-spin state of the particle. From this point on, operations performed 
on the particle’s x-spin state will not display interference phenomena. It 
will also be impossible for Bob to perform any operation on the particle or 
the environment within the lab capable of recovering the original particle 
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state. If Bob were to make further measurements of the spin state of the 
particle, they would display the statistics expected if the particle were 
beginning in a determinate x-spin state. 
Next, consider the lab supervisor Alice, who is standing outside the 
impermeable box containing the lab. Alice knows the procedure which Bob 
is following within the box, having agreed it with him in advance, and can 
easily establish the quantum state of the lab written above. Now though, 
she is able (in principle at least) to achieve a measurement of the z-spin 
state of the original particle spin state. As shown by Schlosshauer (2007, 
pp. 54), a simple basis transformation of the state of the lab provides a 
description in terms of the z-spin state of the original target particle. 
To see this, we will combine the states of Bob and the rest of the lab 
environment. (Reasons for doing this will be discussed shortly.) 
|0𝑥⟩𝐵|𝑡 = 10𝑥⟩𝐸 = |𝑡 = 10𝑥⟩𝐿𝑎𝑏 
|1𝑥⟩𝐵|𝑡 = 11𝑥⟩𝐸 = |𝑡 = 11𝑥⟩𝐿𝑎𝑏 
𝛼|0𝑥⟩𝑆 |𝑡 = 10𝑥⟩𝐿
+ 𝛽|1𝑥⟩𝑆 |𝑡 = 11𝑥⟩𝐿
=
1
√2
(𝛼 + 𝛽)|0𝑧⟩𝑆 |𝑡 = 10𝑧⟩𝐿 +
1
√2
(𝛼 − 𝛽)|1𝑧⟩𝑆 |𝑡 = 11𝑧⟩𝐿 
(Eigenvector transformations from Rae 2008, pp. 126.) 
Thus, by cleverly constructing an appropriate measurement, it is possible 
for Alice to effectively make a z-spin measurement on the original particle 
spin state. 
It seems therefore that Alice and Bob have between them measured two 
non-commuting variables of the original state. This may appear to be a 
violation of the uncertainty principle. However, the viability of the 
uncertainty principle is maintained because, in the course of making a 
measurement, Alice has entangled the state of the contents of the lab to 
its environment by a set of degrees of freedom which do not commute 
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with those of Bob's original measurement. Alice has not measured the 
state of Bob in a way that could possibly reveal the x-spin measurement 
result. Thus, Alice is not able to recover the results of both non-commuting 
measurements. 
The issue raised by this result, however, is the following. Given that the 
state of the lab after Bob made his measurement encoded the state of the 
original particle in full without any loss of information, such that it is 
possible to recover a non-commuting measurement result from the state, 
in what sense was the original measurement a measurement of the x-spin 
state rather than the z-spin state? 
Some interpretations may offer means to resolve this question without 
further reference to decoherence. For example, on a Bohmian account this 
process might be said to constitute an x-spin measurement, simply because 
for a period of time there is a counterfactual dependency between the 
positions of many particles in the lab, including those that make up Bob, 
and the position state of the measured particle passing through the Stern-
Gerlach apparatus. The Bohmian presupposition of position, as a privileged 
variable, provides a possible rationale for characterising this measurement 
as a measurement of a particular spin basis. 
Everettian interpretations, however, do not make any such presupposition 
of a privileged basis. The degrees of freedom of the lab state which encode 
the z-spin particle state are not position variables, or any classically 
recognisable variables. But this does not entitle us to disregard this 
encoding unless we presuppose the privileging of some quasi-classical 
basis. The Everettian, therefore, needs some other account of what it 
means to measure a particular variable. This is particularly important in 
establishing a conception of branching for Everettian many worlds 
approaches. The Everettian must give some account of whether branching 
occurs within the lab when Bob makes his spin measurement, and, if so, in 
which basis branching occurs. In this case, whether branching follows the 
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particle’s x-spin, or z-spin state, and most importantly why it follows one of 
these states rather than the other. 
The Everettian solution to this problem rests on an appeal to decoherence. 
There is a crucial difference between the Lab partitioned into histories 
based on the target particle’s x-spin state, and a partition based on the z-
spin state. The difference is that while the Lab state in its entirety can be 
represented in a very similar way in both bases, the same is not true at all 
for Bob. (This is why it was necessary to combine Bob’s state with that of 
the wider lab when making this basis transformation.) 
In the x-basis, the particle position state following the measurement differs 
in the two histories corresponding to the two measurement outcomes. As 
this state becomes entangled to its environment, many other positions 
come to differ between the two histories. Both of these histories contain a 
version of Bob with different position states. Bob is entangled to his 
environment by these positions, and so Bob considered as a subsystem is 
decohered, and will not display interference phenomena under operations 
affecting only Bob. 
If instead we consider histories distinguished by the z-spin particle state, 
the set of degrees of freedom of the environment which encode this result 
will not be position but a set of radically nonclassical degrees of freedom. 
These degrees of freedom relate to the lab state as a whole, and cannot 
easily be divided up in such a way as to pick out a quasi-classical pattern 
identifiable as Bob. Each history taken individually, if considered in a 
position basis, would show Bob in a superposition of very different position 
states, and would very likely display interference phenomena between the 
two histories. The very great difference in the characteristics of these 2 
pairs of histories, as they relate to Bob as a sub-system, stems from the 
original construction of the experiment. If the experiment had instead 
been constructed so as to entangle the particle’s z-spin state to its position 
state, and then to allow that position state to decohere, then the 
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characteristics of the 2 pairs of histories would be reversed. Histories 
separated according to the particle’s z-spin would be the ones to contain a 
well localised position state for Bob displaying little interference. 
The response offered by Schlosshauer to this problem is simply to identify 
a preferred basis of branching histories with the diagonalization of the 
reduced density matrix of quasi classical objects such as Bob. For any quasi-
classical object within the lab,5 there is a very broad entanglement of 
position states, which will mean that, in the pair of histories originating 
from the particle x-spin state discussed, the object is decohered with 
respect to its environment, and does not display interference phenomena. 
Thus, a clear and reasonably mathematically rigorous criterion is given for 
identifying quasi classical histories from within a wavefunction, and 
establishing the point at which they come to branch off from one another. 
Namely, that branching in the history of a system occurs when the system’s 
state becomes entangled to its environment in a basis in which the 
preceding history of the system would be described as a superposition. 
Before moving on, I will identify two significant concerns relating to this 
solution of the problem of the preferred basis. The first, which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapters 4 and 5, is that this criterion is only 
able to pick out classical-like histories if the object taken as the subsystem 
of interest is quasi-classical to begin with. If, instead, some arbitrary 
selection of degrees of freedom of the lab were taken to be the subsystem 
of interest, there would still be a basis in which the reduced density matrix 
of the system was diagonalised, but the basis would be very unlikely to be 
classically recognisable. There has been a great deal of discussion within 
the Everettian literature of whether, and to what extent, this should be 
                                                          
5 This holds providing that the quasi-classical object considered has a small number of 
degrees of freedom compared to its environment (in this case the rest of the lab). If this 
condition fails to obtain, then effective decoherence becomes impossible, as there is 
insufficient environment to encode the state of the system in question. In realistic cases, 
this condition will always obtain for medium-sized dry goods, as the environment will not 
be limited to a single laboratory. 
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considered an objection to the application of decoherence to the problem 
of the preferred basis (e.g. Thébault & Dawid 2015, Kastner 2014, Zurek 
2005). For now, though, it is simply important to note that decoherence is 
able to provide a rationale for identifying a preferred quasi-classical basis, 
only if we begin with a quasi-classical system of interest. 
The second issue is how to make sense of the fact that after Bob makes a 
measurement of the particle’s x-spin leading to decoherence of the 
particle’s spin state in the x-spin basis, and producing two histories which 
can reasonably be identified as distinct, it is then possible for Alice to 
perform a measurement on the lab which reveals the particle’s z-spin state, 
and in the process makes the x-spin state inaccessible. This issue is 
fundamentally conceptual. Firstly, because systems on the scale of 
laboratories cannot practically be maintained in isolation from the rest of 
the environment as has been supposed here. Even if they could, the 
operations that would have to be performed on the lab in order to recover 
the z-spin state would face extreme technical difficulties. And secondly, 
because if linear Schrödinger dynamics are assumed to apply throughout, 
there is no doubt as to characteristics of the physical evolution of the 
system as described by the wavefunction. The question is rather how we 
can make sense of a process of decoherence producing two distinct 
histories which are then recombined, thereby rendering records of the 
original measurement inaccessible. 
This second problem will apply to any interpretation of quantum 
mechanics which does not endorse wavefunction collapse, and therefore 
allows for the possibility of histories recombining in this kind of process. 
Bohmian interpretations may be able to make sense of what it is to make a 
measurement without appealing to decoherence, but they still accept the 
same wavefunction dynamics, and consequently the possibility in principle 
that Alice could successfully make a z-spin measurement on a lab in which 
Bob has already made an x-spin measurement. This problem, and possible 
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ways of responding to it, is a core theme in this thesis, and will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
2.2.6.3 The Problem of Outcomes 
Finally, we come to the problem of how it is possible to reconcile the 
definite measurement outcomes obtained by observers within histories 
with the determinate superposition states of linear quantum mechanics. 
Schlosshauer 2007 distinguishes two aspects of this problem: the specific 
and the generic. The generic problem of outcomes is the question of how it 
comes about that definite outcomes are (or seem to be) observed in cases 
of measurement. In terms of our Wigner’s friend thought experiment, this 
is a question of how the absence of wavefunction collapse is to be 
reconciled with Bob's belief that he has successfully made a measurement 
of the particle’s x-spin state and observed a definite outcome. 
Decoherence offers a solution to this problem by identifying two distinct 
fairly well-defined histories. In one of these histories, Bob has measured 
spin up, and in the other he has measured spin down. However, it is a 
determinate feature of both of these histories that Bob believes himself to 
have made a measurement and obtained an outcome. Thus, any recording 
operation of Bob concerning whether or not he had measured an outcome, 
which would yield a positive result in the event of the measured particle 
having determinately possessed either x-spin state, would also yield a 
positive result in the event of a superposition state. And precisely the same 
reasoning would apply to Alice's measurement in turn. It seems, therefore, 
that we can account for the experience of obtaining particular 
measurement outcomes, even if we do not actually obtain any. 
The second problem identified by Schlosshauer is the specific problem of 
outcomes. This is the problem of how it comes about that we make the 
measurement that we do, as opposed to any other. In other words, if Bob 
finds himself having just made a spin up measurement, what determined 
that he should measure this result rather than spin down? Schlosshauer 
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identifies this as the one feature of the measurement problem which he 
believes cannot be solved by appealing to decoherence. Instead, this 
problem is left to specific interpretations to offer a means of resolution. 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have introduced a useful way of subdividing the quantum 
measurement problem, as well as one clear and empirically well confirmed 
definition of decoherence. I have shown why decoherence seems to have 
clear relevance to the quantum measurement problem, for interpretations 
of quantum mechanics which reject the collapse postulate. 
As noted, however, there are a range of concerns about this conception of 
decoherence. One concern which has been discussed in the literature 
relates to the difficulty of rigorously characterising decoherence without in 
some way presupposing the recovery of classicality which decoherence is 
being used to achieve. The most common presentation of this problem 
focuses on the difficulty of justifying the physical significance of the 
reduced density matrix without a seemingly illicit application of the Born 
rule (though the same problem can also be presented in other ways). 
Another is that, as the suppression of interference phenomena by 
decoherence is, in realistic cases, not total, decoherence in some sense is 
not truly able to recover the desired classicality, and so does not solve 
anything. These problems will be the subject of chapters 4 and 5. I will 
argue however that, at least when considered within the context of some 
interpretations, both of these problems meet with satisfactory responses. 
Another problem I have noted here is that in many cases diagonalisation of 
a reduced density matrix in a particular basis will be a short-lived 
phenomenon. A single measurement of a quantum system clearly does not 
permanently disrupt its capacity for interference phenomena in the 
measured basis. If the preferred basis we are looking for needs to persist 
over an extended time period (as in Everettian interpretations), then a 
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more complex conception of decoherence will need to be employed. Ways 
of formulating such a conception will be the subject of the next chapter. 
A significant issue that such conceptions will need to consider can be seen 
in the Wigner’s friend example used above. When Bob makes his 
measurement, the x-spin particle state becomes entangled to the rest of 
the lab, and consequently the reduced density matrix of the particle is 
diagonalised in the x-spin basis. On the conception of decoherence 
presented here, this seems to indicate that x-spin is the preferred basis for 
this particle. After Alice's measurement, however, it is the z-spin particle 
state which ends up entangled to its environment, and so the z-spin basis 
which will be diagonalised. A conception of decoherence aiming to pick out 
a preferred basis over an extended time will need to say something about 
which of these contradictory bases we should take as preferred. I will argue 
that this challenge poses significant problems for interpretations which rely 
on such conceptions of decoherence. 
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3 History Spaces and the Decoherence Functional 
 
In the discussion so far, extensive use has been made of the terms 
decoherence and also, less frequently, of histories. These concepts do not 
belong to any single interpretation of quantum mechanics, though some 
have been particularly influential in developing them. They refer to 
particular mathematically defined patterns within a system's wavefunction. 
These patterns have been shown to occur for many systems which 
physicists are interested in, as well as virtually all medium-sized dry goods 
such as we are generally familiar with. As such, they are in an important 
sense interpretation-neutral, between all those interpretations which 
retain the linear Schrödinger wavefunction dynamics, although their 
ontological significance is heavily interpretation-dependent. 
This thesis will heavily rely on both of these concepts, and their application 
to particular interpretations. First, however, more rigorous mathematical 
definitions need to be given and considered for these concepts. In both 
cases, crucial developmental work has been done by advocates of 
consistent (or decoherent) histories approaches. This section will briefly 
outline the central distinguishing features of the consistent histories 
approach, formally introduce the concept of histories (which has already 
been used informally), and differentiate important distinctions in the 
meaning of the word decoherence. 
In the philosophical literature, decoherence is often identified with the 
diagonalisation of a system’s reduced density matrix. In discussion, 
however, a number of subtly different definitions of decoherence are used, 
often without appropriate clarification. This section focusses mainly on two 
rigorously defined concepts, set out in Gell-Mann & Hartle 1990, which 
have come to be discussed within the wider literature (e.g. Wallace 2012). 
Both are sometimes referred to as decoherence. 
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The consistent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics was 
originally suggested by Griffiths 1984, and extensively developed in Omnès 
(1988 and 1999), and also developed into the very similar decoherent 
histories approach of Gell-Mann & Hartle 1990. There are some significant 
differences between these authors on the details of the approach, but all 
share a common core. Like Everettian and Bohmian interpretations, the 
consistent histories approach maintains the linear Schrödinger dynamics as 
universal, without wavefunction collapse. 
Like many-worlds Everettians, the histories approach rejects the addition 
of hidden variables dynamics such as Bohmian particles6. Again like 
Everettians, they use decoherence, or the similar (but weaker) condition of 
consistency, to identify sequences of system states possessing quasi-
classical dynamics from within the overall dynamics of the quantum state. 
They differ, however, in the metaphysical interpretation of these histories, 
and the assessment of their associated probabilities. 
Everettians seek a single branching structure of histories, which they invest 
with strong metaphysical significance. It is in terms of this branching 
structure, and the probabilities obtained by Born rule projections of a 
system’s state vector onto this basis, that all discussions of classical events 
and classical physics derive their meaning. There may be some degree of 
vagueness as to the precise character of this branching structure, but 
Everettian metaphysics relies on such a branching structure being robustly 
identifiable. 
The consistent historian, by contrast, is not committed to there being a 
single such structure, or attributing any special metaphysical significance to 
                                                          
6 For the rest of this chapter I shall refer to Everettian many-worlds approaches simply as 
Everettian approaches, and distinguish them from decoherent and consistent histories 
approaches (which I will collectively refer to as many histories approaches). All of these 
approaches stem from work done by Everett 1957, but the term Everettian has come to 
refer most frequently to many-worlds interpretations. 
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a single structure in particular. The key interpretive principles are 
summarised by Griffiths 2017 along the following lines: 
• Liberty: A physicist interested in a particular system may freely 
employ any number of different bases with associated sets of 
histories to analyse that system. 
• Equality: No basis a physicist may choose to employ is more 
fundamental than any other; no single basis is singled out by 
nature. 
• Incompatibility: Bases which use projectors which do not commute 
with one another, are never to be combined into a single quantum 
description. The (probabilistic) reasoning process starting from 
assumptions (or data) and leading to conclusions must be carried 
out using a single history basis. 
• Utility: Some history bases are more useful than others for 
answering particular questions about a quantum system. 
It is the principles of liberty and equality which clearly differentiate 
histories interpretations from Everettian interpretations. Whereas the 
Everettian seeks to identify a single basis to act as the foundation for a 
clear quasi-classical ontology, the histories approach allows for the use of 
multiple mutually incompatible bases, with no basis singled out as 
fundamental. 
The significance of this position will be explained more clearly in due 
course. For now though, we will focus on understanding the concepts of 
history, consistency, and decoherence, as they are used in the histories 
literature. 
 
3.1 Histories 
So far, the histories we have discussed have been simple pairs 
corresponding to a single particle’s spin eigenvectors. Intuitively, it is easy 
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to imagine a pair of histories corresponding to each of the two possible 
outcomes of a particular measurement and evolving classically thereafter. 
Of course, a single pair of histories would be an exceptionally simple case. 
Realistically, the history in which Bob measured spin up would very quickly 
yield many additional histories as naturally occurring quantum 
superposition states decohere with respect to the rest of the lab. Precisely 
how many times these histories would subdivide will depend on the basis 
of the history space by which the physical system is analysed as well as the 
characteristics of that system. 
The most general requirement for a history of a quantum system is that it 
should pick out a state of affairs for the system, with a corresponding 
projection operator, at a series of times in the system’s evolution. For 
some such history 𝛼, we define a history operator: 
𝐶?̂? =∏ 𝑃𝛼𝑚
?̂?
𝑚
 
Where 𝑚 denotes a time index, and 𝑃𝛼𝑚
?̂?  is the projection operator, for the 
projection of a state |𝜓⟩, onto the state of affairs associated with history 𝛼 
at time 𝑚, denoted as 𝛼𝑚. 
In other words, a history is defined as the product of a continuous series of 
projection operators over time. This means that a history will always 
specify a partial or complete state of the system at many (sometimes all) 
times within the systems evolution.   
This is the most general form of a history, and will include many histories 
that have radically non-classical projectors 𝑃𝛼𝑚
?̂? , as well as many others for 
which there is no identifiable pattern to the projectors that make up the 
history at different times. It is hoped, however, that additional criteria can 
be added to pick out just quasi-classical histories which contain the types 
of useful regularities that we see in classical physics (and perhaps even 
justify a privileged metaphysical status for those histories).  
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For a set of histories, the set of projection operators for a time index do 
not necessarily form a complete basis. If the projection operators do form 
a complete basis at every time index, then the histories composed of 
sequences of these projections are said to be atomic. They pick out 
precisely one way that the world could be at every time. An atomic history 
of our laboratory might have projectors which specify a precise position for 
every particle, as well as x-spin states for every applicable particle.  
A set of atomic history operators together form the basis vectors of a 
history space for the system. The set of histories that form the atomic basis 
of a history space must commute with one another. 
The dimensionality of a history space will depend entirely on the basis of 
histories chosen. To take an extreme example of this, Bob’s lab could be 
represented in a one-dimensional history space, if the projection operators 
of the history that make up the space’s basis were perfectly aligned to the 
wavefunction of the lab at every time. This would be an adequate history 
space characterisation, but not a helpful one, as it would not give us any 
useful conceptual tools by which to understand that wavefunction. 
Similarly, while many sets of histories that do not contain quasi-classical 
states, or feature quasi-classical regularities, could be found that would 
commute with one another, and form a mathematically adequate basis of 
the history space, we are generally only concerned with those histories 
that do offer these kinds of regularities when we talk about histories. 
For any particular wavefunction there are any number of possible history 
spaces that could be applied depending on the choice of projectors at each 
time interval. This choice of complete basis for the history space will 
determine the number of atomic histories and their dynamics. 
Non-atomic histories are formed of projectors which do not form a 
complete basis. This is because they only specify coarse-grained states at 
every time interval. They might, for example, specify particle positions as 
being within a particular range, rather than being a set of histories that 
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distinguish particle positions with infinite precision. Consequently, they 
pick out a set of the atomic histories within the space rather than a single 
such history. 
Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990 suggest 3 common kinds of history specification 
that would not correspond to a single perfectly fine-grained atomic history, 
but to some set of them. These forms of coarse-graining are: “(1) specifying 
observables not at all times, but only at some times (2) specifying at any 
one time not a complete set of observables, but only some of them (3) 
specifying for these observables not precise values, but only ranges of 
values.” 
The references to histories made in the previous section were references 
to non-atomic histories. This is what histories is most often taken to mean. 
For many types of system, a decomposition into perfectly atomic histories 
will not yield any histories which show classically recognisable dynamics. 
For this reason, Gell-Mann and Hartle go so far as to argue that 
probabilities can only reasonably be assigned to non-atomic histories, and 
not to perfectly refined fine grainings of them. 
So far, nothing I have said concerning histories specifies them as more than 
an arbitrarily chosen sequence of projectors. Before turning to introduce 
the concept of decoherence, and the requirements which are our main 
topic of interest, it is important to identify a more general requirement for 
the types of history in which we are interested. This requirement provides 
a dynamical connection between the sequence of projectors which make 
up a history. As Gell-Mann & Hartle put it: 
“…it is clear that the solution of the mathematical problem of 
enumerating the sets of decohering histories of a given Hilbert 
space has no physical content by itself. No description of the 
histories has been given. No reference has been made to a theory 
of the fundamental interactions. No distinction has been made 
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between one vector in Hilbert space as a theory of the initial 
condition and any other. 
“We obtain a description of the sets of alternative histories of the 
universe when the operators corresponding to the fundamental 
fields are identified. We make contact with the theory of the 
fundamental interactions if the evolution of these fields is given by 
a fundamental Hamiltonian.” (Gell-Mann & Hartle 1990, pp. 14). 
In other words, in order to be interesting histories of physical significance, 
the projectors of our histories must be in a basis in which some classically 
recognisable entity is identifiable, and more importantly one in which 
successive projectors follow patterns to be expected given the 
fundamental Hamiltonian for the system in question. 
This is essentially a quasi-classicality criterion which is being indicated. 
Wallace 2012 also sees the need to invoke such a requirement on our 
history space if we are to obtain useful and informative histories. 
Making this requirement precise presents some major difficulties, and 
neither Wallace nor Gell-Mann and Hartle attempt to do so. A first attempt 
would be to use the unitary transformations which in the Schrödinger 
picture connect states of the wavefunction at different times: 
𝜌𝑡=𝑘 = 𝑈𝑗?̂?  𝜌𝑡=𝑗  𝑈𝑗?̂?
−1
 
Where 𝜌𝑡 is the density matrix of a system at time t, and 𝑈𝑗𝑘 is the unitary 
transformation matrix for the change in the system state between time j, 
and time k. This transformation matrix is a direct function of the system’s 
Hamiltonian between these times. 
Switching to the Heisenberg picture, this time dependence moves from the 
state to the projectors: 
𝑃𝛼𝑘
?̂? = 𝑈𝑗?̂?
−1
 𝑃𝛼𝑗
?̂?  𝑈𝑗?̂? 
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It is tempting to think that precisely this relation might hold between 
history projectors at different times. Indeed, for quasi-classical histories 
undergoing entirely classical dynamics without any quantum probabilistic 
events, this relation would indeed hold for the types of history in which we 
are interested. The main problem is that this relation can offer no account 
of history branching, and a history will simply evolve linearly as a single 
history forever, and probably cease to be classical-like in the process. 
Nevertheless, some form of quasi-classicality criterion somewhat like this is 
essential to (and often tacitly assumed by) discussions of histories and 
history spaces. This criterion can be thought of in practice as ruling out 
bizarre and contrived examples. It means that the histories we consider are 
generally meant to be histories which roughly correspond to, or identifiably 
contain, classically recognisable entities, and in which the dynamics 
internal to histories generally follow intuitively natural classically plausible 
patterns. 
Wallace 2012 goes so far as to make this relation between successive 
projectors (with appropriate allowances for history branching) an integral 
part of his definition of histories, and of a history space (pp. 91-92). The 
original architects of the histories approach do not go so far, treating 
histories as a more general term, but, as noted above, they clearly 
recognise histories of this type as being of particular interest and physical 
relevance. 
We will now turn to examine two conceptions of decoherence defined as 
constraints on history spaces, and see how these add a vital criterion to the 
definition of those histories with which quantum interpretational projects 
are concerned. 
 
3.2 The Decoherence Functional 
The quasi-classicality criteria just discussed concern two aspects of our 
history space. The first is the choice of system whose history space we are 
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considering. There are many systems we could choose which do not display 
any classically recognisable regularities. This is to be expected if we set out 
to consider the history space of a system composed of arbitrarily chosen 
and disparate degrees of freedom spread throughout the universe, rather 
than some more classically familiar system. 
The second is the dynamics of those histories which we have chosen to 
form the basis of our history space. In the absence of branching, we require 
these to follow patterns of behaviour which are classically recognisable, 
and the behaviour to be predicted for the internal dynamics of a history 
given the Hamiltonian to which the system is subject. 
Now we turn to criteria which have been developed to analyse the 
structure of such histories within a history space and their relations to one 
another. Gell-Mann and Hartle are seeking a criterion which, if fulfilled by a 
history space, would warrant applying probabilities to particular histories 
within the space. Wallace has the similar but distinct goal of finding a 
criterion which would warrant attributing metaphysical significance and an 
emergent reality to the structures contained within particular histories. In 
both cases they are looking for particular types of behaviour which indicate 
a particularly classical-like character in the histories which form a history 
space, and in the process refine our understanding of when history 
branching can usefully be considered to take place. 
The central tool developed for this analysis is the decoherence functional: 
𝐷(𝛼, 𝛽) = ⟨𝜓|𝐶𝛼
†̂𝐶?̂?|𝜓⟩ 
For a pair of histories 𝛼 and 𝛽, with history operators 𝐶?̂? and 𝐶?̂?, the 
decoherence functional 𝐷 of that pair can be thought of as a measure of 
the overlap between the two histories over time. This overlap is then 
weighted according to the wavefunction amplitude in the region of Hilbert 
space at the time when the overlap occurs. 
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For an orthogonal pair of histories whose projectors do not overlap at any 
time, the decoherence functional will equal zero. The pair will also equal 
zero if their projectors do overlap, but the overlap is perfectly orthogonal 
to the system state vector. 
It is worth noting that this functional can be applied just as easily to coarse-
grained histories, as to atomic ones. 
Two criteria based on this functional have been developed in the many 
histories literature. The first to be developed was consistency. Consistency 
is of very clear relevance to the problem of when probabilities can be 
attributed to particular histories, and is still advocated as the appropriate 
criterion by consistent historians such as Omnès. 
For reasons that will be discussed later in this chapter, this criterion quickly 
lost popularity in the face of the second stronger criterion. This second 
criterion, medium decoherence, is less obviously relevant to issues of 
probability, but is in some ways conceptually and mathematically simpler 
than consistency. For this reason, we will examine the criterion of medium 
decoherence first before returning to consistency. 
 
3.3 Medium decoherence 
The medium decoherence requirement set out by Wallace 2012 can be 
expressed simply:  
A history space fulfils the medium decoherence criterion iff for any 
pair of distinct histories 𝛼 and 𝛽 which make up the space 
𝐷(𝛼, 𝛽) = 0.7 
                                                          
7 There is some variation in precisely how this criterion is defined by different authors. 
This is Wallace's formulation. Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990 instead give the criterion as 
𝐷(𝛼, 𝛽) ≈ 0. I have followed Wallace here because I think it is useful to be able to clearly 
discuss the consequences of the decoherence functional equalling zero precisely (such as 
the branching decoherence theorem). All authors agree that realistic history spaces will 
never fulfil the precise form of this criterion, but only the approximate one. I will follow 
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In other words, it requires that distinct histories should never overlap with 
one another after becoming distinct. 
This criterion is used by Wallace as a criterion for when histories count as 
robust metaphysically significant Everettian worlds. 
Wallace 2012 pp. 93 makes a connection between history branching and 
the decoherence functional using the branching decoherence theorem, 
which he attributes to Griffiths 1993 (though much the same relationship is 
presented less formally in Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990)8: 
Branching-Decoherence Theorem: Suppose 𝒫 = {𝑃𝑗
?̂?} is a history 
space and |𝜓⟩ is a quantum state. Then: 
i. If 𝒫 has a branching structure (relative to |𝜓⟩) and 𝛼 is a 
history then 𝐶?̂?|𝜓⟩ ≠ 0 iff 𝛼 is realised (with respect to |𝜓⟩). 
ii. If the set Hist of all histories 𝛼 such that 𝐶?̂?|𝜓⟩ ≠ 0 has a 
branching structure (that is, if no two histories in Hist agree 
on their 𝑖th but not on all previous projectors), then 𝒫 also 
has a branching structure (relative to |𝜓⟩) and the realised 
histories in that branching structure are just the histories in 
Hist. 
iii. If 𝒫 has a branching structure (relative to |𝜓⟩), 𝒫 satisfies 
the [medium] decoherence condition. 
iv. If 𝒫 satisfies the [medium] decoherence condition it is a 
coarse-graining of a ( [medium] decoherent) history space 
which has a branching structure relative to |𝜓⟩. 
The relationship expressed in this theorem is intuitively natural and easy to 
grasp. 
(i) Offers a definition of what Wallace takes it to mean for a history 
to be realised. 
                                                          
Wallace in discussing this issue in terms of the strict medium decoherence criterion 
obtaining approximately. 
8 See Wallace 2012 appendix A for a proof of the branching-decoherence theorem. 
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(ii) Gives a natural definition of what it means for a set of histories 
to possess a branching structure (namely that once the 
projectors of two histories have come to disagree, they will not 
come to agree again at any future time). 
(iii) Is a clear statement of the connection between a branching 
structure and the decoherence condition. 
(iv) Says that if a history space satisfies the medium decoherence 
criterion then it is a coarse graining of another history space 
which satisfies branching. This is the most interesting of the 
points, and will be discussed further in a later section. 
This serves to make it very clear what the relation is between the medium 
decoherence condition and a history space possessing a branching 
structure. It does not, however, make any obvious link to probability. The 
next section will look at the probability conditions that both Everettians 
and consistent historians wish their history spaces to display. It will 
introduce a criterion designed specifically to ensure that probabilities fulfil 
this condition. And it will show that this new criterion is entailed by the 
medium decoherence criterion. 
 
3.4 Consistency 
The probability condition that motivates the consistency criterion is 
directly linked to the absence of interference. In terms of probability 
calculus this can be expressed as: 
Pr(𝛼) = ∑ Pr (𝛼𝑖)
𝛼𝑖∈𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝛼)
 
Where 𝛼 is a non-atomic history, and 𝛼𝑖 are the atomic histories which 
together form a complete decomposition of 𝛼. 
To understand this, it is helpful to consider the double slit experiment. 
When considering the probability of a particle arriving at a particular point 
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on the final screen, we usually have to consider the effects of interference 
between different particle trajectories. The condition for the absence of 
interference phenomena is that the probability of a particle ending up at a 
particular point on the screen is simply a sum of the probability of that 
particle following every trajectory that would lead to this final point. This is 
what we see when a detector is placed to record which slit the particle 
passed through. Without such a detector, however, interference between 
different particle trajectories is likely to change the probability of the 
particle reaching a particular point. 
The consistency criterion is a direct attempt to capture this absence of 
interference as a constraint on histories within a history space. 
In a history space formalism, this requirement can be written as (Wallace 
2012, pp. 92-94): 
⟨𝜓|𝐶𝛼
†̂𝐶?̂?|𝜓⟩ = ∑ ⟨𝜓|𝐶𝛼𝑖
†̂ 𝐶𝛼𝑖
̂|𝜓⟩
𝛼𝑖∈𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝛼)
 
Where 𝛼 denotes a particular history, |𝜓⟩ denotes the system state, and 
𝐷𝑒𝑐(𝛼) denotes a decomposition of 𝛼 into atomic histories. 
In terms of the decoherence functional, the condition that will ensure this 
for two distinct histories, 𝛼 and 𝛽, is: 
𝐷(𝛼, 𝛽) ∈ 𝕀 
That is, the decoherence functional for any pair of distinct histories must 
be purely imaginary, with its real part equal to zero. 
It is easy to see that this condition is entailed by the medium decoherence 
condition (which requires both real and imaginary parts to be equal to 
zero). Medium decoherence will therefore also ensure that probabilities 
sum in the desired fashion, and histories do not display interference 
phenomena. 
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Medium decoherence goes further than consistency, however, by requiring 
that the histories that form a history space should possess a branching 
structure. In order for interference between histories to be possible, they 
must come to agree on their projectors sometime after separating. Clearly, 
therefore, it is unsurprising that a condition which ensures a branching 
structure also ensures an absence of interference phenomena. There is a 
second situation, however, in which interference phenomena will not be 
displayed. This is if the phases of the histories in question agree at the time 
when they come to meet. In this case, the probabilities of the histories in 
question before and after they merge will obey the classical probability 
summation rule mentioned above. 
Given that fulfilling the consistency criterion is enough to ensure that the 
history space does not display interference phenomena, and that 
interference phenomena are the key distinctively quantum phenomenon 
that separates quantum mechanics from the world of our everyday 
experience, it is easy to see why this criterion has been thought central to 
recovering classicality, and attributing probabilities. Griffiths 1984 and 
Omnès 1988 did indeed use consistency in this way, and Omnès continues 
to advocate an approach based on this criterion. 
Griffiths, however, has since abandoned this criterion in favour of medium 
decoherence. Gell-Mann & Hartle also reject the consistency criterion in 
favour of medium decoherence, and medium decoherence is the criterion 
upon which modern Everettians such as David Wallace base their 
approach. Intriguingly, however, it is not particularly easy to understand 
what led all these authors to adopt the medium decoherence criterion in 
favour of consistency. 
Gell-Mann & Hartle offer a rather cryptic explanation for rejecting the 
consistency condition in favour of medium decoherence: 
“[Consistency] is the condition used by Griffiths as the requirement 
for “consistent histories”. However, while, as we shall see, it is easy 
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to identify physical situations in which the off-diagonal elements of 
D approximately vanish as the result of coarse graining, it is hard to 
think of a general mechanism that suppresses only their real parts. 
In the usual analysis of measurement, the off-diagonal parts of D 
approximately vanish.  We shall, therefore, explore the stronger 
condition [medium decoherence] in what follows.” (Gell-Mann & 
Hartle 1990, pp. 11). 
Their reasoning seems to be that it is difficult to imagine the mechanism by 
which the weaker consistency requirement would be fulfilled without the 
stronger medium decoherence requirement being fulfilled, and so they 
mean to focus on the stronger rather than the weaker requirement. More 
consideration will be given to what might have been meant by this 
argument in the next section. On the face of it, however, this argument 
seems to do little to offset the very clear and direct relevance of the 
consistency criterion for recovering classical dynamics. 
Though it may be unclear why Gell-Mann & Hartle originally introduced 
this strong criterion, there are some clear reasons for its popularity. 
Whereas the histories within a consistent history space may or may not 
form a branching structure of the type desired by the Everettian, the 
medium decoherence criterion implies that histories should form such a 
structure. 
Though the support this gives for Everettian metaphysics may explain the 
popularity of this criterion, it is not used to justify it. The Everettian 
position presented by Wallace seeks to present decoherence as the basis of 
a branching structure of many worlds, not the other way around. Wallace 
however gives little real justification for choosing medium decoherence as 
his preferred criterion. The closest he comes to a direct justification of his 
choice when introducing the medium decoherence criterion is the 
following: 
90 
 
“However, [consistency] does not seem to have any dynamical 
significance (in the way that decoherence proper [medium 
decoherence] has been shown to have), and composite systems 
satisfying weak but not full decoherence have been shown to have 
various unsatisfactory properties (Diósi 2004).” (Wallace 2012, pp. 
98). 
The reference to dynamical significance presumably relates to the 
Everettian need for a branching structure already discussed. More 
interesting is the reference to unsatisfactory properties. Wallace himself 
never explains what these unsatisfactory properties are, but he clearly 
considers Diósi 2004 to have found some. 
The next section will look at Diósi 2004 and the features of consistent and 
medium decoherent history spaces which he discusses. Before moving on 
though, I wish to note that as these issues seem to first appear in the 
literature in a letter written in 2004, it remains unclear to me why medium 
decoherence was being endorsed in favour of consistency by authors such 
as Gell-Mann & Hartle 1990, long before this letter was published. This 
shift in the general consensus of the many histories literature has no clear 
explanation that I have been able to find, but it has had a profound effect 
on more recent literature, including modern Everettian interpretations. 
 
3.5 History space composition 
Surprisingly Diósi 2004, to which Wallace refers readers on this point, is not 
an extended paper considering the relative strengths of these criteria, but 
a two-page letter published in Physical Review Letters. 
Much of this short letter is devoted to setting out the definitions of 
decoherence and consistency, in much the same way that Wallace does. He 
also introduces a proposal by Goldstein & Page for an alternative 
constraint, which will be ignored for the present discussion. Given the 
amount being presented in this short letter, his presentation of the 
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problems he believes consistency to face is understandably brief. In this 
section I will do my best to expand on and clarify the issues with which he 
is concerned. 
Diósi accepts that the consistency criterion yields histories which will obey 
the classical axioms of probability, and which can be assigned probabilities 
without contradiction. He believes, however, that there are two other 
desiderata which this criterion does not guarantee. These he names the 
test of composition and the test of dynamical stability. 
3.5.1 The Test of Composition. 
The test of composition looks at what happens if two distinct systems, each 
with their own history space, are considered as a single composite system 
with a composite history space. 
Diósi considers two systems A and B, each of which has a history space of 
its own which fulfils the consistency criterion. He considers the system AB, 
which is a composite of A and B. Importantly, his analysis specifies that the 
history spaces of the two systems should be un-entangled, or in terms of 
system density matrices: 
𝜌𝐴𝐵 = 𝜌𝐴⊗𝜌𝐵  
He then argues that there is no guarantee that this composite system will 
itself have a history space which fulfils the consistency criterion. His point 
becomes clear by looking at the relationship between the decoherence 
functionals of the relevant systems. Given the independence of the density 
matrices of the two systems mentioned above, this factorises to become: 
𝐷𝐴𝐵(𝛼′𝛽′, 𝛼𝛽) = 𝐷𝐴(𝛼′, 𝛼)𝐷𝐵(𝛽′, 𝛽) 
Where 𝛼 and 𝛼′ are two distinct histories of the system A, and similarly for 
system B. 
It is easy to see that, if the decoherence functionals of systems A and B are 
imaginary (as required by the consistency criterion), there is no guarantee 
that the decoherence functional of the composite system will also be 
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imaginary. Just as easily, it can be seen that, if the decoherence functionals 
of A and B are both equal to zero (as required by the medium decoherence 
criterion), then the decoherence functional of the composite system will 
also equal zero. 
Diósi takes it to be an appropriate expectation of any criterion seeking to 
pick out individual quasi-classical histories that, if individual histories are 
picked out for a particular system, then a composition of the history space 
of that system and the history space of a second which also fulfils the same 
criterion should itself form a history space which fulfils that criterion. 
Having succinctly shown that this is not the case for consistency, he moves 
on. I think the test of composition is an interesting and revealing one, and 
will now seek to further examine this counterintuitive result. 
At first glance it is certainly easy to see why Diósi sees this as a problem 
with using the consistency criterion to decide when probabilities can be 
applied. It is counterintuitive, to say the least, to think that probabilities 
might be applicable to a description of the system A, but not be compatible 
with a description of the conjunction of that system and another. More 
than this, it seems bizarre to find that, while for a particular quantum 
system there might be no interference phenomena, for a conjunction of 
that system and another to which it is unentangled, interference 
phenomena might suddenly return. 
The first thing to notice here is that a failure of consistency in the larger 
history space would not imply the presence of interference phenomena in 
the physical system that made up the smaller history spaces. That is, the 
histories that might possibly interfere with one another, are histories that 
are distinct in their descriptions of both system A and system B. If we 
instead look at pairs of histories that differ only in the dynamics of one 
system, we get: 
𝐷𝐴𝐵(𝛼′𝛽, 𝛼𝛽) = 𝐷𝐴(𝛼′, 𝛼)𝐷𝐵(𝛽, 𝛽) ∈ 𝕀 
𝐷𝐴𝐵(𝛼𝛽′, 𝛼𝛽) = 𝐷𝐴(𝛼, 𝛼)𝐷𝐵(𝛽′, 𝛽) ∈ 𝕀 
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That is, as the decoherence functional of a history with itself is simply the 
Born rule probability of that history, and so always a real number, the 
decoherence functional of the composite system will still be imaginary. The 
effect of the second system will only change the magnitude of this term. 
Consequently, the interference between histories that results in the 
composite history no longer being consistent is entirely down to 
interference between histories separated in ways that could not be 
represented in either of the single system history spaces. This goes some 
way to accounting for the seemingly bizarre possible appearance of 
interference terms in the composite history space. 
Nevertheless, it does seem concerning to find that a criterion under 
consideration for use in deciding when probabilities can be assigned to 
states within a system should be so dependent on the choice of system. 
Diósi does, therefore, seem to have identified an apparently serious issue. 
There is, however, something a little strange about the reasoning which 
underlies Diósi’s analysis. Consistency is intended to be a criterion for when 
the physical phenomenon of decoherence has taken place. That is, when 
the state of the system has become entangled to its environment by 
particular degrees of freedom such that, under operations affecting those 
degrees of freedom of the system, no interference phenomena will be 
displayed. Nothing in Diósi’s analysis represents or models the effect of 
system A or B being entangled by any degrees of freedom to their 
environment. In other words, nothing in the analysis specifies that 
decoherence (in the sense of the physical phenomenon) has taken place. 
The fact that the history spaces of A and B have been chosen such that 
they do not display interference phenomena (and so fulfil the consistency 
criterion) does not guarantee anything about the robustness of these 
dynamics. It is only when records are encoded outside of those systems 
that robust quasi-classical dynamics are to be expected. 
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This is certainly a disadvantage of the consistency criterion. It is overly 
generous. It applies not only in cases when encoding of the system state 
outside of the system leads to robust quasi-classicality, but also when a 
system’s phases simply happen by chance to align in such a way that no 
interference phenomena are displayed. As a result, the criterion lets in 
systems whose consistent dynamics are very easily disrupted. 
Indeed, this lack of stability is precisely the point which Diósi makes in his 
discussion of what he describes as the test of dynamic stability. 
3.5.2 The Test of Dynamic Stability 
This test involves examining the effect of introducing a briefly applied 
additional potential to the systems dynamics. Diósi shows that this brief 
perturbation will introduce a phase shift to the decoherence functional 
which will, quite possibly, lead to the resulting history space of the system 
failing the consistency criterion. 
Clearly then, the consistency criterion admits history spaces of systems 
which are not correlated to their environments in the way we would 
expect for a system displaying the physical phenomenon of decoherence. 
As this entanglement to the environment is what gives rise to the stability 
of quasi-classical dynamics, and Diósi does nothing to represent this 
entanglement in his analysis, it is unsurprising to find that the history 
spaces he considers will not always display robustly classical dynamics 
despite fulfilling the consistency criterion. 
What is more surprising, given that Diósi does nothing to represent this 
external entanglement, is that the medium decoherence criterion is 
sufficient to ensure stability in both cases. That is, a system which had no 
entanglement to its external environment, but which fulfilled the medium 
decoherence criterion, would display stable quasi-classical dynamics, both 
under composition with an external system, and an instantaneous 
perturbation to the Hamiltonian. It is reasonable to wonder, therefore, 
what it is about fulfilling the medium decoherence requirement which 
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gives rise to this remarkable stability in the absence of any encoding of the 
system state onto the environment. 
The answer, surprisingly, is that a system’s fulfilling the medium 
decoherence criterion has absolutely nothing to do with that system being 
decohered with respect to its environment. The absence of interference 
phenomena within systems that fulfil the medium decoherence criterion is 
not due to the state of those systems being encoded outside of the system, 
but due to all past states of the system being encoded within the system 
itself. 
To understand this, consider a particle passing through a double slit 
apparatus. If no record is made within the particles environment as to 
which slit it passes through, then interference will occur as histories in 
which the particle passed through the first slit and histories in which it 
passed through the second slit recombine, and phase relations between 
the different histories play out. In this case, the history space of the particle 
would fail to meet either the consistency or medium decoherence 
requirement. 
If instead, a record of the slit the particle passed through became encoded 
somehow within its environment, then the phase relations of the histories 
in which the particle passed through each slit would be lost, and when the 
histories recombined their amplitudes would add linearly with no 
interference. This is a classic example of the physical phenomenon of 
decoherence, but the history space of the particle would not fulfil the 
medium decoherence criterion. The histories that make up the particle’s 
history space do recombine after previously having separated. As such, 
while the history space of the particle fulfils the consistency criterion, it 
does not fulfil the medium decoherence criterion. 
To see a system in which the medium decoherence criterion is fulfilled, you 
would have to consider one in which, having passed through the two slits, 
the particles continued on entirely different trajectories depending on 
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which slit they went through. This would mean that the particle position 
projectors for the histories which went through the first slit would never 
agree with that of histories that went through the second slit. The history 
space for the particle passing through the apparatus would then have a 
branching structure and fulfil the medium decoherence criterion. As 
histories would never recombine, there would be no interference, whether 
or not the slot that the particle passed through was ever encoded outside 
of the system. 
Of course, in the case where the slit which the particle passed through was 
recorded in the environment, there will generally be a system whose 
history space fulfils the medium decoherence criterion, and which includes 
quasi-classical particle trajectories for the particle with which we are 
concerned. The system will include both the particle’s positions, and at 
least 1 degree of freedom within the environment entangled to the slit 
through which the particle passed. 
Medium decoherence, then, clearly does have a strong connection to the 
robust absence of interference phenomena. It is important to understand, 
however, that a local system displaying quasi-classical dynamics does not 
have any certainty of fulfilling this criterion. Rather, it fulfils the weaker 
consistency criterion. Medium decoherence can only be fulfilled by a 
system large enough that a present projector for a history of the system 
can encode a record of every quantum probabilistic event throughout the 
history of that system. Medium decoherence is therefore a very strong 
(arguably too strong) requirement, and chapter 6 will look in more detail at 
the question of whether it is really reasonable to suppose that this criterion 
will be fulfilled in the kinds of cases we meet in everyday life. 
Consistency, on the other hand, is a significantly weaker criterion. It is 
weak enough to include histories which have nothing to do with the 
physical phenomenon of decoherence. In such cases, the property of the 
history space fulfilling the consistency criterion may well be very tenuous 
and easily disrupted. On the other hand, it can reasonably be applied to 
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local systems that we can study rather than the extremely large systems 
needed to allow medium decoherence. Consequently, when we speak of a 
system as having decohered with respect to its environment, we typically 
mean that it fulfils the consistency criterion rather than the medium 
decoherence criterion. 
The fact that the robustness of consistency, within the history space of a 
system which we might typically be interested in, depends on some far 
larger and more ill-defined system fulfilling the stronger medium 
decoherence criterion, poses an epistemic challenge which shall be a 
central topic of this thesis. That is, do we really have reason to suppose 
that systems with which we daily interact are part of a system which fulfils 
the medium decoherence requirement, and encodes records of everything 
that has happened over the histories of our system of interest? If so, what 
are these reasons? If not, what are the metaphysical consequences if the 
systems that make up the world around us cannot be relied upon to obey a 
probability sum rule? 
Before moving on to look at these questions and their relevance to 
particular interpretations, there is one more connection which must be 
considered if we are to understand how different criteria of decoherence 
relate to one another. The next section will return to the diagonalisation of 
a system’s reduced density matrix (RDM), and examine how this connects 
to the two criteria on history spaces discussed in this section. 
 
3.6 Connection to the Diagonalization of the RDM 
The previous chapter used the RDM diagonalization conception of 
decoherence, which is used by authors such as Schlosshauer and Zurek. 
This conception connects very simply and clearly to the linear formalism of 
quantum mechanics, and has received a great deal of empirical support. 
This chapter has developed conceptions of decoherence as criteria applied 
to history spaces. I hope it has become clear that this approach is inspired 
98 
 
by and heavily connected to the conception of environment induced 
decoherence presented at the start. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to 
wonder just how these conceptions of decoherence relate to the 
empirically and mathematically confirmed reduced density matrix 
formulation. 
Unfortunately, the characteristics of these criteria, and the approaches 
which underlie them, are sufficiently different to one another that it is not 
particularly easy to relate them to one another. One reason for this is that 
RDM diagonalisation is an indicator of decoherence centred around a 
particular measurement and particular set of variables which become 
entangled to their environment. Consistency and medium decoherence, on 
the other hand, are constraints over a history space. Particular variables for 
particular measurements are an important characteristic of the histories 
which form the space, but connecting these variables through to a 
decoherence functional is a far from trivial exercise. 
The second difficulty is that diagonalisation of a reduced density matrix is 
built on a fundamentally different picture of quantum mechanics to that 
which underlies histories approaches. In order for a reduced density matrix 
to become diagonalised as a consequence of interaction, the density matrix 
must be considered as dynamic. This clearly places RDM diagonalization 
approaches within the Schrödinger picture, in which density matrices are 
dynamic and measurement operators are static. Histories approaches on 
the other hand are built very much on the Heisenberg picture. The 
wavefunction (or density matrix) remains fixed, all dynamic evolution of 
the system is built into the projection operators. It is these dynamic 
sequences of operators which form the basis of a history space. 
Consequently, a formidable translation task is required in order to relate 
these conceptions of decoherence directly. 
Perhaps for this reason, the decoherence literature does not seem to offer 
any detailed general explanation of how these conceptions of decoherence 
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relate to one another9. I hope in the future there will be more work done 
to establish precise mathematical relations between these conceptions. 
For now though, I shall limit myself to a more qualitative comparison 
without attempting to rigorously explore their mathematical connections. 
The first thing to note is that diagonalization of the reduced density matrix 
is clearly far closer to consistency than it is to medium decoherence. They 
both relate to interference loss in local systems due to environmental 
interaction rather than concerning the vast systems needed for medium 
decoherence. 
They are both overgenerous in very similar ways. Consistency admits 
history spaces in which there is no environmental decoherence to remove 
interference phenomena, but instead the basis of projectors that form the 
histories simply happens to display phase alignments such that no 
interference is observed. In the same way, for the reduced density matrix 
(or pure density matrix) of a system, there is always a basis in which the 
matrix is diagonalized. This will be the case regardless of whether any 
encoding of a system’s degrees of freedom onto its environment has taken 
place. Consequently, both RDM diagonalization and consistency will admit 
cases in which no environmentally induced decoherence has occurred. 
The reason for the very close parallels is that both consistency and RDM 
diagonalisation are criteria built around the loss of interference 
phenomena. For RDM diagonalisation this means a particular set of 
degrees of freedom which cease to display interference phenomena, under 
operations affecting them. Consistency, on the other hand, concerns not 
only one set of degrees of freedom but a sequence of projectors over time 
which must not display interference phenomena. It seems, then, that 
consistency of the history space of the system will entail diagonalization of 
                                                          
9 Kiefer 2003 pp. 247-251 does offer some analysis of the connections between history 
space consistency and the diagonalisation of a system’s reduced density matrix, but it is 
rather brief, and based on non-trivial assumptions about the nature of system-
environment interaction. 
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the reduced density matrix of the system at a time k in cases where the 
basis of the reduced density matrix matches the projectors of the system’s 
histories at time k. 
Diagonalization of the system’s reduced density matrix, however, does not 
entail the consistency of its history space in the same basis. The reason is 
that RDM diagonalization concerns a particular set of variables at a 
particular time, and is generally used in relation to a particular event which 
encoded degrees of freedom of the system into the environment. A history 
space fulfilling the consistency criterion, on the other hand, depends on 
the continual absence of interference phenomena over time and 
successive branching events. For consistency brought about by 
decoherence, environmental encoding is necessary after every quantum 
probabilistic event which occurs throughout the system’s history space. 
RDM diagonalization is therefore closely tied to the consistency criterion. It 
is, however, a weaker criterion related to a particular set of degrees of 
freedom of a system, rather than a general constraint on a system’s entire 
history space. Given that it is diagonalisation of reduced density matrices 
which can be empirically tested in experimental tests of decoherence, it is 
interesting to find that this criterion is not only weaker than the medium 
decoherence criterion which has come to dominate in the literature, but is 
also weaker even than the consistency criterion. As already mentioned, 
chapter 6 will examine in far more detail the troubling gap between 
empirically verified forms of decoherence, and the far stronger forms being 
used to do explanatory and metaphysical work within modern 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. 
For now though, the next section will summarise the terminology used in 
discussions of decoherence. I hope that by providing these (reasonably) 
clear definitions I can maintain (some) clarity between different 
conceptions of decoherence throughout this thesis. 
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3.7 Summary 
• History: A history is an ordered series of projection operators of a 
systems state, which correspond to successive times. Generally, the 
sequence of projection operators are assumed to be related to one 
another by unitary time evolution operators which are a product of 
the system's Hamiltonian (at least in the absence of history 
branching). From this point on, I will be making this assumption 
about histories I refer to, unless I explicitly state otherwise. 
• Atomic histories: These are any set of histories which form a 
complete basis of states in which to decompose the system’s 
wavefunction. For a quasi-classical history space, this will mean a 
basis which specifies a complete set of particle states (e.g. position) 
for the entire system at every time. 
• Non-atomic histories: Most commonly discussed quasi-classical 
histories do not specify a system state of affairs with absolute 
precision at every time. These histories are coarse-grained, and 
usually only specify a macroscopic state of the system. 
Consequently, they describe a range of possible states of affairs and 
do not form a complete basis in terms of which a system's 
wavefunction can be decomposed. These histories are only partial 
decompositions of the system state, and are themselves composed 
of a number of atomic histories. 
• History space: A history space is the space formed of the product of 
all the projection operators of a set of atomic histories, applied to 
the time dependent wavefunction of the system. These history 
state projectors form basis vectors of this space. 
• Medium decoherence criterion: A history space fulfils the medium 
decoherence criterion if for any two histories at any time t: either 
the projectors of the two histories at every time prior to t agree; or, 
the projectors at time t are orthogonal to one another. In effect, 
this means that histories can branch, separating from one another 
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as time goes on, but cannot merge coming to agree on their states 
after previously disagreeing. This criterion ensures a branching 
structure of histories, unlike the consistency criterion. In terms of 
the decoherence functional this criterion is: 
𝐷(𝛼, 𝛽) = 0 
• Consistency criterion: A history space will fulfil the consistency 
criterion if and only if there is no interference between the atomic 
histories which make up the space. Medium decoherence entails 
consistency, but unlike medium decoherence, consistency does not 
guarantee that a history space will have a branching structure. The 
absence of interference phenomena means that the Born rule 
probabilities of histories within the space will obey the usual 
probability sum rules seen in classical probability, without any 
influence from the relative phases of histories. This condition is 
generally brought about in a history space as a consequence of the 
system decohering with respect to its environment in an 
appropriate basis. The consistency criterion may also be fulfilled by 
history spaces for which this is not the case, however. In terms of 
the decoherence functional this criterion is: 
𝐷(𝛼, 𝛽) ∈ 𝕀 
• Reduced Density Matrix diagonalization: The reduced density 
matrix of a system entangled to its environment by some degrees of 
freedom will, in a basis of those degrees of freedom, be 
diagonalized (off-diagonal elements will go to zero). This means 
that, under operations affecting those degrees of freedom, the 
system will behave as if it is in a definitive but unknown state, 
rather than a superposition (i.e. there will be no interference 
phenomena). 
There are also cases in which the density matrix of the system that 
is not appropriately entangled to its environment still has a diagonal 
form. In other words, the density matrix is diagonalised without 
decoherence. In these cases of diagonalisation interference 
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phenomena will still be absent, but the effect is likely to be very 
easily disrupted. 
• Decoherence: Decoherence is the experimentally observed physical 
process whereby a quantum system, entangled by a particular 
variable to its environment, will behave under operations affecting 
only that system as if it were in a definite, but unknown, eigenstate 
of that variable. This is the phenomenon which underlies both 
reduced density matrix diagonalisation, and the consistency 
criterion. As noted however, both of these criteria are too 
generous, and can be fulfilled without the physical phenomenon of 
decoherence. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to introduce two technical criteria of 
decoherence which appear within the philosophical literature, and 
examine the significance of these two criteria. I have argued that both are 
stronger than the reduced density matrix criterion presented in the 
previous chapter, and introduced the challenge of how we can know that a 
system fulfils these stronger criteria. 
These criteria are based on the notions of history and history space. I have 
noted that the literature concerning histories is generally concerned with 
quasi-classical histories in which quasi-classical entities are easily 
identifiable and display quasi-classical dynamics. Concerns about this kind 
of presupposition of classicality will be discussed in the next chapter. Aside 
from this presupposition however, this conception of history spaces and 
the dynamics which they display stem directly from the linear Schrödinger 
dynamics. Consequently, like the conception of decoherence presented in 
the last chapter, it will be applicable in any interpretation which accepts 
these Schrödinger dynamics as representational and universal. There 
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seems however to be a significant difference in how these histories are to 
be understood on different Everettian interpretations. 
As I noted at the start of this chapter, many histories interpretations depart 
from many worlds interpretations in that they do not seek a single quasi-
classical history space to invest with strong metaphysical significance. 
Instead of a single branching structure of Everettian worlds, they allow that 
a physicist may choose any history space which proves useful provided that 
the history space in question fulfils the relevant criterion (medium 
decoherence or consistency). They maintain that no history space which 
fulfils the relevant criterion is more fundamental than any other, and that 
different history spaces can be used whenever they are useful provided 
that incompatible histories are never combined into a single quantum 
description. 
The primary focus of this thesis is a many worlds formulation of Everettian 
quantum mechanics. Before moving on however, I will briefly consider how 
the challenge of justifying the belief that we occupy a quasi-classical history 
within a history space which fulfils the medium decoherence criterion (i.e. 
an Everettian world) relates to these many histories interpretations. 
It seems that decoherent histories approaches will be just as committed to 
showing that there is a basis of quasi-classical histories which fulfils the 
medium decoherence criterion as are many worlds Everettians. They seem 
to rely on the existence of such history spaces, though they are clearly 
interested in the possibility that there might be more than one such history 
space. 
At first glance, it seems that consistent histories interpretations might be 
less committed to there being any history space which fulfils the medium 
decoherence criterion. To an extent this is indeed true. However, it is 
important to bear in mind that in the physical phenomenon of 
decoherence it is the encoding of a systems history within the environment 
which lead to the suppression of interference effects necessary for the 
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history of the local system to fulfil the consistency criterion. Consequently, 
the most plausible justification for why history spaces of systems with 
which we might be concerned might fulfil the consistency criterion over 
long time periods would be because they are part of a larger history space 
which fulfils the medium decoherence criterion. This is not the only way in 
which local systems could fulfil this criterion, but alternatives rely on the 
phases of previously separated histories always agreeing when systems 
recombine without any explanation of why this should be the case. 
It seems then, that though many histories interpretations may not all be 
directly committed to the existence of a single quasi-classical history space 
which fulfils the medium decoherence assumption, they still ultimately 
seem to be invested in there being at least one such history space. 
The next two chapters will turn to examine specific technical issues which 
affect many histories interpretations which do not presuppose the Born 
rule for quantum probabilities. This is important to understanding the 
Everettian many worlds project, and the role of decoherence within it. 
Chapter 6 will return to history spaces, and examine possible means of 
justifying the assumption that we occupy a history within a history space 
which fulfils the medium decoherence criterion. 
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4 Circularity and the Born Rule 
 
In the previous chapter, I introduced a number of ways in which the 
physical phenomenon of decoherence, and mathematical criteria which are 
to a greater or lesser extent based upon it, are used in particular 
interpretations to solve certain aspects of the quantum measurement 
problem. There are a number of standard objections to using decoherence 
in these ways. This chapter and the next chapter will introduce these 
objections. In this chapter I will focus on the objections presented by Ruth 
Kastner in Kastner 2014. 
Some of these arguments are not relevant to the interpretations of 
decoherence with which I am primarily concerned in this thesis, but to 
Zurek’s quantum Darwinism project. Although, as I will argue, other 
interpretations seem able to avoid these problems, I believe it is important 
to understand Zurek's project, and the problems which it faces, in order to 
understand why other interpretations have the features which they do. 
I will argue that for these problems as presented by Kastner, at least David 
Wallace's form of the Everett interpretation is able to offer satisfactory 
responses to these problems. However, I will also identify some places 
where, while the most natural interpretation of Kastner can be answered 
by Wallace, her underlying concern connects to deeper and more 
important problems for modern decoherence-based interpretations. 
 
4.1 Circularity 
In chapter 2, I presented Schlosshauer’s analysis of the role of decoherence 
in the quantum measurement problem. Schlosshauer shows how 
decoherence plays a major role in resolving a number of significant 
difficulties. He makes it clear, however, that decoherence alone is not 
sufficient to recover the classical dynamics with which we are familiar. 
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Crucially, as we saw in chapter 2, it is not able in itself to resolve the 
specific problem of outcomes. That is, while decoherence may be able to 
account for our belief that quantum measurements have determinate 
outcomes, it does not seem able to account for why we come to believe 
that a measurement had a particular determinate outcome, rather than an 
alternative. For this reason, Schlosshauer accepts that some further 
interpretation is needed, such as that offered in Bohmian or Everettian 
accounts. 
Previously, however, there have been a number of attempts to suggest 
that decoherence might be able to allow a direct derivation of quasi-
classical structures and their dynamics from the linear quantum formalism. 
If this were possible, it would seem to do away with the need for further 
interpretation, as the quantum to classical transition could be replaced 
with a view of classicality as a simple deductive consequence of 
fundamental quantum dynamics. 
Zurek 1991 introduced a position he referred to as quantum Darwinism, 
which attempted to do exactly this. He sought to show that it was possible 
to derive the Born rule probabilities of quantum measurements without 
any presupposition of classical states, or other addition to the linear 
quantum dynamics. Though this position, as originally presented, has been 
substantially discredited (see Adler 2003), and now receives relatively little 
support, it is important to grasp it in order to understand the circularity 
objections still faced by decoherence based arguments. Furthermore, as 
we shall see later in this chapter, the Born rule derivation which Zurek 
provides remains popular with advocates of Everettian interpretations, and 
is used by Sebens and Carrol (2018) as a key part of their analysis of self-
locating uncertainty. 
 
4.2 Zurek’s Born Rule Derivation 
Premises 
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Zurek relies on seven premises. Four premises (0-3) are taken from the 
basic axioms of the standard quantum mechanical formalism, and three 
additional premises (i-iii) some of which are controversial. 
Zurek’s four premises taken from quantum mechanical axioms are (Zurek, 
2014, pp. 1): 
0) The “state of [a] composite system is a vector in the tensor product 
of constituent Hilbert spaces”. That is ℋ𝑆𝐴 = ℋ𝑆⨂ℋ𝐴 
1) “States of quantum systems correspond to normalized vectors in a 
(complex) Hilbert space.” 
2) “Evolutions [of quantum systems] are unitary,  |𝑆𝑡⟩ = 𝑈𝑡|𝑆0⟩” Zurek 
points out that this also implies the linearity of such evolutions. 
3) “Immediate repetition of the measurement yields the same 
outcome” for both measurements. 
None of these premises are particularly controversial. 
Zurek adds three premises which he regards as facts (Zurek, 2014, pp. 3): 
i) Locality: “A unitary [operator] must act on the system to change its 
state.” And a system only changes its state when acted upon by 
such an operator. 
ii) “[The] state of the system is all there is to predict measurement 
outcomes.” 
iii) “A composite state determines the state of subsystems (so [the] 
local state of [a subsystem] 𝑠 is restored when the state of the 
whole 𝑠𝜀 is restored).” 
None of these (except possibly for (ii)) is uncontroversial. 
With these premises in hand, Zurek sets out to derive the Born rule by 
showing, first, that there is nothing other than coefficient amplitudes in the 
wavefunction which could be used to indicate probability, and then 
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showing that it is possible to choose a decompositional basis in which 
different histories are broken down into sub histories of equal amplitude. 
He then uses the assumption of locality, and a state swap operator, to 
show that such sets must be equally probable, and thence derives the Born 
rule. 
 
4.3 Entanglement-Assisted Invariance (Envariance) 
In order to rule out other possible aspects of the wavefunction, which 
might influence or dictate a history’s probability, Zurek begins by setting 
out to show that for a system entangled with its environment, the phases 
of coefficients must be irrelevant to the probabilities of measurement 
outcomes. This invariance to phase of entangled systems Zurek terms 
Envariance, and this is one of the major consequences of the physical 
process of decoherence. 
The care taken in this step shows that Zurek is in many ways extremely 
rigorous in his methodology. The possibility of the direct physical influence 
of phase amplitudes on probability is neglected in many other attempts to 
derive the Born rule, such as that found in Wallace 2012. 
Zurek considers a two-state spin particle 𝑠 which has become entangled 
with its environment 𝜀 such that the total system is described by the state: 
|𝜓𝑠𝜀⟩ = 𝛼𝑒
𝑖𝜃|↑⟩|𝜀↑⟩ + 𝛽𝑒
𝑖𝜙|↓⟩|𝜀↓⟩ 
(Where 𝛼, and 𝛽 are real numbers, and the phases have been taken into 
the complex exponential terms.) 
Importantly, once these systems have become entangled, they are then 
separated and decoupled such that it is possible to perform operations on 
them individually. 
Zurek then defines a phase shift operator: 
𝑢𝑠
𝜑
= |↑⟩⟨↑| + 𝑒𝑖𝜙|↓⟩⟨↓| 
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Which acts on 𝑠 to shift the phase of |↓⟩ by 𝑒𝑖𝜑. 
This operator will act on the total system |𝜓𝑠𝜀⟩ as follows: 
𝑢𝑠
𝜑|𝜓𝑠𝜀⟩ = 𝛼𝑒
𝑖𝜃|↑⟩|𝜀↑⟩ + 𝛽𝑒
𝑖(𝜙+𝜑)|↓⟩|𝜀↓⟩ 
Now consider another similar operator which acts on the environment: 
𝑢𝜀
−𝜑
= |𝜀↑⟩⟨𝜀↑| + 𝑒
−𝑖𝜑|𝜀↓⟩⟨𝜀↓| 
When this operator is also applied to the total system, the system state is 
restored: 
𝑢𝜀
−𝜑
(𝑢𝑠
𝜑|𝜓𝑠𝜀⟩) = 𝛼𝑒
𝑖𝜃|↑⟩|𝜀↑⟩ + 𝛽𝑒
𝑖(𝜙+𝜑−𝜑)|↓⟩|𝜀↓⟩
=  𝛼𝑒𝑖𝜃|↑⟩|𝜀↑⟩ + 𝛽𝑒
𝑖𝜙|↓⟩|𝜀↓⟩ 
As the systems were decoupled, and locality has been taken as a premise 
(i), it is impossible that 𝑢𝜀
−𝜑
, could in any way affect the state of 𝑠. 
Nonetheless, by premise (iii), as the state of the total system has been 
restored, the state of the subsystem is restored also. As the physical state 
of 𝑠 cannot have changed with the action of operator 𝑢𝜀
−𝜑
, and must 
following its action be identical to the state prior to the action of either 
operator, phase shifts can have no physical significance for the states of 
perfectly entangled systems. And, as these states are by premise (ii) the 
only means by which we can predict measurement outcomes, phases 
should not affect the probabilities we assign to possible outcomes in 
quantum measurements. 
Zurek therefore concludes that amplitudes must hold the key to obtaining 
quantum probabilities from wavefunctions. The wavefunction can be 
thought of as being made up of basis vectors, which correspond to physical 
outcome states, amplitudes, and phases. As Zurek has shown that phase 
amplitudes have no direct influence on probability, he now turns his 
attention to amplitudes. 
The reader may be concerned that the wavefunction’s basis vectors 
seemed to go unconsidered here. In essence, Zurek relies on decoherence 
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here too. This is just another instance of the problem of the preferred 
basis, and Zurek regards this as being solved by precisely the same 
decoherence based reasoning presented in chapter 2. 
 
4.4 Born’s Rule for Equiprobable States 
Zurek first derives the Born rule for pairs of states with equal amplitudes, 
before going on to extend this to a more general derivation. To understand 
Zurek’s proof of Born’s rule for equally weighted pairs of states, consider 
the system |𝜓𝑠𝜀⟩ in the case where 𝛼 = 𝛽 =
1
√2
: 
|𝜓𝑠𝜀⟩ =
1
√2
𝑒𝑖𝜃|↑⟩|𝜀↑⟩ +
1
√2
𝑒𝑖𝜙|↓⟩|𝜀↓⟩ 
As in the previous section, Zurek focuses on the case in which the 
subsystems 𝑠 and 𝜀 are decoupled and spatially separated. Zurek then 
considers the effect of operators which swap the states of the subsystems. 
The effect of the swap operator is to exchange system states; for example, 
an operator which, if applied to a spin up state, changed it to spin down, 
and if applied to spin down changed it to spin up, would be a simple swap 
operator. Locality once again ensures that operations performed on one 
subsystem do not influence the state of the other. 
First, consider a swap operation applied to the state of 𝑠: 
|𝜓𝑠𝜀⟩ ⇒
1
√2
𝑒𝑖𝜃|↓⟩|𝜀↑⟩ +
1
√2
𝑒𝑖𝜙|↑⟩|𝜀↓⟩ 
Linearity demands that the probabilities of |↑⟩, and |↓⟩, are therefore 
exchanged, so that: 𝑃↑ = 𝑃↓0, and 𝑃↓ = 𝑃↑0. 
Now consider applying a similar swap operation to the state of 𝜀: 
|𝜓𝑠𝜀⟩ ⇒
1
√2
𝑒𝑖𝜃|↓⟩|𝜀↓⟩ +
1
√2
𝑒𝑖𝜙|↑⟩|𝜀↑⟩ 
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The probabilities of |𝜀↑⟩, and |𝜀↓⟩, are therefore exchanged, so that: 𝑃𝜀↑ =
𝑃𝜀↑0, and 𝑃𝜀↓ = 𝑃𝜀↓0. 
Now, however, in effect the only swap that has taken place is a swap 
between 𝜃, and 𝜙. As it was demonstrated in the previous section that the 
phases these terms determine can have no effect on the probabilities to be 
assigned to possible outcomes, we can therefore perform the phase shifts 
without influencing the probabilities of subsystems states. As such, we can 
perform the phase shift necessary to swap 𝜃 and 𝜙, and restore |𝜓𝑠𝜀⟩ to its 
original state without influencing any probability. 
The state of the total system having been restored by (ii) and (iii), we 
conclude that the probabilities appropriate to assign to possible outcomes 
are also restored, just as in the previous section. 
 We can therefore conclude: 
𝑃↑ = 𝑃↓0 = 𝑃↓ = 𝑃↑0 =
1
2
 
𝑃𝜀↑ = 𝑃𝜀↑0 = 𝑃𝜀↓ = 𝑃𝜀↓0 =
1
2
 
 
4.5 Born’s Rule for Uneven Superpositions 
Zurek expands his derivation to the case of uneven superpositions by 
changing the basis states so as to produce many equiprobable states (Zurek 
2014, pp. 10). 
This can be done remarkably simply. Let us consider our two-state particle 
interacting with a measurement apparatus. The apparatus has two 
macroscopic states: |𝐴↑⟩, and |𝐴↓⟩. In order to fine-grain these states we 
define: 
|𝐴↑⟩ = ∑|𝑎𝑘⟩/√𝜇 
𝜇
𝑘=1
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|𝐴↓⟩ = ∑ |𝑎𝑘⟩/√𝜈 
𝜇+𝜈
𝑘=𝜇+1
 
Where 
𝛼2
𝛽2
=
𝜇
𝜈
, where 𝜇, and 𝜈 are natural numbers 
The state of the system (neglecting normalisation) is therefore: 
|𝜓𝑠𝐴⟩ ∝ √𝜇𝑒
𝑖𝜃|↑⟩|𝐴↑⟩ + √𝜈𝑒
𝑖𝜙|↓⟩|𝐴↓⟩ = 𝑒
𝑖𝜃∑|↑⟩|𝑎𝑘⟩
𝜇
𝑘=1
+ 𝑒𝑖𝜙 ∑ |↓⟩|𝑎𝑘⟩ 
𝜇+𝜈
𝑘=𝜇+1
 
Which during the process of measurement will become entangled to many 
states of the environment: 
|𝜓𝑠𝐴𝜀⟩ = 𝑒
𝑖𝜃∑|↑ 𝑎𝑘⟩|𝑒𝑘⟩
𝜇
𝑘=1
+ 𝑒𝑖𝜙 ∑ |↓ 𝑎𝑘⟩|𝑒𝑘⟩ 
𝜇+𝜈
𝑘=𝜇+1
 
By precisely the same reasoning as in the previous section these 𝑘 states 
must be equiprobable. The probability of |↑ 𝑎𝑘⟩ is therefore:
10 
𝑃↑ =
𝜇
𝜇 + 𝜈
= 𝛼2 
𝑃↓ =
𝜈
𝜇 + 𝜈
= 𝛽2 
And this is precisely the Born rule for quantum probabilities. 
 
4.6 Circularity in Quantum Darwinism 
Zurek's argument has for a long time now faced accusations of circularity. A 
significant reason for this is that the original form of this argument, given 
by Zurek 1991, presented system states and the process of decoherence in 
terms of reduced density matrices. Using these matrices at all seems to 
implicitly presuppose the Born rule, essentially because they rely on the 
possibility of averaging over possible states of the environment, weighting 
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them according to their Born rule amplitudes. Thus, Zurek’s putative 
derivation of the Born rule originally relied on its implicit presupposition. 
Zurek 2005 himself identifies this problem and since then he has 
reformulated his derivation to the form shown here. This did not, however, 
put an end to accusations of circularity for his project. The principal reason 
for this is that Zurek still relies heavily on environment induced 
decoherence, and reduced density matrices remain the most common 
means of representing this process. Consequently it is reasonable to 
wonder if Zurek’s reliance on decoherence introduces a vicious circularity 
to his reasoning. 
Ruth Kastner has been particularly vocal in arguing that his derivation still 
rests on implicit presuppositions of classicality in ways which undermine 
his analysis. Though she presents this primarily as a response to Zurek, the 
arguments appear to extend to the more general project of using 
decoherence to recover aspects of the classical macroscopic world. 
Kastner 2014 makes a range of interrelated points which I think can be 
summarised under two headings: 
1. Zurek’s use of decoherence relies on a particular choice of system 
environment split. 
2. The theoretical models which underlie decoherence theory rely on 
the assumption of an environment made up of randomised phase 
correlations. This is not a plausible assumption in the absence of 
some form of collapse postulate. 
I will examine these points in turn. Both of them are on a basic level 
accurate and important points. The first, I have already noted in chapter 2. 
Quantum Darwinism as presented by Zurek does not currently offer a 
means by which to respond to either point. Other interpretations however 
do seem to have readily available (albeit partial) answers. In a sense, it 
would be very easy to apply these answers to Zurek's quantum Darwinism. 
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It is tempting to offer these as friendly amendments in order to develop 
and defend Zurek’s position. I will not do so, however. The reason is that 
these solutions all involve adding either additional physical dynamics, or 
additional interpretational metaphysics, and doing either of these things 
would directly contradict the spirit of Zurek’s quantum Darwinism, as I 
understand it. Zurek’s aim was to show that the linear quantum formalism, 
and the decoherence theory that derives from it, were, in and of 
themselves, sufficient to recover all the essentials of the classical world 
with which we are generally familiar. This would effectively dissolve the 
quantum measurement problem without any need for any of the additions 
of the major quantum interpretational projects. For this reason, I will 
simply show why I believe Kastner's objections make Zurek’s project 
untenable, and then turn to look at the responses that can be offered 
within Wallace's Everettian quantum mechanics. 
 
4.7 Objection 1: Decoherence Relies on a Particular Choice 
of System Environment Split 
The primary purpose, for which Zurek relies on decoherence, is the 
selection of a set of states naturally preferred within the process of 
measurement, just as I set out in the previous chapter. At the same time, I 
also noted that using decoherence to obtain a preferred basis in this way 
relies on a particular choice of system and environment. 
If we consider the degrees of freedom of a chair as a system, and form a 
reduced density matrix to represent that system, then the heavy 
entanglements of elements of the chair to its environment in a position 
basis, will ensure that the reduced density matrix is approximately 
diagonalised in that basis, so that the chair’s shape and position can act as 
an effectively preferred basis. However, if instead we consider a system 
made up of some other non-classical set of degrees of freedom, such as the 
spin states of a set of electrons in the chair and its environment, then the 
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reduced density matrix formed will not be diagonalised in a classically 
recognisable basis such as position, but in some other profoundly 
nonclassical basis. 
Kastner’s concern is that choosing such classical splits illicitly smuggles in 
what decoherence was meant to prove, by assuming a very particular 
division of system and environment, which she believes to be arbitrary. The 
natural response is that there is nothing arbitrary about seeking 
descriptions of those objects with which we are classically familiar rather 
than others. After all, all scientific theories have a particular subject matter 
which is chosen in accordance with our interests, and the things which we 
wish to model and understand. No one expects, for example, that our ideal 
gas laws, or the theory underlying them, should be able to derive 
theoretically the existence of gases, such as noble gases, to which they 
(approximately) apply. Rather, we are interested in these laws because we 
have found empirically that they are successful at modelling particular 
types of system in particular circumstances. It might be thought that, in 
precisely the same way, modelling a system such as a chair in decoherence 
theory is nothing more than investigating the dynamics of a system of 
particular interest to us. Kastner rejects this suggestion. 
Her reasoning is that treating a system such as a chair as our modelled 
system can only be a non-arbitrary choice if there is a high degree of 
separation and independence between the chair and the rest of its 
environment, making the chair an approximately isolated system. But, 
given the very high degree of entanglement of all macroscopic objects, this 
is not ever going to be a realistic assumption. Given the incredible ease 
with which any two systems rapidly become entangled, the only system for 
which it is ever going to be a reasonable assumption is that of the universe 
as a whole. And as that system has no environment, environment induced 
decoherence theory could not be applied to it in any case. 
Though it might be possible to argue that the observed dynamics of chairs 
mark them out as special in some way, she believes that even this could 
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not serve to avoid the circularity of using such a division. “After all, the 
whole point of the ‘einselection’ program is to demonstrate that the 
observed divisions arise naturally from within the theory. To assume the 
divisions we already see in the world and then demonstrate that, based on 
those assumed divisions, the divisions arise ‘naturally,’ is clearly circular.” 
(Kastner 2014, pp. 10, original emphasis). 
I believe that Kastner's argument is successful against very strong forms of 
decoherence-based reasoning. If decoherence is truly being used in an 
attempt to show that quasi-classical entities and their dynamics are directly 
and objectively derivable from the linear quantum dynamics, then Kastner 
is right to reject the program as viciously circular. As her criticism is 
primarily directed at Zurek, it may be an important and pertinent 
argument. It is difficult to judge what precisely Zurek regards his derivation 
as showing. The crucial question is whether his einselection program is 
indeed intended to demonstrate that the observed divisions of the classical 
world arise naturally from within quantum theory, or rather to 
demonstrate how the observed divisions of the classical world arise 
naturally from within quantum theory. 
Which of these Zurek seeks to achieve remains rather unclear. It seems 
likely that he doesn't attribute any particular significance to the distinction 
and has no settled position on the question. 
Seeking to demonstrate that the observed divisions of the classical world 
arise naturally from within quantum theory, merely by examination of the 
linear formalism and decoherence theory, seems clearly to fall prey to 
objections of circularity. It is not the case that decoherence gives chairs 
and their quasi-classical dynamics as a necessarily preferred structure 
derivable from the fundamental laws of physics. Indeed, it would seem all 
but miraculous if they were to do so, and this interpretation of Zurek's 
project is clearly rendered untenable. 
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On the other hand, if Zurek is understood as simply showing that, for quasi-
classical structures, it is possible to show that quasi-classical dynamics will 
inevitably apply, then his program does not seem to face any difficulty 
arising from this argument of Kastner's. This is how I believe those 
interpretations of quantum mechanics which use decoherence theory 
(discussed in the previous chapter) generally understand it. Whether it is 
the particles following (relatively) quasi-classical trajectories found in 
Bohmian mechanics, the agent-like Information Gathering Utilising System 
(IGUS) discussed by Gell-Mann and Hartle11, or the emergence-based 
understanding found in Wallace's Everettian quantum mechanics, all these 
interpretations have metaphysical and conceptual formulations designed 
to provide some elements of quasi-classicality which simply relies on 
decoherence to show how that continued classicality is consistent with, 
and ensured by, linear quantum dynamics. This is crucial not only to 
answering charges of circularity, but, as argued by Adler 2002, to showing 
how apparently stochastic dynamics are able to emerge from a 
fundamentally deterministic theory. 
If Zurek’s analysis is indeed seeking to show how the observed divisions of 
the classical world are able to arise naturally from within quantum theory, 
then Kastner’s argument ceases to apply. However, if this is the case, 
Zurek’s project also seems to lose much of its unique interest. Zurek does 
not offer an interpretation to go with his formal analysis and derivation of 
the Born rule. He seems to aim his project at providing a means of 
recovering classicality without such an interpretation. And this sets Zurek's 
quantum Darwinism apart as a unique and ambitious project, 
fundamentally different from more recent interpretations which use the 
decoherence-based reasoning he pioneered. Unfortunately, as it stands, 
this project has no means of answering the charges of circularity levelled 
                                                          
11 Gell-Mann and Hartle 1990 pp. 24, introduce the notion of an IGUS as a generic form of 
complex adaptive system which resides within quantum mechanical histories, and changes 
its behaviour in response to past records of its environment. They take human beings to 
be examples of IGUSes. They argue that the patterns which IGUSes would come to exploit 
are those displayed by quasi-classical decoherent history spaces. 
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by Kastner. If on the other hand, Zurek is to be understood as simply 
providing a proof of consistency with classicality which is interpretation 
neutral (at least among those interpretations which endorse his additional 
assumptions), but not a solution of the quantum measurement problem 
without further interpretation, then his project becomes essential and 
pioneering ground work for those interpretations which rely on it, but not 
something to be considered as an interpretation in its own right. 
 
4.8 Objection 2: Decoherence Relies on an Environment with 
Randomised Phase Correlations. This isn't a Plausible 
Assumption.  
Kastner offers a second objection to Zurek's reasoning, which appears to 
have wider applicability, and which could potentially undermine all 
interpretations which rely on decoherence. Kastner believes, based on a 
derivation of time-dependent interference suppression given by Bub 1997, 
that decoherence relies on a very large environment of random 
unentangled states. Given however, the ease with which systems become 
entangled, she points out that it is extremely unlikely to have the kind of 
randomly varying environment needed for this derivation. 
“The crucial point that does not yet seem to have been fully 
appreciated is this: in the Everettian picture, everything is always 
coherently entangled, so pure states must be viewed as a fiction -- 
but that means that it is also fiction that the putative 
'environmental systems' are all randomly phased… Everettian 
decoherentists have effectively assumed what they are trying to 
prove: macroscopic classicality only ‘emerges’ in this picture 
because a classical, non-quantum-correlated environment was 
illegitimately put in by hand from the beginning.” (Kastner 2014, pp. 
4, original emphasis). 
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Kastner is certainly right that Bub’s environment model is implausible in 
representing the environment as a large number of independent elements 
with no entanglements of phase correlations between either the many 
elements of the environment, or the system to be measured. She does not 
seem, however, to offer a clear and convincing argument for how this 
common inaccuracy in the theoretical models which underpinned 
decoherence, is supposed to lead those models into error. In this section, I 
will consider two problems which Kastner suggests this might pose. In both 
cases I will argue that as stated these are very unlikely to represent serious 
problems, as only very specific types of correlation between the system 
and its environment would lead to a failure of decoherence. Finally, I will 
argue that those possible phase correlations which do present a significant 
concern, are precisely those cases which might lead to history 
recombination. 
4.8.1 Entanglement of Elements within the Environment 
Kastner clearly feels that widespread entanglement within the 
environment is an important omission from the standard theoretical 
underpinnings of decoherence. She argues that neglecting this 
entanglement amounts to smuggling in classical dynamics without any 
means to justify them. It is unclear however precisely what she thinks is 
concerning about these correlations. 
Standard decoherence theory relies on an environment with a large 
number of uncorrelated degrees of freedom becoming entangled with the 
system’s measured property in order to effectively diagonalise the reduced 
density matrix of that system. A plausible understanding of Kastner's 
concern here seems to be that the environmental degrees of freedom 
might be sufficiently prone to entanglement with one another that they 
will not act as multiple independent measurements, each forming an 
additional entanglement with the measured property of the target system. 
If so, this would mean that, rather than being measured by a vast number 
of independent degrees of freedom, the system is measured only by a few. 
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This would seem to undermine environmental decoherence, which is 
typically presented as needing a very large number of measuring degrees 
of freedom in order to effectively suppress the off-diagonal elements of 
the systems reduced density matrix. 
In fact however, this argument holds only in the idealized case in which the 
entanglement of the measured system to the first environmental element 
is perfect. In realistic cases, in which there will not be a one-to-one 
correlation between measured particle state and the state of the 
environmental element, other environmental elements will not be 
perfectly entangled to the state of the measured system, and so will be 
able to interact to further decohere the measured system. In the ideal 
case, where the entanglement produced by the first interaction is perfect, 
this alone will be sufficient to set the off-diagonal elements of the reduced 
density matrix of the measured system strictly equal to zero (see example 
given by Wallace 2012, pp. 77-81). 
An alternative formulation of the same problem would be that, at any time 
after the environment has interacted with the measured two-state system, 
there are two states which the environment will occupy in different 
histories, one corresponding to each of the possible values. At any such 
time it is possible to select a basis set in which these branches differ by 
only two elements in the state vector of each environment (these two basis 
vectors describe the plane in Hilbert space upon which the state vectors of 
both branches will lie). Given that all the other elements that make up the 
environment’s state vector are now entirely unaffected by the state of the 
measured system, the measured two-state system can only ever be 
entangled with these two environmental states. At first glance this 
formulation seems to present a problem, as these two environmental 
states are not specifically designed to produce ideal entanglement 
interactions, and typically single interactions do not produce the degree of 
entanglement necessary to substantially suppress interference effects. In 
fact, the degree of entanglement between these environmental degrees of 
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freedom and the state of the measured system will increase with time, 
producing exactly the same interference suppression factor as a function of 
time as any other environmental basis selection. 
This highlights an important point, that for a two-state observable it is 
always possible to select a basis according to which the observed system 
interacts with only 2 degrees of freedom of the environment, and that if 
environment induced decoherence could not be produced for a system 
interacting with a number of degrees of freedom equal to its own, 
decoherence would not be possible for any system. 
In short, the concern that entanglements within a system’s environment 
might render it effectively equivalent to a smaller environment, and so 
undermine the ability of that environment to decohere the system, relies 
on a common misunderstanding of what is required for the suppression of 
interference. In order for a reduced density matrix to become diagonalised, 
the system state must be encoded somewhere outside of itself in the basis 
of that matrix. This is usually regarded as depending on a very large 
number of degrees of freedom to robustly encode the system state. 
However, the same degree of interference suppression can be achieved by 
a single measurement if the single measurement leads to a sufficient 
degree of entanglement, and this entanglement remains robust. Thus, the 
entanglements between elements of the environment which are omitted 
from Bub’s model do not seem to be problematic failings of that model. 
4.8.2 Pre-Existing Correlations Between Measured Systems and Their 
Environment 
The second possible understanding of Kastner’s concern is that it relates to 
pre-existing entanglements between measured systems and their 
environments. Typically, quantum measurement processes are 
represented as pure quantum states becoming entangled to their 
environment and so decohering. One aspect of Kastner’s concern seems to 
be the origin of these pure states. Without the collapse postulate, 
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entanglements will become extremely widespread extremely quickly, and it 
might seem that the (clearly inaccurate) assumption of an environment 
that is initially independent of our measured system is crucial to 
decoherence theory. 
At first glance, the near certainty of entanglement between the 
environment and the measured system which Kastner rightly identifies is 
certainly troubling. In fact, however, this concern is resolved by 
consideration of the process of preparing the target system for 
measurement. In particular, it must be remembered that quantum 
measurements of superposition states, of the type which decoherence is 
meant to facilitate, are performed on particles whose state vectors are 
known with a high degree of accuracy. 
If the state vector were not known, it would be impossible to say with any 
certainty that the measured state of the particle after measurement was 
not the state of the particle all along. In order to obtain particles in known 
superposition states the particles must already have been measured. This 
certainly verifies Kastner’s claim that the target particle and environment 
must already be entangled. Importantly, however, decoherence would fail 
to diagonalise the reduced density matrix of the target particle only if the 
environment with which the particle becomes entangled during 
decoherence were already entangled to the property of the particle being 
measured. In any case in which the target particle is known to be in a 
superposition state for a particular measurement, this is because some 
non-commuting variable has already been measured, in order to identify 
the particle’s state in a non-commuting basis. Consequently, the 
environment will be heavily entangled to the particle observable first 
measured, and accordingly uncorrelated from the second measured 
observable. 
In the more general case of naturally occurring quantum measurements 
which have not been carefully prepared in this way, much the same factors 
still apply. We may not usually possess the prior information about the 
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quantum state which is measured to compare its outcome to any 
theoretical statistics, but its initial state will nonetheless have been 
encoded within the environment. This encoding will decohere the initial 
state of the system, producing a state which (for most purposes) can be 
thought of as a pure quantum state. 
Consider the following example: 
A spin 
1
2
 particle is obtained for the purposes of performing a 
measurement of a particle in a superposition state. The initial state 
of the particle is unknown. In order for a clearly probabilistic 
quantum measurement of a superposition state to be performed, a 
measurement must first be made in order to obtain a known state 
vector for the particle. Suppose that the spin of the particle is 
measured in the 𝑧 basis. In a collapse-free framework this will 
involve the universal wavefunction entering a superposition state 
according to the possible outcomes of the measurement. The effect 
of this measurement is to produce histories in which the state 
vector of the particle is aligned to the spin 𝑧 basis in Hilbert space. 
In each of these histories the environment will become heavily 
entangled with this spin 𝑧 measurement. If a subsequent spin 
measurement is now made in the 𝑥 basis, the value of this 
observable is initially entirely unentangled from the environment: 
thus there is no danger of existing entanglements between the 
environment and the target particle interfering with the ability of 
the environment to decohere the state of the measured 
observable, in this case 𝑥 spin. 
Of course, not all superposition measurements involve successive 
measurements of orthogonal variables. For a measurement made in some 
basis 𝜃, at an angle between 𝑥 and 𝑧, the environment will be partially 
entangled to the 𝜃 spin measurement. However, the effect of entangling 
the 𝜃 spin state to the environment will still be to suppress the off-diagonal 
125 
 
elements in the reduced density matrix of the target particle described in 
the 𝜃 basis. The only case in which there will be no significant suppression 
of these elements will be in the case when 𝜃 is extremely closely aligned to 
𝑧, as in this case these terms will already have been effectively suppressed. 
It is interesting to note that, for those interpreters of quantum mechanics 
who do not advocate a collapse interpretation, local pure states are 
something which no one has ever measured. That is, truly pure states apply 
only to those entities which have never interacted, and which are 
completely unentangled from the rest of the universe. This of course is not 
the case for those particles used in physics experiments. Thus, when a 
physicist describes a particular particle as occupying a pure state, this claim 
cannot be interpreted literally on any view of quantum mechanics other 
than a collapse interpretation. Quantum Darwinism, as well as more 
common no-collapse interpretations, must make sense of this claim as 
meaning something like: the particle has been measured or operated on 
such that a large portion of the environment including the physicist are 
entangled to its state in a particular basis, and we can predict with very 
high accuracy what the result will be of a subsequent measurement in that 
basis if one is undertaken immediately. 
 
4.8.3 History Recombination 
In general, then, we do not need to be concerned about the implicit 
assumption of phase randomness found in decoherence theory. The vast 
majority of possible entanglement relations will still produce very similar 
results to those obtained by assuming phase randomness. However, there 
is a special subset of possible entanglement relations for which this is 
untrue. These are the entanglement relations which under subsequent 
operations to the system will in a short time period lead to history 
recombination and large-scale interference phenomena, as seen in the 
previous chapter. 
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It is unclear how far Kastner herself identifies this as a specific concern. The 
whole of her 2014 paper is built around a comparison to Boltzmann, and a 
putative proof of the second law of thermodynamics which proved to be 
circular. In the circumstances, this comparison seems rather apt for the 
subject of history recombination. Wallace 2012 does suggest that a 
branching structure of histories is ensured by some quantum equivalent of 
the assumed low entropy starting conditions, needed to safeguard the 
second law of thermodynamics. On the other hand, Kastner certainly never 
raises the issue of history recombination directly or engages with Wallace's 
suggestion here. As such, it seems most likely that Boltzmann's argument is 
serving as nothing more than an example of a viciously circular argument in 
physics. 
It is unclear to what extent Kastner has considered the possibility of history 
recombination, and the threat it poses for decoherence based arguments. 
None the less, her very evident concerns about the possibility of long-
standing phase correlations undermining decoherence theory point to just 
these possibilities. She correctly identifies that standard treatments of the 
subject invariably begin by assuming both the system and its environment 
to be in a pure uncorrelated state. This is an understandable decision, as 
the alternative would increase the mathematical complexity hugely, and in 
many cases wouldn't change the results at all. But it undoubtedly 
contributes to obscuring the issue of recombination and the origins of the 
branching history structure. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
I began this chapter by introducing Zurek’s formal decoherence-based 
derivation of the Born rule. This derivation paved the way for more recent 
derivations, such as Wallace 2012 and Sebens & Carrol 2018, which play a 
major role in currently prominent attempts at interpreting quantum 
mechanics. These later works very closely follow the basic structure 
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originally set out by Zurek. Decoherence-based Born rule derivations of this 
kind have particular significance for modern Everettian interpretations. 
I then introduced accusations of circularity against this approach levelled 
by Kastner 2014 amongst others. The concerns presented by Kastner divide 
into two categories: 
First, concern that presupposing a quasi-classical entity with a quasi-
classical choice of basis states of interest implicitly presupposes the 
classicality which decoherence based arguments were meant to obtain. 
Kastner believes that this presupposition renders Zurek's derivation of the 
Born rule viciously circular. As Zurek himself notes in later papers, this is 
entirely true if his work is understood as a derivation showing that classical 
dynamics emerge from the linear quantum mechanics by decoherence. On 
the other hand, if the derivation is understood as simply showing how 
classical dynamics emerge from linear quantum mechanics, when it is 
applied to those types of systems which we already expect are going to 
display this kind of behaviour, then this circularity is not something which 
should concern us. 
Second, Kastner is concerned about the standard assumption of random 
and uncorrelated phases within the environment in presentations of 
decoherence. I have argued that she is right to be concerned about these. 
She does not however distinguish those particular types of phase 
correlations which are going to present a serious concern. These, I believe, 
are precisely those correlations which are likely to lead to history 
recombination under subsequent evolution of the total system. This point 
will be discussed in far more detail later in this thesis. More generally, I 
have argued that phase correlations within the environment do not need 
to represent a serious concern. 
The next chapter will look at the objections to decoherence based Born 
rule derivations raised by Thébault & Dawid 2015. These are in some ways 
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similar to those raised by Kastner, but potentially far more challenging for 
the decoherence project. 
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5 Thébault and Dawid’s Inconsistency Objection(s) 
 
In the last chapter, I looked at the Born rule derivation developed by Zurek, 
and objections of circularity raised by Kastner 2014. I argued that generally 
the objections of circularity rested on a mistaken understanding of the 
appropriate purpose of Zurek’s derivation. 
In this chapter, I will turn to look at somewhat similar objections raised by 
Thébault & Dawid 2015. These objections are not directed against Zurek 
directly, but against Wallace 2012, who offers a derivation of his own 
which duplicates the bulk of Zurek's argument. Wallace departs from Zurek 
in two ways. 
First, he offers a sophisticated decision theoretic characterisation of 
probability designed to make sense of how probabilities can be understood 
in the context of a fundamentally deterministic linear quantum mechanics 
without any additional dynamics. This careful and technical treatment of 
types of probability is largely beyond the scope of this thesis. It is also 
largely irrelevant to the arguments of Thébault & Dawid. The only point 
which will matter for the purposes of this chapter is that Wallace's 
derivation of the Born rule rests on a decision theoretic conception of 
probability. As will become clear, Thébault & Dawid have significant 
concerns about this conception. 
The second difference between Wallace and Zurek is the emergence-based 
interpretational framework within which Wallace's view of the derivation is 
situated. I argued in the previous chapter that, within the context of this 
interpretational framework, Wallace does not need to show that classical 
dynamics and the Born rule are derived from the linear quantum 
mechanics, but rather to show how these things emerge from the linear 
quantum mechanics. 
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The first argument presented by Thébault & Dawid is a concern about 
circularity very similar to that seen in the previous chapter. This argument 
seems to be neatly answered by this distinction between attempting to 
recover classicality, as a derivative consequence of linear quantum 
mechanics, and simply showing how it emerges from the linear quantum 
mechanics. Thébault & Dawid seem to be aware of this response and to 
accept it. They present this form of circularity argument partly by way of 
context setting, and partly to emphasise the limitations on what can be 
achieved by decoherence, which they feel are often neglected. This chapter 
will review this argument because, although it is similar to the circularity 
arguments presented by Kastner, there are some important differences. 
The two later arguments presented by Thébault & Dawid are more 
significant, and argue that this form of Born rule derivation is not merely 
circular but, in some sense, inconsistent. One argument claims that this 
form of derivation of the decision theoretic Born rule rests on the 
presupposition of a form of the Born rule which is far stronger, and (on 
Wallace's view) seems to be incompatible with the decision theoretic form. 
The other argument claims that the neglecting of off-diagonal elements of 
the reduced density matrix is unjustifiably different from the way in which 
other terms are treated, in a way which renders the Born rule derivation 
suspect. If these arguments proved successful it would pose a new and 
very significant challenge for decoherence-based Born rule derivations. 
I will argue that, at least on the most natural understanding of the 
concerns raised by Thébault & Dawid, these concerns can reasonably be 
answered in ways suggested by Wallace in other contexts. Consequently, I 
believe that at least Wallace (who is the main target of Thébault & Dawid’s 
paper) should not be particularly concerned by the arguments they 
present. As I shall identify at the end of the chapter, however, there is 
another way of understanding these arguments which presents a far more 
significant difficulty. 
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5.1 Thébault & Dawid’s Circularity Objection 
In the section of their paper focusing on circularity objections to 
decoherence-based Born rule derivations, Thébault & Dawid present a 
circularity objection produced by a number of authors including Kent 2010, 
primarily targeting the Born rule derivation provided in Zurek 2004. In fact, 
as Thébault & Dawid note, this objection was first presented by Zurek 
himself in Zurek 2005. 
The difference between the derivation presented in the previous chapter 
of this thesis, which is taken from Zurek 2005, and the derivation which he 
offers in his paper a year earlier is the extent to which the reduced density 
matrix characterisation of decoherence plays a role. Presenting the 2005 
version in the previous chapter, I noted at a certain point that Zurek 
presupposed a particular basis for measured states. I commented at the 
time that this preferred basis is precisely what decoherence typically 
provides. The standard means of presenting this, however, relies, as I 
showed in chapter 2, on the formalism of the reduced density matrix. In his 
presentation in earlier papers, Zurek does not confine the reduced density 
matrix to this minor implicit role. This formalism is prominent throughout 
his derivation. 
The reason for this shift in Zurek's presentation is that he came to 
recognise that the reduced density matrix relies fundamentally on the Born 
rule. This is because the reduced density matrix of an entangled subsystem 
is formed by taking a partial trace over the density matrix of the entire 
closed system, which includes the environment of the subsystem. As I 
made clear in chapter 2, this process of taking a partial trace amounts to 
adding together a weighted mixture of density matrices for the subsystem, 
with the weightings of those different matrices based on the Born rule 
probabilities of different states of the environment. This means that any 
derivation of the Born rule which relies on reduced density matrices must 
clearly be circular. 
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Having recognised this problem, Zurek 2005 sets out to eliminate this 
reliance on reduced density matrices as far as possible. The derivation 
provided in the previous chapter does not directly rely on them at all – 
though, as Zurek acknowledges, it does rely on a preferred basis which 
would typically be obtained by consideration of a reduced density matrix as 
discussed in chapter 2. Zurek devotes a section in his paper to 
consideration of other means by which a preferred basis might be justified, 
though he does not seem to produce any very convincing suggestions. 
Thébault & Dawid ignore the subtleties of Zurek's revised argument. As far 
as they are concerned, what has been established is the clear circularity of 
Zurek's Born rule derivation, as well as the related derivation offered by 
Wallace 2012. 
It is interesting to note that Zurek's revised derivation clearly shows that 
there are alternatives to this circularity, albeit somewhat unappealing 
ones. What Zurek offers actually is a derivation which produces the Born 
rule without presupposing it. This derivation is valid and non-circular, as 
long as we accept just putting in the preferred basis states by hand with no 
further derivation. On some level, the explicit presupposition of a system of 
interest and the basis of measurement outcomes do not seem like 
particularly excessive premises from which to derive the Born rule in the 
way which Zurek does. This speaks to the clear and continued interest and 
importance of Zurek's result. 
Nevertheless, explicitly presupposing a preferred basis in this way is clearly 
far from the derivation from first principles we might hope for, and would 
be unacceptable to many advocates of the decoherence program. Most 
relevantly to Thébault & Dawid’s argument, Everettians such as Wallace 
have set themselves the goal of developing an interpretation which does 
not presuppose a particular preferred basis, but allows the preferred basis 
to emerge from the underlying linear dynamics. As such, Everettians such 
as Wallace seem obliged to accept the circularity of Born rule derivations. 
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As Thébault & Dawid put it in their conclusion from this section: 
“Deutsch–Wallace type derivations of the Born rule as a subjective 
probability measure are inherently circular since they involve the 
prior assumption of the Born rule in order to establish the Born 
rule” (Thébault & Dawid 2015, pp. 1568). 
Of course, this circularity is very similar to the circularity which arises from 
the presupposition of a particular choice of system environment split, 
which was discussed in the previous chapter. In the previous chapter I 
looked at how this kind of circularity could be made acceptable by shifting 
the purpose of the Born rule derivation from trying to show from first 
principles that the Born rule obtains without any form of presupposition 
(which I think is clearly impossible), to an attempt to show how the Born 
rule emerges from a particular approach to linear quantum mechanics. This 
appeal to emergence would undoubtedly be the response offered by 
Wallace, as Thébault & Dawid acknowledge. Thébault & Dawid suggest that 
the appropriate way to think of Zurek's Born rule derivation in this context 
is as a demonstration of consistency for the decoherence approach in 
interpretations such as Wallace’s. 
Having introduced this circularity concern and the limitations on Zurek's 
derivation of the Born rule which it demonstrates, Thébault & Dawid now 
turn to examine in more detail this form of consistency. As the next section 
will discuss, however, they believe that the decision theoretic character of 
the Born rule, which is produced as the conclusion of this derivation, is in 
fact very different to the Born rule which must be assumed in order to 
make this derivation possible in the first place. They argue that this renders 
the kind of derivations of the Born rule presented by Zurek incoherent 
within Wallace’s Everettian quantum mechanics. 
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5.2 The Presupposition of the Born Rule 
In order to understand the incoherence objection of Thébault & Dawid, it is 
important to note a surprising difference between the role which Zurek 
identifies the Born rule as playing in allowing his derivation, and the role 
Thébault & Dawid see it as playing. 
Whereas Zurek regards reduced density matrices in general as implicitly 
resting upon the application of the Born rule to the wider environment, 
Thébault & Dawid seem more concerned with its role in warranting the 
neglecting of off-diagonal elements within the reduced density matrix. 
They write as follows: 
“…although such [environment induced decoherence] processes 
may act to re-scale the weightings of the off-diagonal elements of 
the density matrix to be very small, the interpretation of the 
smallness of those values as indicating either: (a) the neglectability 
of the corresponding component of the wavefunction; or (b) the 
robustness of branching structures within the wavefunction, will in 
the end rely on the prior assumption of the Born rule.” (Thébault & 
Dawid 2015, pp. 1568) 
The first thing to say here is that the neglectability of these off-diagonal 
elements does seem like an important factor in solving the problem of the 
preferred basis. It is the fact that these off-diagonal elements, and the 
interference phenomena to which they relate, will be negligible which, on 
the analysis of Schlosshauer 2007, warrants the treatment of these states 
as robust measurement outcomes states, and gives rise to the preferred 
basis of branching used in Wallace's interpretation. It is more difficult, 
however, to understand precisely how this neglectability connects to the 
Born rule. 
A central conviction of Thébault & Dawid is that numbers cannot be 
neglected within a mathematical formalism without understanding what 
the physical significance of those numbers is and the purpose of the 
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approximation. To make this point they point out that neglecting the 
Sahara Desert on account of its extremely low rainfall might be a 
reasonable approximation in a study of population distributions, but clearly 
not if the study directly concerns land area. They clearly believe that the 
Born rule is directly relevant to identifying the physical relevance of off-
diagonal elements within reduced density matrices, and that this is what 
justifies the neglecting of those terms. 
On some level, they are certainly correct that the Born rule is relevant to 
the physical significance of these elements. However, the link is not quite 
as direct as Thébault & Dawid seem to assume. Within a density matrix the 
diagonal elements are all real numbers corresponding to basis eigenstates 
of the subsystem. The Born rule very directly warrants regarding these 
elements within the matrix as probabilities. Off-diagonal elements, 
however, do not correspond to any eigenstates of the subsystem, and the 
values of these elements will typically be complex numbers. 
The suggestion that the Born rule for quantum probabilities is responsible 
for giving physical significance to these complex numbers on the off-
diagonal elements of the reduced density matrix clearly requires further 
explanation. No such explanation is given by Thébault & Dawid 2015, 
leaving this crucial connection in their argument rather mysterious. Later in 
this chapter, I will return to look at how I think the physical significance of 
off-diagonal elements within density matrices connects to the Born rule. 
For now though, I will go on to set out Thébault & Dawid’s inconsistency 
argument concerning the character of the Born rule which they believe is 
essential to making this form of approximation. 
 
5.3 The Inconsistency Argument 
Following on from the dependence of Zurek's derivation on the Born rule 
just discussed, Thébault & Dawid go on to present what they believe to be 
an inconsistency between the precise character of the Born rule which 
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Zurek's derivation relies on, and the character of the Born rule which it 
yields. Specifically, they claim that, while the Born rule which Wallace 
obtains from Zurek's derivation is a decision theoretic subjective Born rule, 
concerning the rational betting behaviour of an agent within an Everettian 
branch, the derivation itself requires a stronger form of the Born rule than 
this. Thébault & Dawid then point out that, as Wallace explicitly rules out 
the possibility of any more objective Born rule beyond the decision 
theoretic form which he derives, Wallace's scheme appears to be internally 
incoherent. 
If true, this would represent a hugely damaging inconsistency within 
Wallace’s approach. Rather than being a complete and internally consistent 
emergent theory, the framework would depend on an objective 
probabilistic rule with no obvious place within Everettian quantum 
mechanics. 
The reason that Thébault & Dawid believe that an objective form of the 
Born rule is needed here, and that the subjective form will not suffice, 
concerns the scope of applicability of the two rules. A purely decision 
theoretic Born rule is presumably only applicable in cases where a rational 
agent either does or could conceivably occupy the histories to which 
probabilities are being ascribed. In contrast, Thébault & Dawid believe that 
“Whilst we can reasonably consider generalising the argument to branches 
which potentially— rather than actually—contain agents, we cannot 
consistently apply the argument to ‘branches’ which are not approximately 
separated.” (Thébault & Dawid 2015, pp. 1568) 
As discussed in chapter 3, the word branch, as used by Wallace, refers to a 
history in a history space which approximately fulfils the medium 
decoherence criterion. The scare quotes applied in this quote reflects the 
fact that histories which are not approximately separated would not, in 
Wallace's terms, be branches. It is a little difficult to follow precisely the 
connection Thébault & Dawid are making to off-diagonal elements within a 
reduced density matrix here. But it seems that, as far as Thébault & Dawid 
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are concerned, off-diagonal elements correspond in some direct sense to 
histories in which this approximate separation does not obtain. 
I suspect much of the reason for the lack of clarity here is that Thébault & 
Dawid are seeking to discuss separation of histories purely in terms of 
density matrices. As I made clear in chapter 3 the connection between 
these is not straight forward or easy to identify. In some cases, off-diagonal 
elements in reduced density matrices may well point to histories which are 
not Everettian branches, and could not contain anything recognisable as a 
rational agent. A little reflection, however, will show that this is very far 
from always being the case. 
 
5.4 Interpreting the Off-Diagonal Elements 
Consider a reduced density matrix describing the state of a spin-half 
particle in the z-spin basis: 
𝜌 = ( 𝑎 𝑐𝑒
−𝑖𝛾
𝑐𝑒𝑖𝛾 𝑏
) 
Where 𝑎, 𝑏, and 𝑐 are real positive numbers. 𝛾 determines the phase of the 
off-diagonal elements. 𝑎 and 𝑏 are the Born rule probabilities of spin up 
and spin down measurements respectively. 
If the value of 𝑐 is zero, then any subsequent operations will behave as if 
the particle is currently in a definite z-spin eigenstate; that is, no 
interference phenomena will be displayed. In terms of histories, such 
subsequent operations are going to yield two branches, one corresponding 
to each z-spin eigenstate. If other noncommuting spin measurements are 
made, the results will still behave as would be expected if the particle 
began in a definitive z-spin state. 
Now, though, suppose that 𝑐 is not zero. Thébault & Dawid clearly believe 
that this should correspond to the occurrence of histories which are not 
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separated from one another, and display nonclassical phenomena. Is this 
the case? 
The answer is that it depends on what subsequent operations the particle 
is subject to. 
If the particle is simply going to be subject to z-spin measurement, or other 
entanglement of its z-spin state to the environment, then there will be no 
interference phenomena. This entanglement will come to suppress the 
interference terms in the off-diagonal elements, and two well separated 
histories will be produced. 
Equally, if the particle is simply left in isolation without any form of 
perturbation, the state will remain unchanged, and can reasonably be 
decomposed as two histories, one corresponding to each z-spin eigenstate 
(or any other pair of spin eigenstates). 
If however, the particle spin state is measured in some other basis, then 
the off-diagonal elements will significantly affect the measurement result. 
The result will no longer be as expected based purely on the probabilities 
of z-spin states given in this matrix. If the basis in which histories of this 
particle are being decomposed is the z-spin basis, then explaining the 
dynamics in this case cannot be done without accounting for interaction 
between the histories. This is the type of case in which separation between 
histories fails in the way that Thébault & Dawid are concerned with. The 
next question is whether, and if so why, they are right in their conviction 
that there could be no agents within histories undergoing this kind of 
process. 
Approximate separation of histories is something which Wallace sees as an 
essential feature of a branch, and as far as Wallace is concerned only 
branches are amenable to a quasi-classical metaphysics which agents might 
occupy. It therefore seems prima facie plausible to believe that histories of 
the above kind could not contain agents. However, it is important to give 
some consideration to the meaning of the word approximate here. A quote 
139 
 
from Gell-Mann and Hartle, which Wallace presents in discussing the 
character of this branching structure, is instructive as to his thinking on the 
subject of what constitutes a branching quasi-classical history space: 
“such that the individual histories obey, with high probability, 
effective classical equations of motion interrupted continually by 
small fluctuations and occasionally by large ones” (Wallace 2012, 
pp. 99)12. 
In other words, the intention is to weaken the absence of interference 
requirement in the identification of quasi-classical branches to allow 
frequent small-scale interference phenomena and occasional large-scale 
interference phenomena. This, of course, means that the history space 
containing these branches cannot strictly fulfil the medium decoherence 
criterion. 
The motivation behind this weakening of the quasi-classicality requirement 
for branches is that, if strictly classical dynamics are required of a history 
space without any exceptions or flexibility, then very few history spaces 
indeed are selected as candidates, and these do not display the types of 
behaviour which we are used to. Nonclassical dynamics are essential to 
sustaining stable atoms, for example, and the only way to rule out these 
dynamics is to select histories which are very dissimilar to our day-to-day 
experiences, and in many of which states never change at all Kent 1996. 
Wallace's interpretation therefore accepts some (rather unclear) degree of 
failure of separation between histories. Quite possibly, then, brief 
instances of failure of separation between histories, caused by off-diagonal 
reduced density matrix elements, would not disqualify histories from 
remaining as branches, so long as these failures of separation were 
sufficiently rare. 
                                                          
12 Wallace attributes this quote to Gell-Mann and Hartle, but does not give a reference to 
any specific text. 
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What, however, about those very low amplitude histories which display 
continual interference phenomena? There will be histories in which large-
scale failures of interference suppression occur not just occasionally but 
continuously. Such histories clearly do not fit Wallace's conception of 
branches, and it is certainly arguable that they do not display the types of 
persistent pattern which would allow us to identify structures within them 
as being a rational agent. These, I take it, are the types of history with 
which Thébault & Dawid are concerned when they speak of off-diagonal 
elements within reduced density matrix relating to histories which are not 
approximately separated, and which could not even in principle contain 
rational agents. 
The question which Wallace must answer is why we do not expect to find 
ourselves in, or even seem to be aware of, this type of history in our day-
to-day lives. The obvious answer is that such histories are incredibly 
improbable. Given the high degree of suppression of interference terms for 
day-to-day macroscopic objects, the chances of such an object displaying 
interference phenomena are infinitesimal. Here we are considering 
histories in which such events occur on a very frequent basis. The result is 
that the Born rule probability of such a history will be so unimaginably 
small that it can be safely ignored. 
The point, however, is that if all we can apply when considering the 
probability of such a history is a decision theoretic Born rule, and, as 
Thébault & Dawid suggest, this type of Born rule is not applicable to 
histories without agents, then we have no rationale for identifying branch 
amplitude with probability. Without this ability to relate branch amplitude 
to some physical quantity, it is nothing more than a very small number. 
And, as Thébault & Dawid make clear, the fact that a number is very small 
does not in itself warrant neglecting anything associated with that number. 
Without some means of assigning a credence to the possibility of ending up 
in these non-classical histories, the decision theoretic derivation of the 
Born rule offered by Zurek and Wallace has no way to justify neglecting 
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such histories. And so no way to justify treating a basis which gives the 
amplitudes of such non-classical histories to be very small as a preferred 
basis. 
This is how I understand Thébault & Dawid’s argument in this section. 
There are some differences between my presentation and theirs, and I will 
consider an alternative way of understanding their argument in a later 
section. This, though, seems the most plausible understanding, and I think 
it can be clearly formalised as follows: 
Premise 1: Deriving the Born rule depends on the ability to ascribe rational 
credences to any successor history of a history which an agent currently 
occupies. 
Premise 2: Applying such rational credences depends on the possibility of a 
rational agent residing within each of those successor histories. 
Premise 3: For some types of successor history which occur this is not 
actually possible on Wallace's account. 
Premise 4: No other means of independently establishing the neglectability 
of such histories (such as a non-subjective Born rule) is available. 
Conclusion: Wallace cannot offer a coherent account of the origin of the 
Born rule within his interpretation. 
This is not an issue about which Wallace offers any direct comments. 
However, as I shall argue in the next section, I believe that his answer to a 
different problem gives a clear indication as to what his response in this 
case would be. I believe that he could (and would) successfully respond by 
rejecting premise 2. 
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5.5 Quantum Russian Roulette 
Wallace 2012, pp. 369-372 seeks to answer the question of whether, on his 
account of quantum probability, it would be rational to play quantum 
Russian roulette. 
Quantum Russian roulette is a game in which the player places a bet on the 
outcome of a quantum process, and arranges, in the event that they lose 
the bet, a swift and painless death for themself. It has been argued (e.g. 
Lewis 2004) that taking such a bet is a thoroughly rational thing for a 
convinced Everettian to do. This is because, although there are successor 
histories in which the player is dead, they do not contain any agent 
appropriately related to the player to be considered when the player is 
considering their possible future experiences, and deciding whether to take 
this bet. 
Wallace however points out that, if all we should be concerned with is our 
possible future experiences, then this would have drastic implications in 
the classical case, not just the quantum. If the player were to bet on a 
similar classical game of Russian roulette, then here, too, the possible 
outcomes would be either the future experience of a material gain, or a 
future in which the player has no experiences. If our credence ascriptions 
concerning the future, or our decision-making practices, were really only 
concerned with our future experiences, then there would be no reason not 
to play classical Russian roulette. The possibility of death is something we 
are well used to ascribing credence as to, and adjusting our decisions on 
the basis of these credences is something we regularly do in day-to-day 
life. This is despite the fact that in the event of death (at least for some 
types of death) there would be no future experience connected to that 
event. 
It therefore seems rather suspect to suggest that we should not ascribe 
credence as to the possibility of death in the quantum case. Wallace makes 
it clear that an agent considering whether to play quantum Russian 
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roulette both can and should, as far as he is concerned, ascribe a credence 
to dying, and adjust their behaviour accordingly. 
Thébault & Dawid’s incoherence argument seems strikingly similar to the 
Russian roulette argument, in that it too relies on the claim that a rational 
agent is unable to ascribe credences or adjust their decision-making 
behaviour to respond to successor histories of the history which they 
currently occupy, in which that agent does not exist. Wallace clearly sees 
no reason why the fact that an agent does not exist in a successor history 
should prevent them from making decisions on the basis of that successor 
history’s existence. 
Thébault & Dawid do make a possibly relevant distinction between cases in 
which it is, and is not, possible to imagine an agent occupying a history. In 
the former case, they seem to believe that analogy to cases in which an 
agent does exist in the successor history may warrant the ascription of 
credences. But they do not believe such credence ascriptions can be 
extended to the latter case. 
There is certainly a difference between the Russian roulette case and the 
case which Thébault & Dawid consider here. I cannot see any reason, 
however, why this difference would render an agent incapable of ascribing 
credences to successor histories in which they could not exist, just as easily 
as to successor histories in which they do not exist. Thébault & Dawid do 
not seem to offer any explanation of why credence ascriptions would be 
more difficult in this case. 
It seems to me, therefore, that Wallace could respond to this argument 
from Thébault & Dawid by arguing that a rational agent could perfectly well 
ascribe credences to successor histories in which they could not exist, and 
adjust their behaviour on the basis of these credences. This would amount 
to rejecting premise 2, and so allow Wallace to escape Thébault & Dawid’s 
conclusion. The decision theoretic Born rule derived by Wallace is able to 
offer physical significance for the relative amplitude of successor histories 
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in an agent’s future (as probabilities), and so justify neglecting successor 
histories with extremely low amplitudes. 
 
5.6 Distant Nonclassical Histories 
So far, I have dealt with what seems to be the most natural reading of 
Thébault & Dawid’s argument. However, there is another way of 
interpreting this argument. I have focused on the case of a nonclassical 
history which is the successor of a history which an agent occupies. An 
alternative way of understanding Thébault & Dawid’s concern is as relating 
to histories which throughout their entire evolution are sufficiently 
nonclassical that they could not be considered as containing agents. In this 
case, an agent's consideration of their future histories in the way discussed 
in the previous section could not be relevant. Consequently, it is hard to 
see how probabilities could be made sense of for such histories. 
Unlike the previous form of this argument, I have no idea how Wallace 
would respond to this concern. Indeed, it is an interesting question how 
you could make sense of the decision theoretic conception of probability in 
the context of such histories. 
I do not feel, however, that this is an argument that would undermine 
Everettian quantum mechanics very profoundly. Ultimately, if probabilities 
can sensibly be ascribed to all histories which agents occupy and all 
successors of those histories, then it does not seem like a particular 
problem if this understanding of probability cannot be extended to 
histories which never have contained or could contain agents. 
This of course brings to light a slightly disconcerting agent dependence in 
the notion of probability within Everettian quantum mechanics. This agent 
dependence is unsurprising given the way in which derivations of 
probability within modern Everettian interpretations proceed from 
considerations of what it is to be a rational agent. Wallace 2012 pp. 142-
156 argues that the Born rule for probabilities which he is able to derive is 
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objective in the sense that under certain assumptions about the nature of 
quantum mechanical probabilities, the Born rule is the only rule that could 
possibly be identified as yielding such probabilities. Nevertheless, this 
derivation still rests on the consideration of decisions made by a rational 
agent, and so will not necessarily extend to histories which could never 
contain an agent. It may be possible to resolve this problem, but even if it 
is not, this feature of Everettian quantum mechanics does not seem 
unacceptable, though some may find it unpalatable. 
 
5.7 The Ontological Prejudice Objection 
As well as the problem of incoherence just given, Thébault & Dawid also 
offer a second problem, which they summarise as follows: 
“In (effectively) eliminating off diagonal elements due to their low 
Born weight the Everettian must either also (effectively) eliminate 
similarly low weighted distinct states and thus subvert their own 
position or simply apply a principle of ontological prejudice, such 
that coherence effects are eliminated simply on the grounds of 
being coherence effects, irrespective of their Born weighting.” 
(Thébault & Dawid 2015, pp. 1571). 
One obvious response to this problem is to point out (as I already have 
done) that off-diagonal elements in a reduced density matrix are very 
clearly different to Born rule probabilities. They are complex numbers 
which do not correspond to any form of eigenstate, and although they may 
well affect the probabilities of future dynamics, this will depend on the 
Hamiltonian to which the system is subject. There are therefore very clear 
differences between off-diagonal elements within a reduced density matrix 
and the Born rule probabilities of histories, and so it seems rather difficult 
to motivate the idea that if one is neglected the other must also be. 
On the other hand, it is true that Born rule probabilities still play an 
important, albeit indirect, role in justifying the neglecting of off-diagonal 
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elements. They can be neglected because the Born rule probabilities 
associated with interference phenomena related to the off-diagonal 
elements within the reduced density matrix (if it is evolved under a 
Hamiltonian that will produce them) will be very low for systems where 
environmental decoherence has suppressed these elements. In some 
sense, therefore, it does seem that neglecting histories associated with off-
diagonal elements is playing a role here, and it is reasonable to wonder 
why just these specific histories are being neglected. I will therefore spend 
a little time considering just why and in what sense off-diagonal elements 
and the interference phenomena to which they are associated are 
neglected as part of Zurek’s derivation of the Born rule. 
 
5.8 Neglecting Off-Diagonal Elements 
In understanding the role of neglecting off-diagonal elements, it is 
significant to recall that this is not done at any point in the derivation taken 
from Zurek 2005, which was presented in the last chapter. The relative 
phases of terms within the wavefunction, which are what give  rise to off-
diagonal elements within a reduced density matrix, are not neglected by 
Zurek. Indeed, he devotes a section of argument to showing just why they 
must be irrelevant to the chances of different eigenstates in the selected 
basis. 
Neglecting off-diagonal elements does not appear in the derivation of 
Zurek 2005 because it is consigned to the portion of reasoning which Zurek 
side-lines in this paper. That is, the neglecting of off-diagonal elements 
plays a role in the process of identifying a preferred basis, and not in the 
broader derivation of the Born rule. 
The next question, then, is what role does the neglecting of off-diagonal 
elements have in providing a preferred basis? 
As discussed in chapter 2, it is the suppression of a density matrix in one 
particular basis as a result of entanglement with the subsystem’s 
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environment which is the distinguishing feature of a preferred basis picked 
out by environmental decoherence. Indeed, this seems to be at the heart 
of what Thébault & Dawid regard as the reliance of Zurek's derivation on 
the neglecting of off-diagonal elements. They write: 
“The off diagonal elements of this matrix would correspond to 
coherence phenomena which render any separation of branches 
impossible. Compare this to a reduced density matrix without the 
off diagonal elements… [which] we can interpret as a proper 
mixture of pure states and so taking it ontologically seriously would 
seem to imply the discrete branching structure which the Everettian 
requires.” (Thébault & Dawid 2015, pp. 1565). 
Thébault & Dawid clearly regard neglecting the existence of interference 
phenomena and histories which display them as a key step in obtaining an 
Everettian branching structure, and the Born rule to go with it. I think, 
though, that they misunderstand the intended character of this branching 
structure. It is not intended to be a branching structure of perfectly 
classical histories, from which all interference phenomena or small-scale 
interactions between histories have been ruled out by fiat, and whose 
similarity to the real dynamics is supported by the neglectability of off-
diagonal elements in reduced density matrices. 
Instead, the significance of the preferred basis given by decoherence, is as 
a basis in which the wavefunction can be decomposed, to produce a set of 
histories in which interference phenomena, though they do occur, will 
occur very infrequently on scales large enough to be noticed by inhabitants 
of those histories. This is not meant to give a set of histories which are 
perfectly separable in the way in which mixed states are. It is simply a 
means of warranting the treatment of a particular basis decomposition of 
the wavefunction as different from others. Different because under this 
decomposition interference phenomena are suppressed to a large extent, 
though not perfectly. 
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Clearly characterising this criterion does presuppose the Born rule, and is 
one aspect of the much-discussed circularity of Born rule derivations. I do 
not believe, however, that it relies on any form of ontological prejudice. 
Histories in which interference phenomena (even very substantial 
interference phenomena) occur are accepted features of the fundamental 
Everettian ontology. Some of these histories will not be sufficiently well 
separated to display quasi-classical dynamics, or contain quasi-classical 
entities, but this does not mean that they are neglected from the 
Everettian ontology. Such histories do have Born rule probabilities 
associated with them, and if they did not this might create significant 
problems for the Everettian account of probability. 
Consequently, I think that Thébault & Dawid are mistaken in their charge of 
ontological prejudice. The importance of the neglectability of off-diagonal 
elements is to show that the basis in which a reduced density matrix is 
written will display quasi-classical dynamics with little interference 
phenomena. This has nothing to do with neglecting the existence of these 
phenomena within the Everettian ontology. 
 
5.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have responded to claims of incoherence within Wallace's 
Everettian quantum mechanics levelled by Thébault & Dawid 2015. I have 
argued that these objections rest on a misunderstanding of the character 
of the Born rule derivation offered by Zurek and Wallace, and the sense in 
which this derivation relies on the presupposition of the Born rule. 
Thébault & Dawid began their paper by noting pre-existing arguments 
which establish the circularity of this form of Born rule derivation. This 
circularity is undeniable. I think it is a mistake however to view this as a 
fatal problem for all accounts which use this derivation. In particular, I 
believe that the role of this derivation within Wallace's Everettian quantum 
mechanics should not be seen as being to derive the Born rule purely from 
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the theory of linear quantum mechanics without any presupposition of 
classical structures. I believe such a derivation to be impossible. Instead, 
Zurek’s derivation should be regarded as showing how the Born rule 
emerges for emergent quasi-classical structures which can be picked out of 
the wavefunction. The fact that these structures themselves depend for 
their physical significance upon probabilities, and so on the Born rule, does 
not undermine the existence of these structures as real patterns within the 
wavefunction. 
Despite my belief that the specific concerns developed by Thébault & 
Dawid in this paper do not present a serious problem for Wallace, I think 
that they are right to ask for empirical evidence for the success of 
approximations and empirical structures within Wallace's interpretation. If 
such approximations and robust structures cannot be shown to be 
underpinned by empirical evidence of their reliability (using Wallace's 
interpretation of the physical significance of quantities) then this would 
seem to pose a significant problem for Wallace. This will be discussed in 
the next chapter. 
In this chapter I have commented that Thébault & Dawid do not seem 
entirely clear as to the connection between reduced density matrix 
conceptions of decoherence, and the dynamics of histories. This is 
unsurprising given that, as I made clear in chapter 3, the connections 
between reduced density matrix conceptions of decoherence, and many 
histories conceptions of decoherence, are not at all easy to pin down. 
In making sense of the connections between reduced density matrices and 
histories in this chapter, I have generally assumed a branching structure of 
histories which form a history space which approximately fulfils the 
medium decoherence criterion. I feel justified in doing this as Wallace 
assumes this to be the character of the history space in his interpretation, 
and Thébault & Dawid give no direct indication of wanting to question it. In 
a sense, however, this may have been uncharitable to Thébault & Dawid. 
Many of their concerns about the assumption of separability between 
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histories could be interpreted as questioning the assumption of a history 
space which approximately fulfils the medium decoherence criterion. In 
this chapter I have taken these concerns as only regarding the types of 
small scale or rare interference phenomena which I believe can plausibly 
be accepted without undermining Wallace’s claim that medium 
decoherence approximately holds. 
This of course leaves the obvious questions of whether the history space 
which we occupy really does approximately fulfil this criterion? And what 
the empirically grounded physical significance of this assumption is? 
To answer these questions will require far more detailed consideration of 
history spaces, the medium decoherence criterion, and Wallace's assumed 
branching structure. This will be the subject of the next chapter. 
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6 Interpretation Neutral Justifications for Medium 
Decoherence 
 
In chapter 2 we saw how the physical phenomenon of decoherence gives 
rise to effective suppression of interference phenomena, in a way which 
seems to hold exciting clues to resolving important aspects of the quantum 
measurement problem. Following on from this, we looked at theoretical 
criteria based on the phenomenon of decoherence. 
The diagonalisation of the RDM of a system of interest is the weakest of 
these criteria. This criterion, however, is sufficient to ensure the short-term 
suppression of interference phenomena in local systems which are most 
commonly discussed in presentations of the physical phenomenon of 
decoherence. It is in terms of this criterion alone that Schlosshauer 2007 
presents his solutions to aspects of the quantum measurement problem. 
A stronger criterion is that of the consistency of a history space. This 
criterion amounts exactly to the absence of interference phenomena 
within that history space. It differs from RDM diagonalisation, in that it 
concerns a history extended in time, rather than an instantaneous state of 
the physical subsystem. 
As discussed in chapter 3, however, both of these criteria lack robustness. 
To ensure the robust absence of major interference phenomena desired by 
many interpretations of quantum mechanics, not only in local systems but 
when considering the history space of the entire universe, the criterion of 
medium decoherence is needed. Medium decoherence entails both the 
weaker criteria, and also entails a branching structure of histories. 
The result is that, while environment induced suppression of local 
interference phenomena, and the everyday appearance of classicality, only 
require the RDM diagonalisation conception of decoherence, the far 
stronger criterion of medium decoherence is needed to ensure that this 
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absence of interference phenomena really applies more generally. This 
makes justifying the use of the stronger medium decoherence criterion 
very important for those realist interpretations of quantum mechanics 
which accept unitary linear Schrödinger dynamics without adding any form 
of collapse postulate, such as the Everett interpretation. 
Later chapters will look at what these interpretations can offer in terms of 
interpretation specific justifications for the assumption of medium 
decoherence. In the present chapter, however, we will look at the 
possibility of justifying this assumption purely in terms of the linear 
quantum formalism and existing empirical evidence, without adding any 
interpretation specific assumptions or methodology. Although several of 
the justifications I will consider are suggested by Wallace in his works on 
Everettian QM, I believe these justifications (if they were successful) might 
also work just as well within other interpretational frameworks. 
I will argue that in general these justifications are not sufficient to make 
the bold cosmological claim, that the quasi-classical history space we 
occupy possesses a branching structure, well supported. The most 
promising justifications are themselves bold and controversial cosmological 
claims, which, though they may be true, should not be smuggled in to 
interpretational frameworks as unconsidered implicit premises (as I believe 
they often are). The next chapter will then turn to focus purely on 
Wallace’s Everettian QM, and examine the interpretation specific 
justifications it can offer for these cosmological claims. 
 
6.1 Empirical Evidence 
The most obvious suggestion for a way to justify the medium decoherence 
assumption is by appeal to the apparently robustly classical dynamics of 
the world with which we are familiar. If the history space we inhabit does 
form part of a history space which fulfils the medium decoherence 
criterion, this will ensure the lasting and reliable consistency of local 
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subsystems, and so ensure the robust approximately classical dynamics 
which the world around us seems to display. We have seen that for 
interpretations which do not use any form of collapse postulate, the 
medium decoherence criterion is required in order to reliably ensure 
robust and persistent quasi-classical dynamics. A very natural response is 
to consider the world with which we are familiar on a day-to-day basis and 
the classical dynamics it appears to robustly display and to conclude on this 
basis that the medium decoherence criterion must obtain. 
I have already hinted at the reasons why I believe this argument to be 
flawed. In short, this is because, while medium decoherence is required to 
rule out the possibility of history recombination, and the failure of 
persistence of quasi-classical entities, it is only short-term local consistency 
(as captured by RDM diagonalisation) which is responsible for easily 
observable cases of interference loss. In other words, while medium 
decoherence is necessary for robust and persistent consistency and 
associated quasi-classicality, interference suppression experiments, in their 
general presentation, only rely on the short-term local consistency 
captured by the diagonalisation of a local system's RDM. I will argue that 
this far weaker conception of decoherence could perfectly well exist 
without a history space fulfilling the medium decoherence criterion. This 
will occur if initially separated histories later come to recombine with one 
another. This section will recap these points and consider the exceptional 
cases in which records of recombination could be found. The conclusion 
will be that, although records capable of establishing whether or not the 
wavefunction we inhabit is medium decoherent are in principle possible, 
they are in practice extremely difficult to obtain, and nothing about our 
experience of quasi-classicality in day-to-day life amounts to such a record. 
To begin with, let us remind ourselves of the Wigner's friend thought 
experiment introduced in chapter 2. We considered a physics laboratory 
bounded by an impermeable box in which Bob is engaged in measuring the 
x-spin state of a spin half particle which has previously been determined to 
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be in a superposition. Outside this lab is Alice who, after allowing time for 
Bob to complete his measurement, then undertakes a measurement of the 
entire laboratory designed to measure the z-spin state of the original 
particle. This second measurement, of course, does not commute with the 
original measurement which Bob made. This is not a breach of the 
uncertainty principle, however, as the process of the second measurement 
will necessarily render the result of Bob's original measurement 
inaccessible to both Alice and Bob. 
To see why this overwriting of Bob's records is necessary, consider the 
following schematic representation of the history space of Bob's lab, in a 
quasi-classical basis (for medium-sized dry goods this will be the 
(approximate) position basis in which their reduced density matrices are 
diagonalised): 
 
• At 𝑡 = 𝑘, Bob makes his measurement. 
• Bob's measurement yields two histories 𝛼, and 𝛽. 
• At 𝑡 = 𝑙 Alice begins applying a Hamiltonian to the lab which will 
over time render all records of the result of Bob’s measurement in 
the two histories to be only contained in the phase correlations of 
the lab, and not contained in any classically measurable property of 
it. This must necessarily involve some quantum process, which will 
overwrite the observables which previously encoded the 
measurement result (such a process is known as quantum erasure 
(Walborn, et al., 2002; Yoon-Ho, et al., 2000)). 
𝛼 
𝛾1 
𝛽 
𝛼1 
𝛼2 
𝛽1 
𝛽2 
𝛾2 
𝜔 
𝑡 = 𝑘 𝑡 = 𝑙 𝑡 = 𝑚 
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• At 𝑡 = 𝑚 this process is complete. The x-spin state record has 
moved from the measurable state of the lab, to phase correlations 
alone. The z-spin state can then pass from phase correlations back 
to the measurable state of the lab, allowing Alice to effectively 
measure this state by viewing the state of the lab. 
• The histories after 𝑡 = 𝑚 are distinguished only by the record they 
have of the z-spin state, and will have no record of results obtained 
from any x-spin measurement. As these histories are products of 
recombination, there is not really any fact of the matter about what 
x-spin records they once contained. 
This example is simplified in several ways. In addition to the idealisations 
which go into this thought experiment, there is also the fact that for ease 
of discussion we have assumed that only two history branching events take 
place throughout the entire history of the lab. Nonetheless, although this 
process is bound to involve far more histories than are shown here, the 
general process would be much the same (just far more complicated to 
represent). 
Let us now consider what empirical evidence within this process there 
could be that recombination had occurred. The most obvious evidence is 
that possessed by Alice. She obtains the final measurement result, which 
would have been impossible without the recombination of histories within 
the lab. If this experiment were run multiple times, she could on some runs 
open the door to the lab immediately after Bob's measurement, to confirm 
that the dynamics within the lab do indeed contain measurable properties 
which depend on x-spin measurements, and not on z-spin measurements 
prior to recombination. If, therefore, we had records of the dynamics of 
large-scale systems which we understood well enough to predict instances 
of recombination, and could remain unentangled from the system 
ourselves, then, like Alice, we could test the occurrence of such 
recombination against those records. Unfortunately we do not have such 
records. We rarely have sufficient understanding of macroscopic systems 
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to predict their quantum dynamics, and are never realistically able to hold 
ourselves in isolation from such systems, let alone reproduce the same 
conditions for multiple runs. Such experiments are only achievable for very 
small systems which cannot really be said to offer a large enough 
environment to enable the physical process of decoherence. 
When introducing decoherence, Wallace 2012 briefly uses a model based 
on two spin half particles. Entangling the state of the first particle with the 
state of the second by some degree of freedom has an effect on the results 
of measurements performed on the first particle very similar to 
decoherence. No one doubts that for such toy examples recombination of 
the type discussed in this thought experiment is possible, and such cases 
have been observed experimentally. However, the size of the environment 
used in such cases (the spin state of a single particle) is generally accepted 
to be far too small an environment to produce anything that could really be 
described as decoherence. Performing such experiments on very large 
scales will almost certainly always be beyond our capabilities. 
The important question to ask, when considering whether the world we 
occupy is really medium decoherent, is not whether Alice can obtain 
empirical evidence of the history recombination which occurs in this 
thought experiment, but whether Bob can. We cannot generally hold 
ourselves in isolation from a large decohering environment, as is required 
for Alice’s measurement of recombination, and in those cases where we 
can (e.g. because the system is outside our past light-cone), sufficiently 
detailed knowledge and prediction of the system and environment to show 
history recombination within it will be beyond our technical capabilities. 
Our records of recombination will therefore resemble those of Bob (a part 
of the decohering, and recombining system), rather than those of Alice 
(watching from outside). 
A significant complication for answering this question is that it is rather 
unclear whether a structure clearly identifiable as Bob would survive the 
processes performed on the lab by Alice in order to obtain her 
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measurement. Any degree of freedom of the lab (or the subsection of it 
that is Bob) which has become entangled to the x-spin state of the particle 
will necessarily be overwritten during this process. Given the very large 
number of degrees of freedom this is likely to cover, the process may well 
be very disruptive to Bob as a pattern within the lab’s wavefunction. If Bob 
does not survive the recombination process, then clearly he is not in a 
position to establish that the recombination has taken place. For now, 
then, we will assume that the recombination disrupts aspects of Bob's 
state only where necessary, and that there is still an identifiable pattern 
corresponding to Bob throughout the recombination process. The question 
then is whether Bob could establish in such a case that recombination had 
taken place. 
The answer, at least in this idealised thought experiment, is that he could. 
The easiest way in which he could do this, would be to make a record prior 
to the recombination process, not of the x-spin measurement which he 
makes, but of whether or not he has made a successful x-spin 
measurement. As this record would not be entangled to the x-spin state 
itself, it could survive the recombination process, unlike any record of a 
particular result. After recombination, Bob could effectively measure the z-
spin state of the particle, either by direct measurement of the lab 
environment, or by simply asking Alice what her result was after she made 
her measurement and the lab was unsealed. If he was confident in both his 
successful measurement of the particle’s z-spin state, and the veracity of 
his record of having made an x-spin measurement, then, knowing these 
two measurements to be non-commuting, he would have clear evidence of 
history recombination. 
A second way in which Bob could establish the recombination had taken 
place would be to know the starting conditions of the lab and its 
Hamiltonian throughout the period of the experiment very precisely. 
Armed with this information, he could use Schrödinger's equation to model 
the time evolution of the state of the lab and see precisely the behaviour of 
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all histories throughout the period of the experiment including their 
recombination. Even in the context of a system the size of Bob's lab this is 
vastly beyond our technical capabilities to record or model with any 
accuracy13. Given that in realistic cases the systems involved in 
decoherence processes are unimaginably larger, there is no realistic 
prospect that we could establish that recombination did or did not take 
place in histories we occupy in this way. 
In the case of this thought experiment, then, Bob is in a position to 
establish by empirical evidence that recombination has taken place. He 
could not establish that it was going to take place, except by knowing the 
Hamiltonian and state of the system very precisely. The question, then, is 
what records indicating that recombination of previously separated 
histories would look like in the less idealised conditions we are generally 
familiar with, and whether we have such records. 
Unfortunately, such records will prove extremely difficult to find. The 
reason for this is that, unlike our thought experiment, the timescales of 
recoherence processes will typically be extremely long. Analysis by Zurek 
1982 suggested that a typical recombination process may take place over a 
timescale greater than the lifespan of the universe. We will consider this 
fact further in the next section. For now, though, the important point is 
that, even for exceptionally short recoherence times, the period separating 
the original history branching and the subsequent recombination is likely to 
be far longer than the period of human history. There would certainly be 
no point in making a careful record of which property of a spin half particle 
was measured today, and waiting patiently in the hope that we could 
someday show that a non-commuting spin property was later measured. 
The chances of this happening in our future histories at all are low, and the 
                                                          
13 Bob must first have some means of encoding the complete state of the lab. Doing this 
inside the lab would produce a kind of fractal encoding problem as, unless the apparatus 
that Bob was using to model the lab was held in isolation from the rest of the lab, it would 
also be necessary to encode the state of the encoding of the lab. On the other hand, if this 
simulation were held in isolation from the rest of the lab, then it would leave Bob none 
the wiser about the character of the wave function he occupied. 
159 
 
chances of it happening within a time period for which we could compare 
the records are virtually non-existent. 
In chapter 2 I argued that diagonalisation of a local system’s RDM alone is 
sufficient to provide the standard responses to aspects of the quantum 
measurement problem, which decoherence is generally thought to 
provide, without any requirement for the system to be part of a history 
space fulfilling the medium decoherence criterion. This is unsurprising 
given that many less formal treatments of decoherence used in discussing 
these results simply identify decoherence with the diagonalisation of a 
system’s reduced density matrix. Despite this, RDM diagonalisation does 
not guarantee robustly persistent quasi-classical dynamics. The question 
then arises whether we have empirical evidence that quasi-classical 
dynamics really are robust in the world around us. Or, in other words, 
whether recombination of previously separated histories occurs in the 
locally quasi-classical history space which we occupy. 
In this section I have considered three possible situations in which an 
observer within a history might find themself. These are the situation of 
Alice outside of a history branching event, the situation of Bob after the 
initial measurement but prior to Alice's measurement, and the situation of 
Bob after Alice's measurement. 
Alice is in the best position to produce records demonstrating the 
occurrence of recombination. Unfortunately, however, in realistic cases of 
large-scale decoherence phenomena we are never likely to be in Alice’s 
position. 
Prior to Alice's measurement, Bob cannot establish that the history he 
occupies is going to undergo recombination unless he knows with an 
extremely high level of accuracy not only the exact state of the history he 
occupies, but the state of the history with which recombination will occur, 
as well as the Hamiltonian governing the labs evolution. There is no 
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experimental process he could perform on the history he occupies that 
would reveal that the history he occupies has not permanently branched. 
On the other hand, if Bob makes appropriate records prior to Alice's 
measurement and then compares them to records he can obtain after the 
measurement, then he would in principle be able to establish that 
recombination had taken place. I have argued, however, that the ease with 
which this is possible is a product of the simplifications that have gone into 
this thought experiment. The timescales over which recombination 
typically occur are so long that obtaining effective measurements of 
quantum states prior to the original history separation, and finding records 
of what states were physically recorded at the time of separation, are both 
very unlikely to be possible. 
I therefore conclude that, although empirical evidence of recombination 
events is in principle possible (at least after the fact), we currently do not 
possess any evidence capable of establishing whether such recombination 
events have ever occurred or not, and most likely we never shall do. I will 
now turn therefore to consider other reasons why we might believe that 
recombination events like these do not occur. 
 
6.2 The Very Long Timescales of Recoherence 
One popular suggestion is that the very long timescales over which 
recombination would happen are themselves clear reason to believe that 
the possibility can be ignored. That is, if recombination will take a time 
period longer than the lifespan of the universe, then we are free to neglect 
it as an aspect of our physical theories and assume medium decoherence. 
Zurek himself raised the suggestion as far back as 1982, correctly 
identifying that quantum recoherence times are of the Poincaré type, rising 
as the factorial of a system’s degrees of freedom (or more precisely the 
degrees of freedom to which a quantum property becomes entangled). As 
the size of the closed system in which decoherence is taking place tends to 
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infinity, “…the recurrence time becomes infinitely long, and in this sense 
the decay of the off-diagonal elements may be considered irreversible”. 
Unfortunately, this faces two major problems as a justification for 
assuming the medium decoherence criterion to hold for the systems which 
make up our environment. 
The first problem is that Zurek's analysis is based on the time taken for the 
total amplitude of recombined histories to reach a certain (very low) level. 
In other words, Zurek regards recombination as having taken place for a 
system when the sum total of probability of histories of the system in 
which recombination has taken place reaches a certain level. This means, 
of course, that there will be some histories in which interference between 
previously separated histories takes place long before Zurek would regard 
the system as displaying recombination. Defining system recombination 
with reference to a particular threshold amplitude like this is necessary 
because extremely low amplitude histories in which recombination takes 
place will begin to appear from immediately after decoherence has taken 
place. These histories which display recombination will appear for any 
system which does not have an infinitely high energy potential preventing 
the erasure of records within the environment (i.e. any realistic system). 
There is therefore a quantum probabilistic aspect to the time taken for 
recombination phenomena to appear within any particular history. So, 
while typically recombination of a history may take an extremely long time, 
for any particular instance of decoherence there is no guarantee that we 
occupy a history in which recombination will take such a long time to 
occur. 
The second problem is similar. It is that the extremely long timescale, over 
which significant levels of recombination is likely to take place, is calculated 
based on the assumption of a random, and initially uncorrelated, 
environment. As we saw in chapter 4, Kastner 2014 points out that such a 
model is clearly not an accurate representation of an environment, unless 
some form of collapse postulate is assumed to apply. Kastner's attempts to 
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develop this problem are unclear, and generally not persuasive, but in the 
context of considering typical recombination times, and possible 
justifications for the medium decoherence criterion, her underlying point 
becomes important. Particular arrangements of elements within the 
environment may in some cases make the overwriting of records to 
produce a substantial total amplitude of recombination a far faster 
process. Records contained within the physical state of the environment 
are overwritten all the time, shifting to become purely encoded within 
phase correlations, and so inaccessible. Which elements will undergo this 
process is very difficult to predict, and will depend on particular details in 
the state of the environment, and the phase correlations between 
elements of that environment. Modelling the environment as an 
uncorrelated set of random states may be adequate to give a typical time 
period for substantial amplitude recombination, but there will be a broad 
probabilistic distribution of time periods. This probabilistic distribution 
does not represent any form of quantum Born rule probability, but simply 
our ignorance of the precise state of the environment and the way in which 
that state will evolve. 
Having shown that for any particular set of histories there will be a 
probabilistic distribution as to the time period taken for recombination 
between those histories, for both quantum and epistemic reasons, I must 
now explain why I regard this as undermining any appeal to long 
recoherence times as a justification for the medium decoherence 
assumption. 
Nothing I have argued so far suggests that the typical recombination time 
following a particular quantum event for the set of histories produced will 
be anything other than extremely long (possibly even longer than the 
lifetime of the universe). Given the staggering size of this estimate, it might 
be thought that it doesn't matter whether the time taken for 
recombination for a particular history should be represented as a 
probability distribution, because the portion of that probability distribution 
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that represents recombination of the history within a time period of 
interest to us is still incredibly small. 
The reason why I believe these probability distributions to be important is 
that, when considering whether the history we occupy will undergo 
recombination events during the course of our lifetime, it is not just the set 
of histories produced by a single quantum event which is of concern to us. 
There will be a probability of recombination associated with every 
quantum history branching event which has taken place at any time during 
the evolution of the universe prior to this point. The probability of 
recombination associated with any individual event may be incredibly 
small, but the total number of history branching events prior to this time is 
astronomically large. 
I do not claim to know what the resulting probability of the history we 
occupy undergoing a recombination event during the course of our 
lifetimes is. Nor do I believe it could easily be established. The reasoning 
offered by Zurek 1982 is, as I have already indicated, only a very rough 
approximation and based on very sweeping assumptions. The total number 
of history branching events over the history of our universe cannot be 
easily established either, in fact it doesn’t seem to have a well-defined 
answer. It only makes sense to speak of histories in the context of a 
particular basis. I have been tacitly assuming a quasi-classical basis in which 
the RDM’s of quasi-classical entities are diagonalised. During the early 
stages of the universe, however, it does not seem that there are entities 
we could easily identify as quasi-classical, and so we seemingly could not 
define a basis of quasi-classical histories, or say with any confidence how 
many quantum events would have occurred which led to history branching. 
It is possible that recombination events typically occur in the histories we 
occupy multiple times every day. Alternatively, it is possible that no 
recombination events of previously decohered systems have taken place at 
any time over the history of our world so far. However, even if 
recombination events between histories are extremely rare over the 
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course of the universe to date, it is worth noting that this won't remain the 
case forever. The probability of recombination events between the 
histories produced from a particular quantum event will drop very sharply 
during the initial decoherence process (assuming sufficiently many 
randomly uncorrelated degrees of freedom in the environment), but over 
time it may well begin to rise again as some of the records left behind in 
the environment begin to be overwritten. On the other hand, the number 
of history sets produced by quantum events between which recombination 
events are possible will only rise with time (assuming that no 
recombination events take place). The result is, that while it cannot be 
established whether recombination is a frequent event in the histories we 
occupy right now, the frequency is only going to rise with time as the 
number of past branching events increases. This trend will continue so long 
as recombination events remain rare. 
The next section will look at an example designed to make sense of what a 
real-world instance of recombination might look like for the histories 
involved, and individuals who resided within them. This is intended to 
make clear why such large-scale recombination events would most likely 
not be noticeable to people residing within the histories, and why they 
nonetheless represent an important departure from classical dynamics for 
the histories concerned. 
First, though, I wish to point out that the discussion in this section has still 
made an important, and potentially suspect, tacit assumption which 
encourages the belief that medium decoherence is likely to hold. Following 
the existing literature, discussion so far has been phrased in terms of 
recombination of previously separated histories, which arise from some 
prior history branching event. Though I have fallen in with this for the 
purposes of discussing recombination in this section (and will continue to 
do so in the next section), it is worth noting that history merger events of 
the type we are concerned with in discussions of recombination do not 
necessarily follow from history branching at an earlier time. To suppose 
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that they do, is to implicitly suppose that there was some time prior to the 
present at which the wavefunction only projected onto a single history 
basis vector in the space of quasi-classical histories. In other words, by 
assuming that all histories with which the history we occupy could merge 
must have branched from our own history at some previous point, we are 
making a very sweeping assumption about early states of the universal 
wavefunction. If this assumption does not hold, this might make 
recombination events extremely common over the course of our history. 
This assumption will be discussed further in a later section. 
 
6.3 A Simple Example 
To try to make clear what a practical instance of recombination might look 
like in physical terms, and the issues it would present, consider another 
example with the same schematic form as the Alice and Bob case 
considered earlier: 
• 𝑡 = 𝑘 is a time very far in the past. At this time some physical event 
causes the original history to branch into two histories which 
become macroscopically distinct in some way. The example I shall 
consider here is interactions between atmospheric particles leading 
to a small but macroscopic difference in the spatial distribution of 
falling raindrops. This example, and the single pair of histories it is 
assumed to produce, is chosen for its relative simplicity, but still 
seems perfectly plausible as an example of recombination. In order 
that recombination may have a significant effect on future 
dynamics, we also need to assume that the histories produced both 
𝛼 
𝛾1 
𝛽 
𝛼1 
𝛼2 
𝛽1 
𝛽2 
𝛾2 
𝜔 
𝑡 = 𝑘 𝑡 = 𝑙 𝑡 = 𝑚 
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have amplitudes of the same order of magnitude. Within minutes 
the macroscopic traces of the original event are lost. Decoherence 
has however encoded the event in a very large number of 
disparate degrees of freedom and the two histories remain distinct. 
• Billions of years later, at 𝑡 = 𝑙, a physicist performs a measurement 
on a spin half particle. The two histories 𝛼, and 𝛽, have remained 
macroscopically indistinguishable, and this event occurs 
simultaneously in both. Both histories then split yielding histories 
𝛼1, 𝛼2, and 𝛽1, 𝛽2. The microscopic encoding of the raindrop 
positions still persists, but is being slowly overwritten with time. 
• At 𝑡 = 𝑚, some time after the measurement performed at 𝑡 = 𝑙, 
the last microscopic degrees of freedom encoding the original 
raindrop distribution pattern are finally overwritten. The branches 
𝛼1, 𝛽1, and 𝛼2, 𝛽2, now coincide within the history space and will 
recombine, most probably producing interference phenomena. 
• The Born rule probability of a spin up measurement at 𝑙 < 𝑡 < 𝑚, 
will be 
 |𝛼1|
2 + |𝛽1|
2. At 𝑡 > 𝑚, it will be |𝛾1|
2. But due to interference 
between the two histories, unless the phases of the two history 
state vectors 𝛼 and 𝛽 agree perfectly, then |𝛼1|
2 + |𝛽1|
2 ≠ |𝛾1|
2. 
That is, the total Born rule probability of histories in which a spin up 
measurement took place at 𝑡 = 𝑙, may change at 𝑡 = 𝑚. 
First of all, let us consider that final result. A physicist makes a quantum 
measurement. We assume that probability within a particular history can 
be understood as an amplitude measure over successor histories divided 
by the amplitude of the immediately preceding history, as indicated by the 
Born rule. Thus, the probability of our scientist making a spin up 
measurement in history 𝛼 is 
|𝛼1|
2
|𝛼|2
= 𝑃1 and, given that the experiments 
performed on the two histories are assumed to be effectively identical in 
history 𝛽, It will be 
|𝛽1|
2
|𝛽|2
= 𝑃1 also. These are the probabilities of spin up 
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measurements having been made immediately following the 
measurement. After the recombination event however the probability 
amplitude associated with histories in which spin up was measured will be 
|𝛾1|
2 = 𝑃1′, and depending on the phase amplitudes of the combining 
histories it is very likely that 𝑃1 ≠ 𝑃1′.
14 
On an Everettian account this seems to mean that the amplitude 
associated with histories in which spin up was measured will change at a 
time considerably after the measurement itself. If probability is to be 
identified with branch amplitude, this would seem to mean that the sum 
probability of histories whose internal dynamics originate from a spin up 
measurement will change considerably after that measurement is made. 
Similarly, on the Bohmian account, there will be a set of initial trajectories 
which, under the influence of this form of wavefunction, will correspond to 
the results of a particular spin measurement between 𝑡 = 𝑙 and 𝑡 = 𝑚, 
and then rearrange themselves so as to follow the trajectory that would be 
expected if the other measurement has been made at 𝑡 = 𝑙, after 𝑡 = 𝑚. 
In this way, a very similar change of probability after the event will be 
produced. 
Other ways of interpreting probability in these cases may be available 
within each of these interpretations, which would produce less 
counterintuitive accounts. Probability and the metaphysics of histories are 
not simple in either of these interpretations. Unfortunately, specific 
Bohmian responses are beyond the scope of this thesis, but would be a 
fruitful area for future research. Later chapters of this thesis will look in 
more detail at the interpretation specific responses allowed by Everettian 
quantum mechanics. For now, though, I wish to highlight that this 
disconcerting behaviour is at the heart of why recombination is thought to 
                                                          
14 For the sake of simplicity, I have assumed the total amplitude of all histories 
represented here to be normalised |𝜔|2 = 1. 
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undermine the robust quasi-classicality of consistent histories approaches, 
which do not rely on the further claim of medium decoherence. 
The need for medium decoherence is often discussed in terms of a need to 
preserve the applicability of classical axioms of probability. In fact, though, 
I believe the issue goes beyond this. There is no axiom of probability 
dictating that, if Bob tosses a coin at time 𝑡1, the chance that he gets heads 
at that time will still be the same as the chance that at a later time 𝑡2 he 
will occupy a future in which the coin came down heads at time 𝑡1. This 
principle is so basic to the assumed dynamics of our world that as far as I 
am aware no one has ever formulated it as an axiom of probability15. Yet 
for a history space which does not fulfil the medium decoherence criterion, 
the possibility of interference between recombining histories seems to 
directly call this principle into question. 
It is also worth noting in this case, as previously emphasised, the great 
difficulty of obtaining records of the profound effects of recombination. In 
both histories 𝛾1 and 𝛾2, records of one measurement result will exist, with 
no indication that that measurement result might ever have changed. It 
will be virtually impossible for people occupying either of these histories to 
establish that histories in which records have seemingly always indicated a 
particular result now exist with higher amplitude than they did 
immediately following the original measurement. 
I have argued in this and the previous section that the very long typical 
time periods taken for recombination do not give us a reason to believe 
that recombination events are particularly uncommon at the present time. 
Even if, as is customary, we implicitly assume that at some previous time 
the universal state vector projected onto a single consistent history vector 
(or at least very few vectors), the extremely large number of history 
branching events that will have taken place since that time still means that 
                                                          
15 Though this is certainly not a standard axiom of probability, a principle somewhat along 
these lines is discussed by Belnap & Green 1994. 
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the probability of recombination events at this time cannot be shown to be 
negligible. If this assumption is not made, then there is no reason to 
suppose that the frequency of such events should not be as high as, or 
even higher than, the frequency of history branching events at the present 
time. If such recombination events do take place on a regular basis, this will 
substantially disrupt the quasi-classical character of the histories we 
occupy, but will not generally provide us with records capable of showing 
that such events are taking place. 
The next three sections will look at responses to this issue suggested 
(though not developed in much detail) by Wallace 2012. I will argue that 
the first of these suggestions is of no real value as a justification, and can 
be disregarded. The second (or at least one possible reading of it) is more 
persuasive, but relies on another cosmological claim about our universe, 
which is just as controversial as assuming medium decoherence itself. The 
third suggestion is the most interesting, and potentially fruitful. Its viability 
however, will depend on the interpretational and conceptual framework 
within which it is applied. 
 
6.4 The Intuitive Locality of Dynamics 
I stated in chapter 3 that Wallace 2012 introduces medium decoherence 
with very little discussion of its significance or relation to the alternative 
criteria of consistency and RDM diagonalisation. This is true, and when he 
does this in chapter 3 there is no critical discussion of these criteria or the 
possibility of recombination. In chapter 9, however, Wallace turns to look 
at the time asymmetry of classical dynamics, and the question of how this 
emerges from the fundamentally time symmetric dynamics of the unitary 
quantum theory. In this chapter Wallace never discusses recombination 
directly or any connection to the medium decoherence criterion essential 
for formal aspects of the branching structure developed in chapter 3. 
Nevertheless, Wallace is clearly aware that the time asymmetry of this 
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structure is vital to his interpretation and that such an asymmetry is a 
surprising feature of an interpretation which claims to originate from 
simply taking time symmetric linear quantum mechanics at its face value. 
In chapter 9 Wallace therefore makes some attempt at sketching a 
justification for the introduction of this time asymmetry. He offers sketches 
rather than fully developed arguments. He writes: “In any case, my 
purpose here is not to provide detailed dynamical hypotheses but to 
identify those hypotheses that we need.” (Wallace 2012, pp. 347). In other 
words, Wallace's aim is to provide some indication of the hypotheses that 
would ground belief in the kind of time asymmetric branching structure 
which would provide histories containing real and robust quasi-classical 
dynamics, and is not to present or support a particular detailed physical 
hypothesis which would account for how such a time asymmetry came 
about. 
The next three sections will look at and try to develop arguments that 
Wallace identifies, and review their significance. 
The first of these arguments is based on the intuitive locality of 
macroscopic dynamics. Wallace writes: 
“Since macroscopic properties are typically local, and correlative 
information tends to be highly delocalised, heuristically one would 
expect that generally the details of the correlations are mostly 
irrelevant to the macroscopic properties – only in very special cases 
will they be arranged in just such a way as to lead to longer-term 
effects on the macroproperties.” (Wallace 2012, pp. 346). 
The argument here seems to rely heavily on our intuitive belief in local 
entities whose dynamics are determined locally. This generally seems to be 
an effective principle when it comes to our day-to-day experience of the 
world around us, at least as far as macroscopic objects are concerned. 
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The suggestion is that recombination events and macroscopic interference 
phenomena would involve the properties and dynamics of macroscopic 
entities being affected by nonlocal factors and nonlocal changes. Given 
that this is in sharp contrast with our intuitions about the behaviour of 
quasi-classical macroscopic entities, it seems that we have prima facie 
reason to believe that such events do not take place, or at least do not take 
place often. 
It is certainly true that recombination events will involve changes being 
brought about as a result of nonlocal phase correlations. We saw in the 
previous example how the final records of an event being overwritten 
(wherever in the universe those records might be) affected the 
probabilities of the measurement performed by a physicist, and the results 
of that measurement. These records are likely to be in the form of local 
entities with local characteristics, and in the course of this recombination 
event those characteristics are changed as a result of a profoundly nonlocal 
influence. 
On the other hand, it seems reasonable to doubt whether our intuitions of 
locality can be trusted in the context of interpretations of quantum 
mechanics. For those length scales over which quantum mechanics is 
generally seen to apply, it is an intuition that we have already been forced 
to abandon. The properties and dynamics of electrons are very often 
affected to a substantial extent by correlations with other particles at a 
distance from the electron in question. 
Given that the approach of realist interpretations of quantum mechanics, 
such as the Bohmian and Everettian, is to extend quantum mechanics from 
being a purely microscopic theory to include the macroscopic world as 
well, it seems unreasonable to assume that the intuitions of locality we 
have already had to give up in the microscopic domain will remain tenable 
in the macroscopic context. 
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Moreover, as technology improves, it is increasingly unclear that such 
nonlocal phenomena can really be consigned to the purely microscopic. 
Tests of Bell’s inequalities such as Aspect, Grangier, and Roger 1982 have 
led to demonstrations of entanglement and interference phenomena on 
ever larger scales such as Ockeloen-Korppi et al 2018. These show that, at 
least in those cases where decoherence with respect to the wider 
environment in general is prevented, size seems to be no barrier to 
nonlocal entanglements. 
As I have said, Wallace certainly does not regard this argument as offering 
any very strong evidence for time asymmetry. Given the arguments I have 
already provided concerning the extreme difficulty of obtaining records 
capable of providing evidence for or against the occurrence of history 
recombination, I would go so far as to suggest that our intuitions on the 
subject are of little or no value as evidence of any kind.  
 
6.5 Cosmological Arguments 
Another argument which Wallace indicates but never fully develops relates 
to the extremely large and expanding environment within which records of 
branching events can be encoded. 
“These traces generally become extremely delocalised, and are 
therefore not erasable by local physical processes. In principle one 
can imagine that eventually they relocalize and become erased – 
indeed, this will certainly happen (on absurdly long timescales) for 
spatially finite systems – but it seems heuristically reasonable to 
expect that on any realistic timescale (and for spatially infinite 
systems, perhaps on any timescale at all) the traces persist.” 
(Wallace 2012, pp. 346). 
One aspect of the argument presented here is simply the argument from 
the long typical recombination times discussed in the previous section. I 
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believe, though, that there may be a second argument which Wallace has 
in mind here16. 
The suggestion is that as a matter of fact the universe which we occupy is 
not a finite closed system (or at least not a finite system of constant size). 
This is true both in the sense that the volume occupied by astronomical 
entities within the universe has been shown to be expanding, and in that 
cosmic microwave background radiation emanating from macroscopic 
entities continues to travel out into empty space with no reason (as far as 
we know) why it should ever stop. 
If the number of ways in which a past event is recorded continues to 
increase indefinitely over time, then this will progressively reduce the 
probability of recombination. Thus, if the universe were infinite, or 
expanding in such a way that records of past events could continue to 
multiply indefinitely, then it might be that the probability of recombination 
of a particular pair of histories continues to diminish over time at a 
sufficient rate that the total probability of a recombination event involving 
the history we occupy will remain negligible. 
This is the strongest argument offered by Wallace 2012 for believing the 
consistent quasi-classical history space we occupy to have a truly branching 
structure. However, it is still very far from definitive. 
Firstly, the claim that the universe is expanding in such a way as to allow 
for the multiplication of records in this way is a bold and potentially 
controversial cosmological claim. It seems likely that, in order to keep pace 
with the ever-growing number of past branching events, the growth in the 
number of records would have to happen very generally and very rapidly. 
Moreover, in order to prevent recombination there must not only be 
persistent or multiplying records of a fixed finite number of past events, 
but records of every further branching event as it takes place. This seems 
                                                          
16 I am grateful to Simon Saunders for bringing the second aspect of this argument to my 
attention. 
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to call for a remarkably persistent and rapid expansion in the degrees of 
freedom capable of recording past events, and it is far from clear that the 
expansion of our universe which we observe is sufficient for the purpose. 
Secondly, if decoherence-based approaches to quantum mechanics really 
rely on this continuous expansion of recording degrees of freedom, then 
interpretations which rely on decoherence are relying on a bold and 
controversial cosmological claim. If this is really the case, then it is a fact 
about decoherence-based interpretations of quantum mechanics which 
needs to receive far more attention and discussion. This reliance on 
controversial cosmological facts certainly seems to be at odds with the 
description Wallace gives of his interpretation as being purely a matter of 
understanding the consequences of taking the linear quantum formalism 
seriously. 
Thirdly, the relevance of this argument still seems to rest on the 
assumption that at some past time the total number of histories within the 
consistent quasi-classical history space was small. Or at least, some 
constraint preventing it from including a portion of high amplitude 
histories which already included this expanded number of degrees of 
freedom. The point is that, while the steady expansion of our past light 
cone offers a steadily growing number of degrees of freedom with which it 
is possible for past events to be entangled, it also offers a steadily 
increasing number of degrees of freedom which may have been in 
superposition states. If so, becoming entangled to these states would 
provide yet another source of histories involving ourselves, which may 
subsequently recombine. In short, expanding the number of degrees of 
freedom available to decohered systems improves the situation only if 
those degrees of freedom begin as, to some degree, simple unentangled 
eigenstates with no entanglement to each other, or the rest of our 
universe. 
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6.6 Past Hypothesis 
The majority of Wallace's argument in chapter 9 is not directed at the 
general question of whether recombination events take place and if so 
with what frequency, but more specifically at what could give rise to time 
asymmetric branching dynamics. The answer Wallace gives is that, just like 
the time asymmetric macro dynamics which emerge from time symmetric 
statistical mechanics, the time asymmetry is imposed as a result of some 
form of boundary conditions. 
Wallace considers at some length various boundary condition assumptions 
and the conditions needed to maintain them. He considers various 
formalisations of this requirement, but seems never to reach a formulation 
which he is entirely happy with. In general, he seems to believe that time 
asymmetry in both classical and quantum mechanics will depend on some 
assumed past boundary condition and the existence of dynamics which will 
maintain some important aspects of that initial condition. 
Already in this chapter, I have raised the issue that the plausibility of the 
medium decoherence criterion will depend on the character of the 
universal wavefunction at an earlier time. This assumption, as well as the 
assumption that some (rather ill-defined) factor in the character of this 
earlier wavefunction will be maintained, are precisely what Wallace is 
attempting to introduce here17. 
The formulation of these assumptions which he seems most happy with 
are as follows: 
                                                          
17 Chen (Forthcoming) offers an ‘Initial Projection Hypothesis’ which is also intended to 
play the role of a past hypothesis within quantum mechanics. Chen’s proposal however 
does not seem like it will be of any help in securing the medium decoherence assumption. 
His proposal is to treat the initial state of the universe as a density matrix for an equal 
mixture of all quantum states compatible with a classical past hypothesis. Chen gives no 
consideration to histories or the possibility of history recombination following this starting 
point. It seems likely that this mix of states would make such recombination far more 
probable than if the initial state were taken to be any single component wave function of 
this initial density matrix. 
176 
 
“Simple Dynamical Conjecture (for a given system with coarse-
graining C). Any distribution whose structure is at all simple is 
forward predictable by C; any distribution not so predictable is 
highly complicated and as such is not specifiable in any simple way 
except by stipulating that it is generated via evolving some other 
distribution in time (e.g. by starting with a simple distribution, 
evolving it forwards in time, and then time reversing it).” (Wallace 
2012, pp. 348). 
Making sense of how this criterion applies to quantum mechanics is made 
more complicated by the fact that Wallace is attempting to formulate this 
criterion in a way which is applicable to those time irreversible coarse-
grainings which make up the microscopic world in both classical and 
quantum mechanics. The issue is compounded by the fact that (as Wallace 
accepts) the notion of simplicity being used here is extremely difficult to 
pin down.  
A first step in understanding Wallace's intention is to understand that, in 
the quantum context, coarse-graining here means coarse-graining of the 
wavefunction into (generally not unitary) histories. I think, therefore, a 
good summary of the quantum form of Wallace’s conjecture here would be 
something like the following: 
Quantum Simple Dynamical Conjecture [rephrasing]: Consider a 
wavefunction which can be coarse-grained into a particular structure of 
histories. Any wavefunction whose structure is at all simple is forward 
predictable by examining the internal dynamics of those histories; any 
wavefunction that is not so predictable is highly complicated and as such is 
not specifiable in any simple way except by stipulating that it is generated 
via evolving some other wavefunction in time. 
The arguments offered by Wallace for this dynamical conjecture are those 
discussed in the previous two sections. As I have already argued that 
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neither of these is particularly convincing, I think the justification of this 
dynamical conjecture remains in need of serious critical consideration. 
The additional claim which Wallace introduces, is a direct assumption 
about the state of the wavefunction at an earlier time, very much along the 
same lines as the past hypothesis coined by David Albert for statistical 
mechanics: 
“Simple Past Hypothesis (quantum version). The initial quantum 
state of the universe is simple.” (Wallace 2012, pp. 354) 
Clearly, when this hypothesis is added to the Simple Dynamical Conjecture 
previously introduced, the result is that the history of the wavefunction of 
the universe is forward predictable in terms of a particular set of histories, 
and will not involve recombination events, as these could not be predicted 
in terms of the internal dynamics of those histories. 
Of course, as I have already argued that we do not have a convincing 
reason to endorse the simple dynamical conjecture, I am unsurprisingly 
dubious about the simple past hypothesis as a means of guaranteeing the 
branching structure which Wallace needs. More generally, however, it does 
seem that Wallace is correct in maintaining that some asymmetric 
boundary condition must be employed if there is to be any hope of 
obtaining a time asymmetric branching structure from time symmetric 
linear dynamics. For now then, I offer the following as suggested forms of 
these criteria: 
Revised dynamical conjecture: Consider a wavefunction of the universe, 
and a corresponding history space which contains quasi-classical structures 
with diagonalized reduced density matrices. If at a time the number of 
history states onto which the universal wavefunction projects within the 
space with significant amplitude is very small, and consequently the 
amplitude associated with recombination events between histories is also 
extremely small, then this state of affairs will persist to a reasonable 
degree over any reasonable time-scale that may be considered. This means 
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that it is possible to forward predict the evolution of individual histories 
and their amplitudes in terms of the internal dynamics of those histories 
without any need to consider the wider dynamics of the history space. 
Revised quantum past hypothesis: The initial quantum state of the 
universe projects onto a very small number of histories within the 
consistent quasi-classical history space. 
I have already discussed reasons for believing some form of the dynamical 
conjecture presented here. Wallace seeks a precedent for his appeal to a 
past hypothesis, in the classical past hypothesis of Albert 2000. This may 
provide a precedent, but it is not in itself any form of argument for 
endorsing this major assumption about the structure of our universe. 
Justifying such an assumption, and understanding its implications, is not 
something that I believe can be done in an interpretation neutral way. For 
this reason, I will not deal with this question in this chapter apart from 
commenting that there does not seem to be any such interpretation 
neutral justification. 
The next two chapters will abandon interpretation neutrality. I will focus 
on Wallace's Everettian quantum mechanics and investigate the question 
of how it is possible to justify the assumption that the history space we 
occupy fulfils the medium decoherence criterion within Wallace's 
interpretation. As part of this, I will give careful consideration to past 
hypotheses of the type used by Albert and Wallace and the question of 
how they are to be justified. 
 
6.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have looked at interpretation neutral reasons to suppose 
that the universal wavefunction might fulfil the medium decoherence 
criterion in a quasi-classical basis. Medium decoherence goes far beyond 
the simple diagonalisation of reduced density matrices of local systems for 
which we have direct empirical evidence. I have argued that it is very 
179 
 
difficult to find any empirically based reason to believe that this strong 
criterion obtains. The most convincing justifications, discussed here, 
themselves rely on highly controversial cosmological claims about our 
universe, which seem themselves to stand in need of justification. 
If the medium decoherence criterion cannot be assumed to obtain then, on 
any interpretation which accepts the reality of the universal wavefunction 
without collapse, there is the real possibility that the histories we occupy 
are interrupted on a regular basis by recombination events. Precisely what 
these events entail depends somewhat on the interpretation in question, 
but in any case they will represent a serious departure from the dynamics 
of classical physics which we generally assume apply (to a good 
approximation) to the world around us. 
Though the drastically nonclassical dynamics involved in these events, and 
the overwriting of past records they entail, may at first sight seem 
implausible, these are just the consequences to be expected from standard 
linear quantum mechanics if taken at face value and applied universally. 
The reason we have for believing that such events take place is that it 
seems to be directly indicated by one of our best scientific theories. This is 
precisely the same reason that Everettians have long given for believing in 
the existence of many worlds whose presence we cannot usually detect. 
There are special states that the wavefunction could occupy which would 
prevent these interference events. We have discussed several assumptions 
which may go some way to ensuring that our history space fulfils the 
medium decoherence criterion and does not display recombination. To do 
the job, these assumptions will need to ensure some form of past 
hypothesis concerning an earlier state of the wavefunction, and some 
assumption about the dynamics of the universal wavefunction which will 
ensure that some elements of the assumed past conditions still persists. 
Such assumptions include assuming the visible universe with which states 
can become entangled to be expanding in such a way as to provide many 
new uncorrelated degrees of freedom. And, as Wallace does, directly 
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assuming the past state of the wavefunction to have been simple (in a 
quasi-classical basis). 
Up until this point, I have done my best to make this thesis a general 
discussion of the issues associated with using decoherence in 
interpretations of quantum mechanics without a collapse postulate. While 
much of my discussion has focused on Everettian approaches to 
decoherence, because of the degree to which this predominates in the 
literature, I have done my best to make my conclusions more generally 
applicable. From this point on, however, I will turn to consider 
interpretation specific factors of relevance to the characterisation and 
applicability of decoherence. Unfortunately, I will not be able to deal in 
detail with all the interpretations of quantum mechanics which are 
featured in this thesis up to this point. I have decided to focus on Wallace's 
Everettian quantum mechanics as this is a well-developed and well-known 
interpretation, which deals extensively (and generally clearly) with issues 
related to decoherence. In the conclusion, however, I will make a few 
preliminary remarks about how Bohmian interpretations might deal with 
similar issues, which I hope might be an area for future research. 
The next two chapters will look carefully at interpretation specific ways in 
which Wallace might seek to justify the medium decoherence assumption, 
and the implications for his interpretation if this assumption is dropped. 
 
  
181 
 
7 Everettian Justifications for Medium 
Decoherence 
 
This thesis began by looking at (and seeking to clarify) various conceptions 
of decoherence. In general terms, I have explained why particular 
interpretations have come to rely on the strong, medium decoherence 
conception of decoherence, and explained why justifying the use of this 
criterion poses substantial difficulties. The previous chapter examined a 
variety of interpretation neutral reasons for believing that the medium 
decoherence criterion might obtain for systems with which we are 
generally interested. The conclusion was that, while the possibilities for 
interpretation neutral justifications of medium decoherence are certainly 
not hopeless, they are unpersuasive as it stands. This chapter will turn from 
interpretation neutral considerations to look in more detail at Wallace's 
formulation of Everettian quantum mechanics, to see whether this can 
offer any interpretation specific reasons to believe that the medium 
decoherence criterion should obtain. In particular, I will examine in more 
detail Wallace's suggestion that an appeal to the past simplicity of the 
universe's wavefunction state could be justified by making this condition a 
Humean law of nature. 
I will argue that a Humean account of laws of nature is difficult to reconcile 
with Everettian metaphysics (at least as set out by Wallace). This is because 
the Humean account of laws describes them as regularities over a mosaic 
of locally instantiated particular properties. Everettian quantum 
mechanics, however, does not offer any such mosaic. While it is reasonable 
to suppose that some flexibility in this conception of a mosaic may be 
possible, I will argue that Wallace’s presentation of Everettian quantum 
mechanics still seems to rule out all plausible candidates. 
Before getting to discussion of such justifications, however, I will begin by 
recapitulating the reasons why Everettian interpretations in general rely on 
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decoherence, and then look in more detail at precisely the role it is playing 
within Wallace's formulation of this approach. 
 
7.1 Two Problems of the Preferred Basis 
In chapter 2 we looked at three problems which Schlosshauer sees 
decoherence as solving. By decoherence Schlosshauer seems to mean the 
diagonalisation of a local system’s reduced density matrix as a result of 
interaction with its environment. This section will make clear precisely 
where the problems which Wallace is seeking to solve depart from those 
discussed by Schlosshauer, in a way that requires him to abandon 
Schlosshauer’s criterion in favour of the medium decoherence criterion. 
Using just this simple characterisation of decoherence Schlosshauer claims 
to solve three major aspects of the quantum measurement problem. As I 
commented in chapter 2, one of these, namely the generic problem of 
outcomes, does not really have very much to do with decoherence except 
in so far as it relates to the dynamics of a local system which is part of a 
nonlocal linearly evolving wavefunction which does not collapse. 
I wish now to focus more carefully on the problem of the preferred basis, 
particularly with regard to its role in Everettian quantum mechanics. The 
problem, as set out by Schlosshauer, is primarily a question of identifying 
what constitutes a measurement of a particular property. The example he 
uses (Schlosshauer 2007, pp. 54) is that of a spin half particle coming into 
contact with an apparatus intended to measure its z-spin state. 
The apparatus is defined such that 
|0𝑧⟩𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|"𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦"⟩𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 → |0𝑧⟩𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|0𝑧⟩𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 
|1𝑧⟩𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|"𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦"⟩𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 → |1𝑧⟩𝑆𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚|1𝑧⟩𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 
For some general particle state the interaction will then be: 
(𝛼|0𝑧⟩𝑆 + 𝛽|1𝑧⟩𝑆) |"𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑦"⟩𝐴 → 𝛼|0𝑧⟩𝑆 |0𝑧⟩𝐴 + 𝛽|1𝑧⟩𝑆 |1𝑧⟩𝐴 
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As Schlosshauer points out, a simple basis transformation applied to the 
final state seems to change the quantity being measured in this process. 
𝛼|0𝑧⟩𝑆 |0𝑧⟩𝐵 + 𝛽|1𝑧⟩𝑆 |1𝑧⟩𝐵
=
1
√2
(𝛼 + 𝛽)|0𝑥⟩𝑆 |0𝑥⟩𝐴 +
1
√2
(𝛼 − 𝛽)|1𝑥⟩𝑆 |1𝑥⟩𝐴 
After this transformation, the form in which the state is written appears to 
show that the apparatus has become entangled to the particle by its x-spin 
state. The problem of the preferred basis as Schlosshauer understands it is 
as follows: 
“if we interpret in the spirit of the von Neumann scheme…, this 
formation of system-apparatus correlations as a complete 
measurement, this state of affairs seems to imply the following. 
Once A has measured the spin of S along the z axis, A may be 
considered as having measured also the spin of S along the x axis… 
Thus our device A would appear to have simultaneously measured 
two noncommuting observables of the system… In apparent 
contradiction with the laws of quantum mechanics.” (Schlosshauer 
2007, pp. 54, original emphasis). 
In other words, by means of a basis transformation it appears that we can 
trivially transform what was intended to be a measurement of z-spin to a 
measurement of x-spin. The problem is finding some reasoned basis for 
claiming that we made one of these measurements and not the other. 
The solution, as already presented in chapter 2, rests on consideration of 
the interaction between the measurement apparatus and its environment. 
As the measuring apparatus in this case is designed to measure z-spin, it 
will presumably be designed to have some macroscopic distinction, such as 
the position of a pointer, become entangled to the z-spin state of the 
target particle. This pointer will in turn very quickly become extensively 
entangled to its environment. As a result, in this basis, the off-diagonal 
elements in the reduced density matrix of the measurement apparatus and 
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target particle will become very close to zero. Of course, there are 
elements of the measuring apparatus which become entangled not to the 
z-spin state, but to the x-spin state, but these degrees of freedom are not 
of the type to become entangled to the apparatus’s environment in the 
same way. Consequently, because of the design of the apparatus, 
environment-induced diagonalisation of the system’s reduced density 
matrix will occur for only a single observable (z-spin in this case). 
Schlosshauer takes this to be a reasoned justification for identifying z-spin 
as the measured property rather than any other. 
When introducing this problem and Schlosshauer’s solution in chapter 2, I 
said that it held important clues to providing a branching structure for 
Everettian many worlds interpretations of the type presented by David 
Wallace. This is certainly true; however, a solution to the form of this 
problem presented by Schlosshauer does not, in and of itself, provide a 
means to identify a branching structure of robustly distinct worlds of the 
type needed for an Everettian multi-verse. Identifying this structure is a 
different and more challenging form of the problem of the preferred basis, 
and it is central to understanding why Wallace employs the medium 
decoherence criterion in his analysis of the branching structure. The 
problem of the preferred basis for Everettian quantum mechanics is the 
problem of identifying when portions of the wavefunction are and are not 
distinct Everettian worlds. 
Decoherence, as Schlosshauer characterises it (i.e. diagonalisation of a 
system’s RDM) is not a condition applicable to very long timescales. In due 
course the system and apparatus for which a reduced density matrix was 
produced will be tidied away, or rearranged for the next experiment, or 
permanently dismantled and recycled. Working out whether the reduced 
density matrix of the system remains diagonalised at a later time might 
well prove extremely difficult. 
Moreover, it is clearly not a viable criterion for world separation. We 
should not in general expect that a measurement apparatus in which 
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decoherence has once occurred will never again display any form of 
interference phenomena. An interferometer apparatus might be used 
many times in a day. This shows that whichever degrees of freedom 
decohere when a measurement is made, clearly do not remain decohered 
indefinitely. Otherwise interference phenomena within these elements 
would be suppressed, on subsequent uses of the apparatus, and no 
interference phenomena could be observed. If the criterion for Everettian 
world separation were simply the diagonalization of the RDM of a localised 
system, then world separation would often be very short lived indeed. 
This loss of diagonalisation does not mean that the original measured state 
would no longer be entangled to some elements of the wider environment 
(a lab book being a likely example). It almost certainly would be. But these 
entangled elements will be widely spread, and may well not include the 
localised system of degrees of freedom whose reduced density matrix was 
originally diagonalized in the environmental decoherence process. 
This short-term approach to identifying the phenomenon of decoherence is 
eminently practical when it comes to deciding whether or not an 
interaction which has just taken place should count as a measurement of a 
particular observable. Consequently, it clearly offers significant help to the 
Everettian when it comes to establishing which types of interaction would 
result in world branching, and according to which basis that branching 
would take place. 
It fails, however, when it comes to answering the question of whether or 
not two histories which have previously branched remain distinct at a later 
time. As I have argued extensively in previous chapters, establishing that 
histories remain distinct at a later time relies ultimately on the assumption 
of medium decoherence. The key difference in the problem of the 
preferred basis as set out by Wallace, as opposed to the problem as set out 
by Schlosshauer, is that Wallace is concerned not only with establishing the 
basis by which histories branch, but with establishing the basis by which 
you can decompose the universal wavefunction into individuated worlds. 
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The second way in which the consequences of medium decoherence 
depart from what is achieved by Schlosshauer’s conception, concerns the 
problem of the non-observability of interference. As characterised by 
Schlosshauer, this is the problem of why we do not generally observe 
interference phenomena on scales other than the extremely small. If the 
universal wavefunction fulfils the medium decoherence criterion, then the 
answer is simple. Any entity whose state is continuously entangled with 
elements within its environment will not display interference phenomena 
in the basis by which the environmental entanglement takes place. These 
states will have become entangled to the environment and remain there 
for ever more without ever being lost, thus permanently preventing the 
separated histories from recombining. Without this criterion, however, the 
door is open to large-scale interference phenomena. Schlosshauer argues 
that continuous entanglement to the environment will suppress 
interference phenomena displayed by medium-sized dry goods on a day-
to-day basis. I argued extensively in the previous chapter, firstly that this 
does not guarantee that interference phenomena will not occur, and 
secondly that it does ensure that the scale on which they occur is 
sufficiently large (both in terms of time and the size of system involved) as 
to be effectively unobservable. 
A second distinction between the dynamics ensured by Schlosshauer’s 
criterion and Wallace’s, is that whereas RDM diagonalisation makes large-
scale interference phenomena extremely difficult to observe, for the 
medium decoherence criterion to (approximately) obtain, as Wallace 
believes, would mean that large-scale interference phenomena 
(approximately) never occur at all. As we shall see in the next chapter this 
is crucial to securing the Everettian conception of probability. 
Here then are the two key ways in which the problems which Wallace 
seeks to solve by invoking environmental decoherence depart from those 
discussed by Schlosshauer. The next section will look in more detail at how 
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Wallace characterises his branching structure and the role it plays in 
securing quasi-classical structures for Wallace’s metaphysics. 
 
7.2 The Role of the Preferred Basis in Everettian Metaphysics 
In chapters 4 and 5, I looked at objections to decoherence-based reasoning 
which stemmed from suspicions of the for all practical purposes nature of 
the reasoning involved. I noted then that much of the response to these 
issues offered by David Wallace stems from his use of Dennettian concepts 
of emergence. In essence, much of the metaphysical foundations of 
Wallace's approach rest on his endorsement of what Wallace coins as 
Dennett's criterion: 
Dennett’s Criterion: a macro object is a pattern and the existence 
of a pattern as a real thing depends on the usefulness -- in 
particular the explanatory power and predictive reliability -- of 
theories which admit that pattern in their ontology. (Wallace 2012, 
pp. 50). 
This criterion is clearly intended to accept vaguely defined and 
approximate patterns as real, provided that they are sufficiently robust to 
be useful for explanatory and predictive purposes. To demonstrate this 
point, here is one of Wallace’s often repeated comments in response to 
the question of how many Everettian worlds exist in his view: 
“Decoherence causes the universe to develop an emergent 
branching structure. The existence of this branching structure is a 
robust (albeit emergent) feature of reality; so is the mod-squared 
amplitude for any macroscopically described history. But there is no 
non-arbitrary decomposition of macroscopically-described histories 
into ‘finest-grained’ histories, and no non-arbitrary way of counting 
those histories.” (Wallace 2012, pp. 101. Original emphasis). 
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This is representative of Wallace's overarching characterisation of the 
metaphysics of his Everettian multi-verse. The precise characterisation of 
entities, described within his interpretation, will inevitably become vague 
in some cases and on some scales. As far as Wallace is concerned though, 
this is not a problem for his view so long as the general patterns which, 
following from Dennett’s criterion, are what constitute emergent 
macroscopic entities, really are robust enough to provide ongoing 
predictive and explanatory power. 
This need for robustness is linked to the difference between the problem 
of the preferred basis, as considered by Schlosshauer, and that considered 
by Wallace. In a sense, the problem of the preferred basis considered by 
Schlosshauer, and his solution to it, are both clearly concerned with 
patterns within localised subsections of the wavefunction, just as Wallace 
is. The patterns picked out by RDM diagonalisation, however, have nothing 
to guarantee their ongoing robustness, and consequently nothing to 
guarantee that ongoing predictive reliability. If these patterns are not in 
fact robust then it seems that they would fail to fulfil Dennett’s criterion, 
and so not describe anything which Wallace would consider a macroscopic 
object. 
If on the other hand a quantum system which decoheres, becoming 
entangled to its wider environment in some basis, in fact forms part of a 
wider history space which (approximately) fulfils the medium decoherence 
criterion, then the entanglement of the system state will persist 
(approximately) forever, and the associated interference phenomena will 
remain (approximately) suppressed (approximately) for ever. 
Given this robustness, it is easy to see why Wallace believes that the 
patterns contained within a history space which approximately fulfils the 
medium decoherence criterion would be robust enough to fulfil Dennett's 
criterion for inclusion in our ontology. If we accept that criterion, and that 
the universal wavefunction (or the portion of it we occupy) almost 
perfectly fulfils the medium decoherence criterion, then it is difficult to see 
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how we could fail to see Wallace's scheme for Everettian quantum 
mechanics as recovering the manifest quasi-classical image of the world 
around us in day-to-day life (ignoring the question of probability for the 
time being). 
Clearly then, securing the claim that the portion of the wavefunction we 
occupy approximately fulfils the medium decoherence criterion should be a 
major priority for all advocates of Wallace’s project. In the previous 
chapter I considered a wide range of interpretation neutral reasons for 
believing that the medium decoherence criterion might obtain. I argued, 
however, that none of these reasons was particularly convincing. I will now 
turn to consider the suggestion made by Wallace that a simple initial state 
of the universal wavefunction might constitute a Humean law of nature. 
The suggestion was mentioned in the previous chapter, but as I will make 
clear it is not a suggestion that can be evaluated independently of the 
metaphysical apparatus of particular interpretations. As this suggestion 
was made by Wallace, it will be particularly interesting to examine how it 
fares in the context of his own form of the Everett interpretation. 
Examining this, and the issues which arise from it, will be the main topic of 
this chapter. 
 
7.3 Humean Laws and Medium Decoherence 
Humean laws of nature depart from other conceptions of laws in that they 
do not govern the behaviour of entities in the world, but rather supervene 
on that behaviour. Lewis 1986, who was one of the major modern 
champions of this view, took Humean supervenience to be “the doctrine 
that all there is in the world is a vast mosaic of local matters of particular 
fact, just one little thing and then another” (Lewis 1986, ix), with the laws 
of nature being regularities over the particulars which make up this vast 
mosaic. Specifically, laws of nature are seen as being those regularities 
which give the best balance of theoretical simplicity and predictive 
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strength within some theoretical system. There are many concerns relating 
both to how precisely this simplicity and strength should be characterised, 
and whether this is an adequate characterisation of laws at all. For a 
discussion of many of these issues see Ned Hall 2015 and Carrol 2016. For 
present purposes though I will ignore most of these questions and assume 
that, at least for non-quantum cases where a mosaic of the type Lewis has 
in mind can be supplied, then best regularities over that mosaic can be 
identified as laws of nature in much the way that Lewis suggests. 
In this chapter, I will focus on two questions regarding Wallace's appeal to 
Humean laws. Firstly, I will consider what could count as a mosaic over 
which these laws might supervene in the context of Everettian quantum 
mechanics. Secondly, I will look directly at Wallace's suggestion that an (in 
some sense simple) initial state of the universal wavefunction might 
possibly fit the criteria to be a law of nature in such a context. 
Before going on to these points, however, I will very briefly recap why, and 
in what sense, these simple initial conditions for the starting state of the 
universal wavefunction would provide support for Wallace's belief that the 
medium decoherence criterion approximately obtains for the universal 
wavefunction. 
In chapter 9 of his book, Wallace introduces two principles, neither of 
which he rigorously defines. These are his quantum past hypothesis, which 
states that the universal wavefunction begins in a “simple” state, and 
simple dynamical conjecture, which seems to amount to the conjecture 
that a once “simple” state will remain that way on reasonable timescales. 
Simplicity here refers to some vaguely identified condition on the state of 
the universal wavefunction (which is certainly not simple to define). The 
central purpose of requiring simplicity is clear however, and this is to rule 
out history recombination. 
Just how Wallace’s concept of simplicity is to be characterised is something 
which he leaves extremely unclear, and it seems likely that specifying it 
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precisely would prove extremely difficult. I made some attempts to find a 
more precise formulation in the previous chapter, though it is hard to be 
sure whether they were really in the spirit of what Wallace had in mind. 
For the present chapter, I will use a perhaps simplistic conception of these 
principles which, though possibly suspect in some ways, certainly captures 
the spirit of Wallace's proposal. 
Consider the initial segment of a single history within the history space of a 
closed system and the successor histories produced as it (and its 
successors) undergo history branching events. As discussed previously, if 
particular subsystems of interest within the total system are assumed, then 
the bases in which these subsystems interact with the rest of the system 
will give rise to a basis in which the reduced density matrices of these 
subsystems are diagonalised. Following standard practice in histories 
approaches, we will take our histories to be picked out by the bases in 
which these reduced density matrices are diagonalised. Now consider the 
question of whether after some time interval history recombination has 
occurred within the history space. 
History recombination will occur if and only if two histories come to agree 
on their projectors at a time after previously disagreeing. Whether or not 
this will happen depends on the character of other histories which form 
the history space of our system, and the Hilbert space which they occupy. If 
at a starting time there are histories in our space corresponding to a large 
proportion of accessible points within the Hilbert space of our system, then 
it is highly probable that our considered history and its successors will 
quickly come to recombine with other histories. I take the quantum past 
hypothesis to amount to the assumption that this is not the case for the 
starting conditions of the system which is that portion of the universe 
which we occupy. 
Assuming that there are not histories which correspond to a large 
proportion of points in the Hilbert space of a system at our initially 
considered time, the progressive branching of the successor histories we 
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are considering will after some period of time inevitably make this the 
case. I take the simple dynamical conjecture to be the assumption that the 
time for this process to happen is long compared to any timescales we are 
likely to be interested in. 
The second of these points I have already discussed in the previous chapter 
and I have nothing to add in the specific context of Everettian quantum 
mechanics. My position remains that it is extremely difficult to say one way 
or another whether this conjecture is plausible or not. 
In this chapter I will follow up on this brief suggestion of Wallace, that 
assuming medium decoherence might be justified by some form of 
quantum past hypothesis. It should be remembered in what follows that 
this is a speculative suggestion by Wallace, and not a position which he 
develops or defends in any clear fashion. What follows is intended as an 
exploration of this possibility, not a critique or counter argument to 
Wallace. 
It should also be remembered, though, that the claim that our universe 
fulfils the medium decoherence criterion is something which Wallace relies 
on heavily. Consequently, while Wallace is not committed to the viability of 
a Humean quantum past hypothesis, it would be a great support to a claim 
which he does rely on.  
 
7.4 Albert’s Classical Past Hypothesis 
The past hypothesis in thermodynamics (a term coined by Albert (2000)) is 
(roughly) the hypothesis that at the start of the (classical) history of the 
universe it occupied a particular low entropy state. The precise 
characterisation of this hypothesis is controversial – not least because the 
characterisations that Albert gives do not always seem consistent with one 
another. Brown 2017 identifies three different characterisations of this 
hypothesis within Albert 2000, and argues that these characterisations are 
not all equivalent. The intended gist is clear enough, however. 
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This hypothesis, and its intended consequence, that entropy begins in a 
low state and increases progressively over the course of the universe, is 
essential to our ability to make many reasonable judgements both when 
retrodicting past states and the history of our universe, and predicting 
future ones. Both the precise character of this classical past hypothesis, 
and the degree of justification we have for believing it, are complex issues 
which I will largely ignore. For an overview of this literature see Callender 
2016. For discussion more directly relevant to Wallace's understanding of 
this hypothesis see Wallace's own discussion (2012, pp. 324-358), much of 
which is concerned with the classical form of the past hypothesis, and the 
extensive discussion offered by way of response by Brown 2017. 
The other thing to be noted about the classical past hypothesis is that it is 
often seen as likely to constitute a law of nature on a Humean 
understanding of laws. In the words of Callender 2016, “It is likely that the 
specification of a special initial condition would emerge as an axiom in such 
a system, for such a constraint may well make the laws much more 
powerful than they otherwise would be.” 
Wallace's quantum past hypothesis, then, is a close analogy of Albert's 
classical past hypothesis, and Wallace hopes that it too might be 
considered a Humean law of nature. I will return to the question of just 
how close the analogy between the quantum and classical past hypotheses 
are, but for now the next section will focus on the questions of what it 
would mean for something to be a Humean law within an Everettian 
interpretation, and what would constitute the mosaic onto which Humean 
laws are supposed to supervene. 
 
7.5 In Search of an Everettian Mosaic 
As previously mentioned, this Humean mosaic in classical cases was 
generally seen as being locally instantiated properties in four-dimensional 
space-time. Central to this conception was the idea that there were no 
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necessary connections between the distinct local particulars which make 
up the Humean mosaic and that these particulars could be freely 
recombined into other possible configurations. In this section I will take the 
essential elements of a Humean mosaic to be freely recombinable 
particulars with no necessary connections between them.18 Searching for a 
candidate mosaic which fulfils these requirements is the aim of this 
section. 
Quantum mechanics poses a very clear prima facie challenge for the 
traditional mosaic. Central to the theory is the possibility of quantum 
entanglement between spatially distinct particulars. These entanglements 
seem at first glance to represent a clear example of necessary connections 
between spatially separated particulars.19 
Within the context of the Bohmian interpretation there is something very 
reminiscent of the traditional Humean mosaic, namely the space-time 
positions and trajectories of Bohmian particles. The ontological status of 
the wavefunction, and the connections between particular particles that it 
seems to contain, still remain challenges for such interpretations, which 
have received a wide variety of responses see for example Miller 2013, 
Bhogal & Perry 2015, Dewar 2016. There is however a clear consensus as to 
the subvenient basis onto which Humean laws are meant to supervene in 
the context of this interpretation, and this is the positions of Bohmian 
particles. 
In Everettian quantum mechanics there is no such straightforward answer. 
Quasi-classical Everettian worlds contain approximately classical patterns 
                                                          
18 This recombinability of particulars is crucial within the modern Humean project as it is 
the basis of the Lewisean conception of possibility and necessity in terms of possible 
worlds (very different to the Everettian conception of worlds). These possible worlds are 
related to our own by difference in some of the particulars which make up the Humean 
mosaic. For more on this see Hall 2015 or Lewis 1986. 
19 Darby 2015 argues persuasively that entanglement does not have to be understood in 
terms of necessary connections, and so does not necessarily undermine Humean 
metaphysics. His analysis is strictly interpretation neutral, however, and so does not rule 
out the possibility that particular interpretations of QM may understand entanglement 
relations in a way incompatible with Humean metaphysics. 
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which behave like simple local structures under most interactions, and so 
may seem like a promising choice for the subvenient basis of an Everettian 
Humeanism. Unfortunately, on Wallace's view these structures are merely 
emergent patterns within a profoundly nonlocal wavefunction. Their 
apparently local dynamics rely fundamentally on the profoundly nonlocal 
fact of their entanglement to many other degrees of freedom within their 
extended environment. Consequently, they do not seem able to offer 
either the locality which is traditionally expected in a Humean mosaic, or 
the freedom of recombination among elements of the mosaic on which the 
Lewisian account of possibility (which is at the heart of modern 
Humeanism about laws) relies. 
Similarly, the wavefunction itself, if considered purely in three-space, does 
not seem like a promising candidate for the subvenient basis of Humean 
laws. Like the emergent quasi-classical structures which it instantiates, it is 
fundamentally profoundly nonlocal, and it is even less clear what a 
recombination of the mosaic would mean where the mosaic is something 
as complex as a wavefunction in three-space than it is in the context of 
these emergent structures. 
As far as I can see, then, it does not seem at all promising to seek a 
candidate for a Humean mosaic in any three-space account of Everettian 
quantum mechanics. None of the structures found by examining Everettian 
quantum mechanics as described in three-space seem to display the 
necessary capacity for recombination independent of one another. As such, 
a Humean account of laws which sought to use any of these structures as 
its subvenient basis would be forced to make a radical departure from the 
way that Humean laws of nature have been conceived of in the literature 
since the work of Lewis 1986. 
The alternative would be to identify the mosaic, not with any structures in 
three-space, but with the wavefunction in some higher dimensional space 
such as 3N configuration space. 3N configurations space means the higher 
dimensional space whose dimensionality is three times the number of 
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particles present in three space. In this space, any arrangement of particles 
in three space is represented as a single vector. Strictly speaking, of course, 
this still doesn't capture everything we want to know in the context of 
quantum mechanics, as properties such as particles’ spin are not included. 
Nonetheless, adding extra dimensions to capture particles’ spin is a 
(reasonably) simple addition to make, and Ney 2016 pp. 14 makes clear 
that it is this expanded space rather than simple configuration space which 
she considers the wavefunction to occupy. 
Advocates of what has become known as wavefunction realism have long 
argued that the wavefunction is best conceived of in the context of this 
higher dimensional space. This view, originating with Albert 1996 and more 
recently defended by Ney 2013 and North 2013, takes the wavefunction as 
an entity which should be considered as fundamentally occupying this 
higher dimensional space. The major advantage of this view is that viewed 
in the context of this higher dimensional space, quantum mechanics no 
longer describes nonlocal properties or interactions. Consequently, the 
wavefunction can be represented by simply assigning a complex number to 
every point in this space. 
This corresponds far more closely to the traditional notions of a Humean 
mosaic. It is a space composed of local properties instantiated at points, 
just as traditionally expected. Moreover, these locally applied coefficients 
could easily be rearranged independently of one another (excepting 
possible issues of renormalisation), meaning that recombining the mosaic 
into other possible configurations corresponding to other possible worlds 
(in the Lewisian sense) could be easily considered. In the context of 
wavefunction realism, therefore, it seems as though there really is a viable 
candidate for the Humean mosaic. Laws of nature could potentially be 
conceived as regularities over this mosaic, and assuming that Wallace's 
quantum past hypothesis actually obtains, and offers a good enough 
balance of simplicity and strength to those systems of laws which include 
it, it could potentially be a Humean law of nature on this view. 
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There are, however, many people who believe that the wavefunction 
realists are fundamentally mistaken in their commitment to conceiving of 
the wavefunction as occupying a higher dimensional space in this way. One 
particularly persuasive opponent of this view is David Wallace himself. 
Wallace (forthcoming) makes a wide range of generally persuasive 
arguments against conceiving of the wavefunction in this way. These begin 
with the point already noted, that configuration space (the usually 
discussed candidate for this higher dimensional space) caters only to 
position, and not to other quantum properties such as spin. Less easily 
corrected problems arise when consideration is given to relativistic 
extensions of quantum mechanics. Wallace points out that many of our 
leading candidates for theories of relativistic quantum mechanics do not 
appear to reside in a space where particle position is primary or even, in 
some cases, a clearly defined property. He also points out that locality, as it 
is obtained by representing the wavefunction in a higher dimensional 
space, does not have anything to do with locality as it is generally 
conceived of in day-to-day life (that is, as locality in three-space) and as 
such locality in the sense achieved is a rather dubious virtue. 
Wallace’s general theme in this paper, with which he continues, is to attack 
the basic rationale for believing that our mathematical descriptions of the 
wavefunction suggest it to be fundamentally an entity in configuration 
space. Essentially, he believes this to be an error made by people who have 
taken the ways in which the wavefunction is often written in non-
relativistic cases far too seriously.  
It seems, then, that at least as far as the position advocated by Wallace is 
concerned, wavefunction realism in configuration space is not to be 
endorsed as an Everettian mosaic. 
Part of the reason for Wallace's opposition no doubt stems from the fact 
that configurations space as customarily presented could be seen as giving 
a privileged status to the position basis. This is at odds with Wallace's 
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project of presenting an interpretation which does not rely on such a 
preferred basis. This is not the only reason for Wallace's objection to this 
position, however. 
 
7.6 What is Wallace Talking About? 
Throughout his development of Everettian quantum mechanics, there is a 
fundamental question which Wallace explicitly does not answer. This 
question is what the fundamental ontology of quantum mechanics is. 
Wallace says a great deal about the ontology of Everettian quantum 
mechanics, but all of this ontology is composed of emergent structures – 
patterns within the wavefunction whose fundamental nature is never 
explained. 
Both in his concluding remarks in Wallace (forthcoming), and in chapter 8 
of his book on Everettian quantum mechanics (2012), Wallace explicitly 
states that he does not know what the correct fundamental ontology of 
quantum mechanics is. Moreover, he seems far from optimistic about the 
possibilities for answering this question. He writes: 
“I suspect that looking for `the' ontology of a framework theory is a 
category error and that we would do better to reformulate the 
question in terms of the ontology of specific quantum theories, 
such as the standard model of particle physics (and also to 
recognise that these are unlikely to be fundamental theories, so 
that hopes to learn about fundamental ontology from those 
theories are probably vain).” (Wallace Forthcoming, pp. 11). 
The recognition of ignorance about the fundamental ontology of quantum 
mechanics may be entirely appropriate here. Certainly, it seems very 
plausible that committing to a particular ontology on the basis of our 
present knowledge might be premature. However, it does present a 
striking problem for anyone seeking a subvenient basis of Humean laws 
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within Everettian quantum mechanics. As I have already argued, the 
emergent structures which feature in Wallace's form of Everettian 
quantum mechanics do not seem to have the necessary character to 
function as such a subvenient basis. Given that Wallace is also unwilling to 
commit to any particular fundamental ontology, it seems to be left open to 
speculation whether or not any viable subvenient basis for Humean laws 
within Everettian quantum mechanics exists. 
Wave function realism in some updated form capable of allowing for 
relativistic cases remains a possible fundamental ontology, and if the 
fundamental ontology of Everettian quantum mechanics is really of this 
form then it might be possible to apply a Humean account of laws as 
regularities over this mosaic in a higher dimensional space. Alternatively, if 
the fundamental ontology was in line with the priority monism advocated 
by Schaffer 2016, then recombination of particulars within a mosaic 
independent of one another would not be possible, and a Humean account 
of laws (at least one of traditional form) would be ruled out too. 
It seems, therefore, that treating Wallace's quantum past hypothesis as a 
Humean law of nature within Everettian quantum mechanics is on some 
level a potentially workable possibility, but given the present state of 
Everettian ontology it is a distant possibility rather than a presently viable 
argument. Moreover, it is a possibility which rests on progress in 
establishing fundamental quantum ontology in a way which Wallace 
himself seems very doubtful about. 
 
7.7 Comparing the Classical and Quantum Past Hypotheses 
Before leaving the topic of the quantum past hypothesis there is one more 
point that I wish to make. It concerns a subtle but significant dis-analogy 
between the past hypothesis concerning entropy of the early universe 
presented by Albert 2000, and that suggested by Wallace. 
Consider the following quote: 
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“What will follow (more particularly) from the world’s present 
macrocondition + the uniform microdistribution over that 
macrocondition + the laws of motion is… that any book describing 
the Roman Empire is far more likely to have fluctuated out of 
molecular chaos than to have arisen as some sort of distant causal 
consequence of the existence of that empire; and no amount of 
redundancy among various such books, or among such books and 
archaeological artifacts and whatever else you may be able to come 
up with, will change that one iota. Period.”  (Albert 2000, pp. 115. 
Original emphasis). 
The point Albert is making is that everyday inferences about past states of 
the world, which we make based on the present state of the world, cannot 
be supported simply by our knowledge of the present, and the laws of 
motion. These inferences rely on a crucial additional premise. They rely on 
assuming that the universe previously occupied a lower entropy state than 
it does at present, and that over the time period considered total entropy 
has been increasing. That is, they rely on some form of classical past 
hypothesis. 
If this hypothesis is not assumed, then our epistemic access to the past is 
almost unimaginably weaker than we generally take it to be. This provides 
a very clear incentive for endorsing the classical past hypothesis. If, as most 
people do, we believe that the existence of books about the Roman Empire 
should give us a high degree of confidence that the Empire itself once 
existed, then we seem to be obliged to endorse some form of this 
hypothesis. 
On the other hand, the same does not seem to be true in the case of the 
quantum past hypothesis. If we assume that the total entropy within 
histories will generally increase over time, in accordance with the classical 
past hypothesis, then the existence of a large number of books about the 
Roman Empire make it highly probable that the Roman Empire existed in a 
large proportion of the predecessor histories which led to the one which 
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we currently occupy. There will also be predecessor histories of this one in 
which those books came about with no causal connection to any such 
Empire, but these will almost certainly make up an extremely small 
proportion of the total amplitude of predecessor histories at any past 
time.20  
The point is that, as I argued extensively in the previous chapter, branch 
recombination events will only affect the distribution of history amplitudes 
over the history space. Records we have of past events within the history 
we occupy will be accurate records of events (neglecting the usual 
accidents21) regardless of whether the history recombination has taken 
place or not. The thing that may well have been disrupted if history 
recombination has taken place is the amplitude of the history we occupy. 
As this (except in the highly exceptional cases discussed in the previous 
chapter) is not something that we have records for or direct empirical 
access to, it would not obviously make us wrong about any of our natural 
beliefs concerning the world we occupy. 
It seems to me, therefore, that our epistemic access to our past survives 
the rejection of the quantum past hypothesis far better than it survives the 
rejection of the classical past hypothesis. One of the strongest motivations 
for endorsing the classical past hypothesis, therefore, seems to be 
irrelevant in the quantum case. Consequently, I do not feel that the 
quantum past hypothesis shares the same intuitive appeal as the classical 
past hypothesis. 
The only issue that this would present relates to the Everettian treatment 
of probability. This will be discussed in the next chapter. For now though it 
                                                          
20 It should be noted of course, that when the assumption of medium decoherence is 
dropped the total amplitude of predecessor histories is very likely to change at different 
times. In particular, it is entirely possible that the total amplitude of our present history is 
greater than the total amplitude of predecessor histories which lead to it at some 
particular time. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is because of the possibility of 
constructive interference between recombining histories. 
21 Unlike in the classical case, of course, such accidents will certainly occur in a small 
proportion of the predecessor histories which lead to our present one, but these will be a 
very small proportion of the total. 
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is simply worth noting that this seems to represent a clear dis-analogy 
between the classical and quantum cases and, I would suggest, undermines 
the intuitive appeal of accepting the quantum past hypothesis. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to look in more detail at the specifically 
Everettian uses to which the phenomenon of decoherence is put as set out 
by David Wallace. I have then focused on Wallace's quantum past 
hypothesis, and the suggestion he makes that this could be understood as 
a Humean law of nature. I have argued that, while this hypothesis may 
quite possibly be true, the case for viewing it as a law of nature is 
significantly undermined by the present state of Everettian ontology. 
I have also set out an apparent dis-analogy between the quantum past 
hypothesis and the classical past hypothesis of David Albert, which I believe 
undermines the intuitive appeal of the quantum past hypothesis. 
Introducing Wallace’s quantum past hypothesis, and defending it as a 
Humean law of nature, was the last of Wallace’s suggested justifications for 
assuming medium decoherence to be considered. It may be possible to 
develop such an argument, but it would require adding metaphysical 
commitments beyond those of Wallace’s Everettian interpretation, and 
these do not seem like safe commitments given the present state of our 
theories.  
In this chapter and the previous chapter then, all the suggestions made by 
Wallace as justifications of the medium decoherence assumption (and 
some others besides) have been considered. None of them seem to offer 
persuasive reason to endorse this assumption. This assumption, however, 
is crucial to Wallace’s interpretation, as a source of robust patterns 
through which quasi-classical entities can be identified, allowing the 
recovery of our manifest image of the world. 
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There remains one possibility which I still wish to examine by way of a 
possible interpretation specific defence of the medium decoherence 
criterion. This would be a defence by way of indispensability. The next 
chapter will examine in more detail the impact on the Everettian derivation 
of the Born rule, and the broader Everettian metaphysics which depend on 
it, of dropping the medium decoherence assumption. I will consider firstly 
the question of whether the medium decoherence criterion is 
indispensable to the effective functioning of this metaphysics and its ability 
to recover our experiences of quasi-classical reality. I will then turn to 
consider the question of whether, if it is indispensable to the Everettian 
framework, this could in itself be the basis of a direct argument for 
believing in it. 
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8 Everett Without Medium Decoherence 
 
The last two chapters have considered many reasons for endorsing the 
assumption that the medium decoherence criterion obtains for the 
universe we occupy. I have argued that all of these arguments are 
unconvincing. This is not to say that the universe could not fulfil this 
criterion (for now at least), but the few arguments found in the literature 
for this position as well as the other plausible suggestions I have 
considered do not seem like convincing justifications for believing it. 
This chapter is intended to serve two purposes. Firstly, it will look in more 
detail at just what the problems are which are produced for Wallace's 
Everettian quantum mechanics if this assumption is abandoned. Secondly, 
it will identify what I believe to be the most hopeful prospect for a 
justification of the medium decoherence assumption. 
The justification I have in mind is to appeal to the assumption’s explanatory 
indispensability in a way rather similar to that sometimes used to argue for 
mathematical Platonism. The form of this argument will closely follow the 
indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism as given by Baker 
2009 pp. 613: 
P1) We ought rationally to believe in the existence of any entity 
that plays an indispensable explanatory role in our best scientific 
theories. 
P2) Mathematical objects play an indispensable explanatory role in 
science. 
C) Hence, we ought rationally to believe in the existence of 
mathematical objects. 
The argument I propose is as follows: 
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P1) We ought rationally to commit to all and only those physical 
claims about our universe that play an indispensable explanatory 
role in our best scientific theories. 
P2) The claim that our universe fulfils the medium decoherence 
criterion plays an explanatorily indispensable role within our theory 
of quantum physics, which is one of our best scientific theories. 
C) Hence, we ought to commit to the claim that our universe fulfils 
the medium decoherence criterion. 
Premise 1 is closely connected to arguments about conformational holism 
within the existing literature on mathematical Platonism. I will touch on 
these arguments towards the end of this chapter. 
There is one clear dis-analogy between the indispensability argument 
presented here and the argument as used for mathematical Platonism 
which may concern the reader. This is that in the case of mathematical 
Platonism this form of argument is used to argue for an ontological 
commitment (to Platonic numbers), rather than a general claim about the 
structure of the universe. While I acknowledge this clear dis-analogy, I 
don’t believe that it undermines the use of this form of argument in 
support of the claim of medium decoherence. The reason for this is that 
the indispensability argument in mathematics itself gains much of its 
persuasive power by being analogous to general scientific reasoning about 
the commitments entailed by our theories. I believe that it is general 
scientific practice to believe those claims about our universe which are 
indispensable to our best scientific theories, just as much as it is scientific 
practice to believe in the existence of entities which are indispensable. 
For the purposes of this chapter I will treat our theory of quantum physics 
as meaning Wallace’s Everettian theory of quantum physics. This is of 
course an approach which advocates of other interpretations would 
certainly reject. The concluding chapter will suggest that the medium 
decoherence assumption appears to be indispensable to at least some 
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other interpretations of quantum physics, but even so, there will certainly 
remain other interpretations of quantum mechanics for which the 
assumption is not indispensable. The argument will therefore also need to 
rely on Everettian quantum mechanics being a better theory than quantum 
mechanics interpreted in some other way. 
I also take the meaning of this dispensability to be the same as that found 
in indispensability arguments in the philosophy of maths. Colyvan 2015 
writes “What we require for an entity to be ‘dispensable’ is for it to be 
eliminable and that the theory resulting from the entity's elimination be an 
attractive theory.” The first task of this chapter will therefore be to argue 
that if the medium decoherence assumption is dispensed with, Everettian 
quantum mechanics ceases to be an attractive theory. 
From what was said concerning the implications of the medium 
decoherence assumption in the previous chapter, the reader would be 
forgiven for wondering if it is really so necessary as an assumption for 
Wallace's Everettian quantum mechanics. In the last chapter I focused on 
the need to clearly delineate robustly distinct Everettian worlds. This is 
certainly something that Wallace is committed to, but given that (as I have 
already argued) the failure of this separation is extremely unlikely to have 
easily observable physical consequences, it is unclear just why Wallace is so 
committed. 
Now I will turn to look at Everettian accounts of probability and the drastic 
impact which abandoning the medium decoherence assumption has for 
them. I will argue that this impact is at the heart of why medium 
decoherence is indispensable to Everettian quantum mechanics. 
 
8.1 Deriving the Born Rule 
In chapter 4 I looked at a scheme for deriving the Born rule presented by 
Zurek. Since Zurek first presented the scheme, many authors have 
presented their own schemes for deriving the Born rule for linear quantum 
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mechanics without a collapse postulate. Though many of these schemes 
have been conceptually more sophisticated than that offered by Zurek, 
they share the same basic approach of showing that the modulus squared 
of a state’s coefficient should rationally be treated as probability by agents 
described within a linearly evolving wavefunction. 
These approaches can sensibly be divided into two broad camps: the 
decision theoretic approaches of Deutsch 1999, Saunders 2004, and 
Wallace 2010, and the epistemic approaches of Sebens & Carroll 2018, and 
Zurek 2005. 
The decision theoretic approach begins from the assumption of a 
branching structure of worlds in accordance with Wallace's general 
metaphysical project. It then proceeds to show that for agents within these 
worlds the modulus squared of the coefficient of a successor history state 
vector fulfils the functional role of the probability of a future state. A range 
of arguments concerning the nature of probability are then used to argue 
for accepting the modulus squared of this coefficient as quantum 
probability, just as set out in the Born rule. 
The epistemic approaches on the other hand do not begin from such 
general Everettian metaphysical assumptions. They attempt to show that, 
for an agent uncertain about their future location within the wavefunction, 
the modulus squared of the coefficient of future histories gives the 
epistemically justified credence ascriptions for their future state. These 
approaches are less specific about the metaphysical structure into which 
these probabilities fit. They are certainly compatible with a variety of 
Everettian interpretations including Wallace’s. 
All of these approaches rest on reasoning very much like that originally set 
out by Zurek which was discussed in chapter 4. Zurek's argument is given in 
a form very similar to that found in Sebens & Carroll 2018, pp. 17-20 and 
Wallace 2012 ch3. This reasoning is used to show that, for a branching 
structure of histories of a system which decoheres with respect to its 
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environment, Born rule amplitudes behave as probabilities are generally 
expected to. And that no other easily identifiable quantity within the 
description of this process fulfils the general expectations on the behaviour 
of probability (Zurek, 2005, 2014). I will not present the reasoning for these 
results again in this chapter. For a structure of branching histories, I will 
simply take these results as proven. 
In this chapter I will focus on the changes brought about if the medium 
decoherence assumption fails, and consequently, the histories of the 
system cannot be assumed to possess a branching structure. I will focus 
primarily on Wallace's work, but I will also refer to Sebens & Carroll as an 
example of a Born rule derivation which seems compatible with Wallace’s 
project, and which, at least prima facie, does not seem to rely on the 
assumption of medium decoherence in the same way. 
 
8.2 Macro Interference and Wallace’s Justification of the 
Born Rule 
The first task then is to review the effects of the failure of medium 
decoherence discussed in chapter 6. I will briefly re-present this result in 
order to make clear precisely how it leads to a failure of wavefunction 
amplitudes to fill the functional role of probability within the context of 
Wallace style Everettian metaphysics. 
In the fifth chapter of his book Wallace 2012 gives an extended and very 
careful discussion of decision theoretic notions of probability. His intention 
in this chapter is to argue that, because history amplitudes are able to play 
the functional role of probability for an agent within those histories, they 
can be regarded as actually being in some sense an objective form of 
probability for such an agent. This is a subtle and interesting treatment to 
which Wallace devotes the bulk of his discussion of deriving the Born rule 
for Everettian quantum mechanics. For my purposes in this chapter, 
however, I believe it can be set aside. The reason is that this chapter is 
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concerned really with showing that the concept of probability is one that 
can be given a rigorous analysis within the deterministic theory of 
Everettian quantum mechanics. The basic derivation of the Born rule on 
which Wallace relies actually happens in the previous chapter. He makes 
this clear in chapter 5. 
“At its mathematical core, the argument I will present is not really 
decision theoretic at all: it rests on the same symmetry 
considerations as the proof of the Born rule which I presented in 
section 4.13. The reason for appealing to decision theory, as I have 
been at pains to stress, is simply that it provides us with a sharp 
unambiguous notion of probability applicable to a context – that of 
a branching universe – in which it has been questioned whether 
probability makes sense at all.” (Wallace 2012, pp. 159). 
I am prepared to grant Wallace's claim that decision theory provides a 
viable account of probability within Everettian quantum mechanics suitable 
to all those purposes, provided that the symmetry considerations to which 
Wallace alludes really can provide a means to derive the Born rule and that 
this rule is able to fill the functional role of classical probability. I will 
therefore focus my attention on his argument in section 4.13, which in fact 
is very largely the same argument originally presented by Zurek, which I 
presented in chapter 2. 
I will briefly set out the type of branching structure to which Wallace 
applies this reasoning, and then turn to consider cases of history 
recombination, and how these undermine that reasoning. 
Wallace takes the general form of a quantum probabilistic branching 
process to be: 
𝜒𝑡=0  ̂ → ∑𝜙?̂?
𝑖
 
Here an initial history state yields some number of successor histories 
which differ on their projectors from one another by degrees of freedom 
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which become encoded within the wider environment. Recombination of 
histories is something which Wallace assumes not to take place in 
accordance with the general metaphysics of his project. With this 
characterisation in hand, he follows precisely the same symmetries-based 
reasoning as Zurek. He uses this to initially show that for a pair of successor 
histories of equal amplitude, the probability ascribed should be equal, just 
as given by the Born rule. He then considers decompositions of more 
complex sets of histories into a larger set of histories of equal amplitude 
and argues that these should have equal probability as one another for just 
the same reason. Finally, he shows very simply that in consequence, the 
probability for any general set of history states 𝜙𝑖  and associated 
coefficients 𝛼𝑖, the appropriate probabilities to ascribe are just as given by 
the Born rule: 
𝑃(𝜙𝑖) = ⟨𝜓|𝜙?̂?
†
𝜙?̂?|𝜓⟩ 
Now I will turn to look at what happens if the medium decoherence 
criterion does not obtain, and consequently, history recombination and 
interference do occur. To do this, I will return to the schematic 
representation of the process presented in chapter 6. 
As previously, the branching event that takes place at 𝑡 = 𝑘 will be some 
event in the distant past which yields two macroscopically similar histories 
within which records of the event are stored, but gradually erased with 
time, until they are lost entirely at 𝑡 = 𝑚. I will focus on how probabilities 
would be described by agents within history ?̂?, and its successors. 
At 𝑡 = 𝑙 a quantum probabilistic event occurs in both ?̂? and ?̂?, which is 
observed by an agent within each of those histories. For the present 
?̂? 
𝛾1ෝ  
?̂? 
𝛼1ෞ 
𝛼2ෞ 
𝛽1̂ 
𝛽2̂ 
𝛾2ෞ 
𝜔ෝ 
𝑡 = 𝑘 𝑡 = 𝑙 𝑡 = 𝑚 
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discussion we will take this to be the measurement of a spin-1/2 particle 
initially in a superposition. The first question to be considered is what the 
appropriate credence ascription is for an agent in history ?̂? for the 
outcome of the measurement. 
If we concern ourselves only with probability ascriptions over the successor 
histories 𝛼1ෞ and 𝛼2ෞ, then the symmetries-based analysis suggested by 
Wallace seems perfectly appropriate, and capable of giving clear 
probabilities for both possible outcomes (outcome 1 being obtained in 
history 𝛼1ෞ, and outcome 2 being obtained in 𝛼2ෞ). The trouble is, that as I 
argued in chapter 6, the histories which recombine at 𝑡 = 𝑚, will very 
generally interfere with one another. This occurrence may be seen as in 
itself enough to invalidate Wallace's analysis, but if it can be applied to the 
probability ascriptions of our agent in ?̂?, then they are still perfectly able to 
find sensible credence ascriptions for the histories 𝛾1ෝ  and 𝛾2ෝ , but these 
credences will generally not match those appropriate to give to the 
histories 𝛼1ෞ and 𝛼2ෞ. In consequence, it seems that our agent would be 
compelled to ascribe one probability to outcome one having been obtained 
at 𝑡 = 𝑙 between 𝑡 = 𝑙 and 𝑡 = 𝑚, and a different probability to the same 
outcome of the measurement after 𝑡 = 𝑚. 
To be clear here, this process does not involve any second measurement 
which has different probabilities for its outcomes. The only measurement 
being considered is the measurement made at 𝑡 = 𝑙. That measurement, 
however, seems to change the probabilities of its possible outcomes 
significantly after the measurement itself takes place. This is clearly a 
striking departure from our traditional notions of probability. 
Even if we are happy to accept that our agent in ?̂?, should ascribe two 
contradictory probabilities to a single event in this way, we have a still 
more challenging problem. This is the question of what probability an 
agent in 𝛼1ෞ should ascribe to the successor history 𝛾1ෝ . Given that the only 
distinguishing feature of 𝛾1ෝ  is a result 1 being obtained for a measurement 
at 𝑡 = 𝑙, which in history 𝛼1ෞ has already been performed and recorded as 
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producing result 1, the classically expected answer is certainty. But it is 
very unclear how this can be reconciled with the difference in Born rule 
probabilities between 𝛼1ෞ and 𝛾1ෝ . 
In the circumstances, it seems clear to me that arguing for the 
identification of Born rule amplitudes as probabilities on the grounds that 
they play the functional role of classical probability is not a tenable strategy 
in the context of history recombination. Wallace's symmetries argument 
relies on the assumption of a branching structure of histories as produced 
if the medium decoherence criterion obtains. Dropping this assumption 
therefore has fatal consequences for Wallace's Born rule derivation. 
 
8.3 The Epistemic Separability Principle 
Perhaps it is unsurprising to find that an interpretation with medium 
decoherence at its heart does not provide a derivation of the Born rule 
which survives dropping this assumption. Before moving on however, I will 
briefly consider the derivation of the Born rule given by Sebens and Carroll 
2018. The reason is that this derivation does not make any explicit mention 
of medium decoherence. If this really were a Born rule derivation which 
could be incorporated into Wallace's project, but which did not rely on the 
presupposition of medium decoherence, then this might be an important 
step in saving Wallace's project from the effects of history recombination. 
Unfortunately, however, while medium decoherence is not employed 
directly by Sebens and Carroll, they rely on what they term an epistemic 
separability principle. The quantum form of this principle is given as follows 
(Sebens & Carroll 2018, pp. 17): 
“ESP-QM Suppose that an experiment has just measured 
observable Ô of system S and registered some eigenvalue Oi on 
each branch of the wavefunction. The probability that agent A 
ought to assign to the detector D having registered Oi when the 
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universal wavefunction is Ψ, P(Oi|Ψ), only depends on the reduced 
density matrix of A and D, ρADෞ : 
P(Oi|Ψ) = P(Oi|ρADෞ ) 
Consequently, the impact of any changes in records outside of the system 
which directly undergoes the quantum probabilistic process is, by virtue of 
this principle, irrelevant to the appropriate credence ascriptions of an 
agent concerning the results of that process. Sebens and Carroll justify this 
principle by comparison to the classical cases to which it is very generally 
appropriate. 
This principle is used as grounds to neglect the wider environment for the 
purposes of Sebens & Carroll's analysis. Given that history recombination 
of the type I am discussing relies on records within the wider environment 
being erased, this amounts to the assumption that such records and 
potential erasure events are irrelevant to the probabilities that an agent 
should ascribe to results of an experiment within their local environment. 
There seem to be two possible responses to this state of affairs. The first is 
to say that this principle implicitly rests on the assumption of medium 
decoherence, and the Born rule developed by Sebens and Carroll is simply 
not applicable to cases where medium decoherence does not obtain. This 
seems the more natural understanding of Sebens & Carroll’s intention. A 
second possibility, however, is to treat this principle as the basis for a new 
quantum probability rule which differs from the traditional Born rule. 
This would be the suggestion that if this principle is applied when analysing 
the recombination case discussed above, then the probability that an agent 
within ?̂? should ascribe to obtaining result 1 is simply the probability that 
their immediate successor history is 𝛼1ෞ. The Born rule amplitude of 𝛾1ෝ  
would be irrelevant. 
I suspect that if it was generally applied this new probability rule could be 
shown to produce inconsistent probability ascriptions in some cases. Even 
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if it did not, it would certainly be a striking departure from the Born rule, 
and require a significant revision of quantum mechanics. Such a revisionist 
project does not look likely to prove fruitful. 
It seems, therefore, that Sebens & Carroll do not provide a Born rule 
derivation that is capable of surviving the failure of the medium 
decoherence assumption. I will now turn to consider why this failure 
matters to Wallace's broader project. 
 
8.4 The Problem of Low Amplitude Histories 
In this chapter I have argued that there is a significant problem in the 
application of the Born rule to Everettian quantum mechanics in the way 
that Wallace suggests. However the reader may wonder, given my 
discussion in chapter 6, whether this is really an important problem. The 
cases which I have used to develop a problem for Born rule probabilities in 
Everettian quantum mechanics are cases in which, as I have argued 
previously, we are very unlikely to have any evidence of anything untoward 
having taken place. The fact that it is difficult to make sense of probability 
in such cases might therefore be thought a rather abstract theoretical 
problem, rather than an insurmountable difficulty for a putative 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. And given that my purpose in this 
chapter is to outline an indispensability argument for believing the medium 
decoherence criterion to obtain, I do need to show that there is, or at least 
seems to be, a really serious and insurmountable problem. To explain why I 
believe medium decoherence really is indispensable to Wallace's project, 
let us return to a problem already discussed in chapter 3. 
The problem is that, while the branching multi-verse of Everettian 
quantum mechanics definitely includes worlds which correspond to the 
types of experience and apparent dynamics with which we are familiar, it 
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also includes many histories22 which do not display anything like these 
classical dynamics. This is because for a quasi-classical entity within a 
history, such as a table, there is a persistent low Born rule probability of it 
spontaneously relocating to any other position in the universe. This is just 
one example of the very many types of radically nonclassical behaviour 
that some low amplitude histories within the wavefunction will display. The 
problem this poses for Everettian quantum mechanics is to explain why we 
can reasonably expect the quasi-classical dynamics we observe on a day-to-
day basis and not these outliers. 
Barrett, writing before the development of modern Born rule derivations, 
expresses this problem well: 
“Consider trying to use splitting worlds theory to make bets about 
where the Eiffel Tower is right now. Suppose that the universal 
wavefunction assigns a small but nonzero amplitude to me having 
all the beliefs that I have as I write this and the Eiffel Tower being in 
Pittsburgh (as it presumably would given the usual dynamics). So I 
bet a friend $10 that the Eiffel Tower is in Pittsburgh right now. This 
is presumably a bad bet, but why?... There is nothing in the splitting 
worlds theory as it stands that tells me which sort of world I inhabit 
right now or even which sort I should expect to inhabit right now. 
“As it stands then, the splitting worlds theory does not even explain 
why one should expect to record the usual quantum statistics right 
now.” (Barrett 1999, pp. 166. Original emphasis). 
With the Born rule in hand this problem is very simple to answer. We can 
neglect these extremely low amplitude histories because they are very 
improbable. This is precisely the answer that Wallace points to when 
responding to this question (Wallace 2012, pp. 248). But if, as I have 
argued, dropping the medium decoherence assumption fatally undermines 
                                                          
22 As previously noted, technical issues relating to Wallace's characterisation of a world 
mean that many of these histories will not fulfil the criteria to count as a world. 
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Everettian Born rule derivations, then it also returns the Everettian to the 
position of being unable to answer this basic question. 
The problem posed is explanatory rather than empirical. The histories 
which display the quasi-classical dynamics with which we are generally 
familiar do exist, and will continue to exist. Our observation of such 
dynamics is an inevitability within linearly evolving deterministic quantum 
theory. The trouble is that histories in which radically nonclassical 
behaviour is displayed are also inevitabilities. With medium decoherence 
assumed, Wallace's project is able to explain why it comes about that our 
observed experience is of histories of the former type and not of the latter. 
More generally, if medium decoherence is granted, Wallace’s project is 
able to explain quantum probability ascriptions, and our existing statistical 
records. These records cannot be used as the basis of a direct empirical 
argument for medium decoherence, but the ability of Wallace's project to 
explain them clearly represents a very great theoretical strength. 
The reason these records cannot be used for a direct empirical argument is 
that we are not comparing two theories which make competing 
probabilistic claims. We are comparing a theory which makes probabilistic 
claims to one in which probability is simply not an applicable concept. Both 
are capable of predicting the occurrence of records of precisely the types 
we possess. The grounds for deciding between them must rest on their 
theoretical virtues rather than direct empirical comparison. 
I believe however that the level of difference between the explanatory 
virtues of these theories is sufficient that, so long as we are only 
considering Everettian quantum mechanics with and without the 
assumption of medium decoherence, medium decoherence can be taken 
as clearly indispensable. 
 
217 
 
8.5 Indispensability 
This state of affairs in which a theory relies on a physical claim about the 
universe which is indispensable to the theory, but which the theory does 
not empirically confirm may seem a little puzzling. The key thing to 
understand is that this claim about the universe is not needed for any 
empirical prediction, but is indispensable to explaining why observations of 
these types are not simply inevitable features of one determinately 
predicted history amongst many, but features of the type of history in 
which we should expect to find ourselves. This explanatory power is of 
such great importance to the attractiveness of the interpretation that I 
believe Everettian quantum mechanics without this power ceases to be an 
attractive theory (as Barrett 1999 also suggests). Consequently, it seems to 
me that this explanatory indispensability provides a promising argument in 
support of the medium decoherence assumption, as set out at the start of 
this chapter. 
This form of argument faces objections. Maddy 1992 argues that we should 
not think of empirical confirmation for a theory as representing empirical 
confirmation for every ontological claim which is indispensable to that 
theory. She bases this claim on the observed practice of scientists, who 
frequently seem to have varying levels of credence for different parts of a 
theory. Consequently, simply showing that a physical claim about the 
universe is indispensable to a theory does not necessarily mean that we 
have significant justification for accepting that claim. 
Another possible concern is that though the assumption of medium 
decoherence is explanatorily indispensable to the theory of quantum 
mechanics, it might still not be sufficient to commit us to the assumption. 
Saatsi 2016 argues that for mathematics to be in some sense indispensable 
to scientific theories is not necessarily enough to commit us to accepting 
mathematical entities into our ontology. He argues that whether or not we 
should be committed to accepting such entities will depend on the nature 
of the explanatory role they are playing within the theory, as well as the 
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theory of explanation we have in mind. In particular, he suggests (Saatsi 
2016 pp. 1060) that the explanatory role of mathematical entities 
(indispensable though it may be) is thin meaning that it acts as a 
representation of something else which is what really plays the thick 
explanatory role. In the case of the medium decoherence assumption, it 
seems to me that if the assumption is, in any sense a representation of 
something explanatorily indispensable, which must be accepted as real, 
then all that Wallace needs of the assumption will be established, and the 
essence of this indispensability argument will have succeeded. Establishing 
this however will require a level of engagement with the philosophy of 
explanation literature which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
These arguments originate in the context of indispensability arguments for 
the existence of mathematical entities, but they may also apply in the 
context of medium decoherence. Various questions therefore still remain 
concerning the justification of medium decoherence in this way. 
Nevertheless, an indispensability argument of the type I have suggested in 
this chapter does at least seem like a promising basis on which a 
justification of medium decoherence might be developed. 
Of course, throughout this chapter I have ignored other interpretations of 
quantum mechanics. In order for the indispensability argument I have 
described to succeed, it would be necessary to show either that medium 
decoherence was indispensable to other interpretations of quantum 
mechanics as well, or that Everettian quantum mechanics was in some 
sense theoretically superior to interpretations which did not need this 
assumption. 
This seems to me to be an entirely appropriate demand. Medium 
decoherence is a very broad claim about the physical characteristics of our 
universe, which is essential to the account of Everettian quantum 
mechanics developed by Wallace. I have not been able to find any 
convincing justification for this claim about our universe either in the 
existing literature or my own investigation. While this assumption is not 
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untenable, it does represent a real and significant disadvantage of the 
Everettian interpretation. Noticing this point seems particularly important 
given that Wallace often presents his interpretation as simply a matter of 
taking the linear quantum mechanics seriously, without any additions or 
further assumptions. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
The main purpose of this chapter has been to outline a possible 
justification of the medium decoherence assumption. This justification is to 
argue that medium decoherence is indispensable to what seems to be one 
of our best scientific theories. This, I suggest, can be used as the basis for 
an indispensability argument for accepting this assumption. 
I have argued that medium decoherence is indispensable to the Everettian 
Born rule derivations available in the literature, and that these derivations 
are indispensable to Wallace's Everettian project generally. This first step in 
the indispensability argument seems to me indisputable as this 
interpretation stands, and likely to remain that way under foreseeable 
developments. 
Beyond Everettian quantum mechanics, however, the argument depends 
on complex and disputed issues relating to theory confirmation. It also 
depends on a favourable comparison being made between Everettian 
quantum mechanics and other possible interpretations. The second of 
these issues will be dealt with at slightly greater length in the final chapter. 
The first is a question which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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9 Conclusion 
 
In the last chapter I argued that it might be possible to justify assuming the 
universe we occupy satisfies the medium decoherence criterion, in order to 
support Wallace's Everettian quantum mechanics, on the grounds of the 
indispensability of this assumption. For such an argument to be successful, 
there must be no equivalently good (or better) theory which does not rely 
on this assumption. That is, in order to justify the medium decoherence 
assumption within Everettian quantum mechanics, it is necessary that all 
other interpretations of quantum mechanics are either less good theories, 
in some sense, or also rely on the assumption of medium decoherence. 
In this chapter, I will review the results of this thesis to remind the reader 
of the significance of medium decoherence, and the difficulties involved in 
justifying the assumption that this condition really applies to the history 
space of our universe in a quasi-classical basis. I will then close this thesis 
with a preliminary examination of other interpretations of quantum 
mechanics to see if there is an interpretation other than Everettian 
quantum mechanics which does an equivalently good, or better, job, 
without relying on this assumption. 
I will argue that the only viable candidate for such an interpretation is 
GRW, and that it is far from clear that this interpretation could at present 
be considered to be as appealing as Everettian quantum mechanics. 
Finally, I will argue that Bohmian mechanics, though still reliant on the 
same medium decoherence assumption, may be in a better position to 
justify this assumption within its interpretational framework. I will not 
investigate these possibilities in any detail here, but will indicate why I 
believe them to be hopeful avenues for future research, which I hope to 
see developed further. 
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9.1 A Review of this Thesis 
In the first chapter of this thesis, I introduced the basic problems which 
arise when we try to reconcile linear and deterministic quantum 
mechanics, as captured by the Schrödinger equation, with the world of our 
everyday experience. I outlined four different types of interpretation which 
seek to solve this problem. 
I also gave a broad characterisation of decoherence – the process by which 
a quantum system, when entangled to its environment, will come to 
behave under subsequent operations, performed in the basis by which it is 
entangled, without displaying distinctively quantum interference 
phenomena. This phenomenon presents the exciting prospect of a means 
to distinguish those areas of the world which we can expect to display 
distinctively quantum interference phenomena, from those which will not. 
As a result, three of the four families of interpretation set out in this 
chapter use it to help distinguish when linear quantum mechanics should 
or should not be taken as a useful and appropriate guide to physical 
behaviour. 
Importantly, the phenomenon of decoherence in the sense set out here is 
a direct consequence of linear Schrödinger dynamics rather than being a 
change or addition to the theory. Consequently, it will feature (in a similar 
form) in any interpretation which incorporates the linear Schrödinger 
dynamics as a real and universal feature of reality (e.g. Everettian and 
Bohmian interpretations). The rest of this thesis has focused on examining 
different ways of understanding decoherence within a universally 
applicable linear and deterministically evolving wave function. 
Chapter 2 began by returning to the quantum measurement problem, and 
introducing a subdivision of the problem set out by Schlosshauer 2007. 
Schlosshauer divides the problem into the problem of the non-observability 
of interference, the problem of the preferred basis, and two distinct 
problems of outcomes. Of these, the most important over the course of this 
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thesis has been the problem of the preferred basis. That is, the problem of 
explaining how within linear quantum mechanics it is possible for a 
measurement to be a measurement of one property of a system rather 
than another noncommuting property. 
I then set out the first rigorously defined conception of decoherence given 
in this thesis. This is the conception of decoherence as the diagonalisation 
of a local system’s reduced density matrix in a particular basis, as a result 
of interaction with its environment. As I emphasised, this conception of 
decoherence is empirically well confirmed, and, aside from relying on a 
rather suspect application of the Born rule and a particular choice of 
system-environment split, as discussed in chapter 4, it has a clear and 
direct connection to the formalism of linear quantum mechanics. This 
relatively clear and direct connection to the standard formalism and 
empirical evidence is a distinctive feature of this weakest conception of 
decoherence. 
Following Schlosshauer, I went on to set out how this conception of 
decoherence seems to offer a means of resolving three of these four 
aspects of the quantum measurement problem. In the context of the 
problem of the preferred basis, this is done by identifying the measured 
basis with the basis in which the reduced density matrix of the system is 
diagonalised over the course of the measurement process. Consequently, a 
natural choice for a criterion, to determine when quasi-classical histories of 
a local system branch off from one another, is precisely this process of 
diagonalisation. This will ensure that under operations performed only on 
the local system there will be no interference phenomena between distinct 
histories. I noted however, that there is nothing about fulfilling this 
criterion that will ensure these interference-free dynamics persist in the 
long-term, and that if such interference effects returned this would seem 
to present both Bohmian and Everettian interpretations with puzzling 
distinctly nonclassical dynamics. 
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Chapter 3 set out two different criteria of decoherence, both of which aim 
to ensure robustly interference free quasi-classical dynamics within 
histories. To explain these, I set out a more detailed conception of a 
history, and a history space, as well as outlining the many histories 
interpretations which developed these concepts. I also introduced the 
decoherence functional in terms of which these two criteria, consistency 
and medium decoherence, are defined. Unlike the diagonalisation of a local 
system’s reduced density matrix, which is a short-term criterion for when 
decoherence takes place within a single history and its immediate 
successors, these new criteria are conditions over a system’s history space 
which ensure particular dynamics over the entire duration of the system 
considered. 
Consistency, the weaker of these criteria, ensures that there is no 
interference between the different histories which make up the history 
space of a system. This is of very obvious relevance to our everyday notions 
of the classical world and what it would mean for a history space to display 
quasi-classical dynamics. However, within the Everettian literature, 
consistency has declined significantly in popularity as a criterion of 
decoherence. Instead, Wallace, in his presentation of the many worlds 
interpretation, as well as authors such as Gell-Mann, Hartle and Griffiths 
within the many histories literature, have come to advocate the stronger 
criterion of medium decoherence. Medium decoherence entails 
consistency, and also requires that histories, having once separated from 
one another, should never at any later time recombine. 
I argued in chapter 3 that consistency is too weak as a conception of 
decoherence as it is fulfilled in cases where a system’s history space does 
not display interference between histories, but where this absence of 
interference is not guaranteed by entanglement to the wider environment. 
As such, this criterion can be fulfilled in cases where the physical 
phenomenon of decoherence has not taken place. 
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Medium decoherence, on the other hand, seems to be too strong a 
criterion. For a system’s history space to fulfil this criterion, each history 
within the space must always retain records of every past branching of that 
history. Whereas the physical phenomenon of decoherence concerns 
records being encoded outside of a system, the medium decoherence 
criterion requires that the results of all probability events over the system’s 
history should remain always encoded within the system itself. A 
consequence of this is that any history space which fulfils the medium 
decoherence criterion will have a branching structure. That is, histories will 
branch off from one another but never recombine, just as desired for 
Wallace's many worlds interpretation. 
Clearly, the medium decoherence criterion is a far stronger criterion than 
the diagonalisation of a system’s reduced density matrix, which raises the 
question of why we should believe that the history space of the universe 
we occupy really fulfils this criterion and has such a branching structure. 
Chapter 4 left the subject of medium decoherence in order to further 
examine how reasoning based on environment induced decoherence is 
used to develop an interpretation of quantum mechanics which seeks its 
origin purely in terms of linear Schrödinger dynamics and a universally 
applying wave function. The biggest challenge for such approaches is how 
to reconcile a linear and deterministic theory with the probabilistic nature 
of the observations which underpin quantum mechanics. In chapter 4 I 
presented a derivation of the Born rule developed by Zurek, and showed 
how, based on certain assumptions, it is possible to derive the Born rule as 
the rational credence ascription of an agent who is part of a history which 
undergoes a branching process. 
Zurek's derivation is compelling, but faces criticism from authors such as 
Kent 2010 and Kastner 2014 who claim that it is viciously circular. The 
remainder of chapter 4 focused on examining and responding to two 
criticisms raised by Kastner 2014. In both cases, I argued that the circular 
nature of Zurek's derivation, identified by Kastner, is a legitimate criticism 
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of Zurek's attempt to show that Born rule probabilities for quasi-classical 
states follow as a necessary consequence of the linear Schrödinger 
formalism. However, I also argued that Kastner is mistaken in extending 
these objections from the use of this reasoning within Zurek’s quantum 
Darwinist project (which attempts this direct derivation), to its use within 
broader Everettian projects such as Wallace’s, which simply use this 
reasoning to show how such probabilistic quasi-classical states robustly 
emerge from the linear formalism. 
A second point raised by Kastner is that typical models of decoherence 
used for calculating decoherence times rely on the assumption of 
randomised phase correlations within the environment to which the 
system becomes entangled. She points out that this assumption does not 
seem plausible in reality. Kastner does not give any clear example of when 
such phase correlations could present a significant problem for 
decoherence or Zurek's Born rule derivation. I reviewed several concerns 
about this approximation which she might have had in mind, and argued 
that the only one which need concern us is the possibility that phase 
correlations within the environment will give rise to subsequent history 
recombination. 
In chapter 5 I consider two concerns presented by Thébault & Dawid 2015 
which are related to those of Kastner, and which are presented primarily as 
a challenge to Wallace. The first of these concerns is that Thébault & Dawid 
believe that the derivation of the Born rule, as given by authors such as 
Zurek and Wallace, presupposes not simply the subjective Born rule which 
the derivation yields, but a stronger objective Born rule. They believe that 
such an objective Born rule is inconsistent with the nature of the Everettian 
project, thus leading to an inconsistency within the theoretical framework. 
The second concern is that the neglecting of off diagonal elements within 
the reduced density matrix is ad hoc and an example of ontological 
prejudice given that diagonal elements within the matrix are not 
disregarded in the same way. 
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I argued in chapter 5 that neither of these concerns, as presented by 
Thébault & Dawid, need trouble Everettians such as Wallace. I argued that 
a derivation of the Born rule in the style given by Zurek and Wallace, while 
it must presuppose a subjective form of the Born rule, does not need a 
stronger objective form of the Born rule. I also argued that the neglecting 
of off diagonal elements within reduced density matrices, as discussed by 
Thébault & Dawid, is not something that need concern us. I noted, 
however, that this supposed neglectability of off diagonal elements is only 
benign within the context of a branching structure of histories. I assumed 
such a branching structure in the discussion in chapter 5, as Wallace 
assumes such a structure, and Thébault & Dawid never indicate that they 
wish to question this assumption. 
In chapter 6, I examined the dynamics of individual histories within a 
history space which does not possess a branching structure, and looked at 
a variety of arguments for why we might believe that the history space of 
our universe possesses such a branching structure. I began that chapter by 
setting out cases in which environment-induced diagonalisation of a local 
system’s reduced density matrix takes place without the permanent history 
separation needed for such a history to occupy a history space which fulfils 
the medium decoherence criterion. I looked at two such examples: a 
Wigner's friend style thought experiment originally discussed in chapter 2, 
and a more realistic, though still very simplified, case of history 
recombination. I argued that, although it is in principle possible to have 
empirical evidence of this kind of history recombination, and the 
interference phenomena which are likely to result, the very long typical 
recoherence timescales make such records extremely difficult to obtain in 
practice. As such, it seems that we do not have direct empirical evidence 
for the medium decoherence assumption. 
On the other hand, though these recombination events are very difficult to 
prove or disprove empirically, they do seem to have a profound effect on 
the dynamics of the recombining histories. This is because destructive or 
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constructive interference between the recombining histories leads to 
changes in history amplitude, independent of the internal dynamics of the 
individual recombining histories. This seems to mean that the probabilities 
associated with different histories change as a consequence of a 
profoundly nonlocal property of the history space in a way that is very 
difficult to reconcile with the quasi-classical internal dynamics of the 
histories in question. 
Having shown that history recombination leads to profoundly nonclassical 
dynamics, I then turned to consider a variety of reasons why it might be 
reasonable to assume that the history space we occupy does possess a 
branching structure, and so does not display these dynamics. I argued, 
however, that these arguments were all either unconvincing, or rested on 
bold cosmological claims which themselves stand in need of careful 
justification. 
One such argument, suggested by Wallace, is that there should be a 
quantum past hypothesis postulating an initial state of the universal wave 
function, which when coupled with a simple dynamical conjecture will 
ensure a time asymmetric branching structure for the history space of our 
universe. Wallace goes on to suggest that the quantum past hypothesis 
might be defensible as a Humean law of nature rather than simply as a 
cosmological claim on which his interpretation depends. 
In chapter 7 I set out to examine this suggestion of using the Humean 
conception of laws to offer a means of justifying the quantum past 
hypothesis and the medium decoherence assumption, rather than relying 
directly on a bold cosmological claim about the universe we live in. 
Examining this claim will depend on the metaphysics available which varies 
between particular interpretations. For this reason, from this point on, the 
thesis focuses purely on Wallace's many worlds Everettian interpretation. 
I argued that it is difficult to reconcile a Humean conception of laws of 
nature with Wallace's Everettian quantum mechanics as it stands. The 
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problem is that such a conception requires a subvenient basis of 
recombinable particular facts. Laws of nature, on a Humean view, are 
nothing more than regularities in the arrangement of particulars in this 
subvenient basis. As it stands, it is very unclear on Wallace's interpretation 
what could fill the role of this subvenient basis. 
Much of the reason why this problem is so difficult to resolve is that 
Wallace himself is explicitly noncommittal as to what the fundamental 
ontology of his interpretation is. A suggestion advocated by Ney 2013 and 
North 2013, of taking the wave function in configuration space as the 
fundamental ontology, might offer a potential subvenient basis for 
Humean laws. Such a proposal, however, would be at odds with the 
intended basis neutrality of Everettian quantum mechanics, and has been 
strongly rejected by Wallace himself as an unnecessary change to the 
theory which makes it significantly harder to reconcile with the theory of 
relativity. 
I therefore conclude that as it stands it would be very difficult to 
incorporate the quantum past hypothesis into Wallace's Everettian 
quantum mechanics as a Humean law of nature. 
In chapter 8 I continued to focus purely on Wallace's interpretation, and 
looked in more detail at what the consequences would be for it if the 
medium decoherence assumption was abandoned. I argued that this 
assumption is of pivotal importance to the conception of probability within 
Wallace's interpretation, and that it could not be dropped without 
fundamentally undermining Wallace's derivation of the Born rule. 
This poses a serious problem for Wallace's interpretation as, although 
without the Born rule his interpretation is still capable of predicting and 
describing histories very much like the one we occupy, without an account 
of probability there is no means of explaining why we should expect to find 
ourselves in a history which displays approximately classical dynamics. As 
Barrett 1999 puts it, without a justified means of identifying amplitudes 
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with probabilities, we cannot explain why it is more reasonable to expect 
the Eiffel tower to currently reside in Paris than in Pittsburgh. 
I argued that the extreme loss of explanatory power, which results within 
Wallace's interpretation if the medium decoherence assumption is 
dropped, could itself be seen as the basis for an indispensability argument 
to support this assumption. I believe that this is probably the best 
justification that can be offered for the medium decoherence assumption 
within Everettian quantum mechanics, as it does not rely on the direct 
assumption of other controversial cosmological claims, unlike several of 
the other arguments considered in this thesis. However, this 
indispensability argument relies on their being no other equally virtuous 
similar theory which is able to dispense with the medium decoherence 
assumption. 
 
9.2 The Indispensability of Medium Decoherence 
A thorough comparison of the full range of interpretations of quantum 
mechanics and their relative virtues is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, this section will look briefly at which interpretations of quantum 
mechanics rely on the medium decoherence assumption, and why 
Wallace’s Everettian quantum mechanics might be thought superior to 
those interpretations which do not rely on it. If Wallace's interpretation is 
indeed superior to all such interpretations, then this goes a long way 
towards justifying the use of the indispensability argument outlined in the 
previous chapter. 
It was mentioned in the first chapter that Bohmian mechanics uses a local 
effective wave function, rather than the complete universal wave function, 
to predict the dynamics of particles within local systems. I noted at the 
time that Goldstein 2013 regards this use of an effective wave function as 
being the same phenomenon which has come to be known as 
decoherence. I also pointed out in chapter 6 that the possibility of 
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interference phenomena between previously separated histories, when 
they come to recombine, is a direct product of the linearly evolving 
universal wave function, and as such is a result that applies to Bohmian 
mechanics just as much as it does to Everettian quantum mechanics. 
What such interference phenomena mean for the Bohmian interpretation 
is a question that I will turn to in the next section. It seems clear, however, 
that any Bohmian interpretation which is committed to the viability of 
effective wave functions, must endorse the medium decoherence 
assumption. This is because effective wave functions rely on the 
assumption that only the local states within a particular history will affect a 
system’s future evolution. The nonlocal entanglement phenomena which 
give rise to history recombination directly undermine this assumption. 
Consequently Bohmian mechanics, like Everettian quantum mechanics, 
seems to rely on a commitment to the medium decoherence assumption. 
In chapter 1 I also noted that pragmatist interpretations of the type 
presented by Healey 2012 and Friederich 2015 make use of decoherence to 
demarcate non-representational purely quantum claims from non-
quantum measurement claims which are representational. It remains 
unclear to me just what conception of decoherence is really needed here. 
Consequently, it is also unclear to me whether or not these pragmatist 
interpretations need to be committed in any sense to the medium 
decoherence assumption. 
Even if these interpretations are not committed to this assumption 
however, I do not think that pragmatist interpretations offer an alternative 
theory to Wallace's Everettian quantum mechanics. This is because the 
pragmatist accounts are not realist interpretations seeking to describe the 
state of reality which underlies the applicability of quantum mechanics. As 
a result, the project in which they are engaged is not sufficiently similar to 
that of Wallace's Everettian quantum mechanics that comparison could 
usefully be made as to their theoretical virtues. 
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The final interpretation presented in chapter 1 was the GRW collapse 
interpretation. This interpretation, unlike the others presented in chapter 
1, does not rely on decoherence. Environment induced decoherence may 
be displayed in the system’s wave function prior to the spontaneous 
localisation of the system’s wave function, but this is not of particular 
importance to the interpretation. Moreover, frequent spontaneous 
localisations will prevent the development of any long-lasting large-scale 
entangled states. Consequently, GRW has no need to add the medium 
decoherence assumption, as history recombination of the type discussed in 
this thesis is already ruled out by the assumption of spontaneous position 
localisations. 
Here then, is an interpretation which does not rely on the medium 
decoherence assumption. Therefore, if the GRW interpretation is equally 
as attractive in other respects as the Everett interpretation, it would 
indicate that the medium decoherence assumption is in fact dispensable, 
and remove the possibility of defending it by means of an indispensability 
argument. 
I will not attempt a detailed comparison of the theoretical virtues of 
Wallace's Everett interpretation with the various forms of GRW 
interpretation. However, I will briefly identify two reasons why the Everett 
interpretation might reasonably be thought the more attractive theory. 
The first is the difficulty of reconciling wave function collapse with 
relativity. The spontaneous wave function localisations described in the 
GRW theory are difficult to reconcile with relativity theory as, on the 
standard formulation of GRW, these localisations seem to involve a 
superluminal change in the states of wave functions for entangled systems. 
This problem is the subject of ongoing research and may well not be 
insurmountable. For a detailed presentation of the problem, as well as an 
account of ongoing efforts to resolve it, see Maudlin 2002 and Tumulka 
2006. For the time being, however, this tension between GRW and 
relativity remains a significant disadvantage to the interpretation. 
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The second reason why Wallace’s Everettian interpretation might be 
thought more attractive than the GRW interpretation is that, whereas 
Wallace's interpretation relies on the medium decoherence assumption to 
rule out the possibility of problematic history recombination, within the 
GRW interpretation this is achieved by spontaneous wave function 
localisations. Both of these are additions to the standard linear quantum 
formalism. For the time being, neither of these additions to the standard 
formalism is supported by any empirical evidence23. I would suggest, 
however, that the addition of collapse dynamics to the standard formalism 
is a far more radical assumption than the assumption of a particular type of 
structure for the history space of our universe. The collapse dynamics of 
GRW rely on the identification of position as a preferred basis and involve 
the introduction of discontinuous and fundamentally stochastic dynamics 
unlike anything seen in our other fundamental physical theories. Given the 
emphasis which Wallace places on conformity to the standard formalism 
without unnecessary alterations or additions, it seems likely to me that he 
and other Everettians would still regard Everettian quantum mechanics as 
considerably more attractive even if it does require one very general 
assumption about our history space. 
 
9.3 A Bohmian Defence of Medium Decoherence 
In the previous section, I said that, as Bohmian mechanics seems to rely on 
the medium decoherence assumption just as Everettian quantum 
mechanics does, the relative appeal of these two interpretations could not 
undermine the indispensability of the medium decoherence assumption. 
However, although both of these interpretations rely on the medium 
decoherence assumption, this does not mean that they rely on it for the 
same purpose, or that it has the same status within both interpretations. 
                                                          
23 Though, as noted in the first chapter, GRW is empirically distinct from other 
interpretations of quantum mechanics, and may someday receive independent empirical 
support. This is presently beyond our technical capabilities, however. 
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This section will offer some preliminary comments on the significance of 
the medium decoherence assumption within Bohmian mechanics, and 
possible ways of justifying the assumption within that interpretation. I will 
suggest that, based on this preliminary examination, it seems possible that 
the medium decoherence assumption may be easier to justify within 
Bohmian quantum mechanics than it is for Everettian quantum mechanics. 
The first difference from Everettian quantum mechanics lies in the reason 
for the interpretation to commit to this assumption. Within Everettian 
quantum mechanics, the most important role which medium decoherence 
plays is to provide a robust basis of branching histories which can be 
identified as worlds, which emerge from the linearly evolving quantum 
state. And, following from this, to ensure that history amplitudes persist in 
playing the functional role necessary to be identified as probabilities. 
Within Bohmian mechanics on the other hand, both the problem of the 
preferred basis and the problem of the origins of probability find solutions 
in the dynamics of Bohmian particles. Quantum probability is accounted for 
as a consequence of our ignorance of the initial positions of Bohmian 
particles, and the proportions of possible trajectories which would lead 
them to particular points. Particle position is given as a preferred basis, and 
the process of measurement can be analysed in terms of a counterfactual 
dependency between the final positions of the particles of the measuring 
apparatus and the trajectories of the measured particles. 
Instead, the medium decoherence assumption seems to be needed just in 
order to justify the use of effective wave functions, and the reliability of 
the dynamics which they predict. Consequently, it seems that this 
assumption may be somewhat less pivotal within Bohmian mechanics than 
it is within Everettian quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, it still seems to 
play a very important role. The universal wave function is epistemically 
very hard to access, unlike locally determined effective wave functions. 
Thus, if the medium decoherence assumption is abandoned, then the 
Bohmian may find it very difficult to make useful predictions. 
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Another striking difference between the status of the medium 
decoherence assumption in Bohmian and Everettian quantum mechanics, 
is the ease with which it could be defended as a Humean law of nature. In 
chapter 7, I argued that within Everettian quantum mechanics it is very 
difficult to find a subvenient basis onto which Humean laws could 
supervene. Within Bohmian mechanics, on the other hand, the 
arrangement of particle positions is a readily available candidate for a 
mosaic of freely re-combinable particulars onto which Humean laws of 
nature could supervene. Thus, it seems likely that identifying the medium 
decoherence assumption as a Humean law of nature would be a perfectly 
reasonable strategy for supporting the assumption in a Bohmian context. 
Indeed, authors such as Dewar 2016 already argue for regarding the wave 
function itself as a Humean law of nature which supervenes on the 
positions of Bohmian particles in a similar way. At least for those Bohmians 
who already think of the universal wave function in this way, it seems that 
incorporating the medium decoherence assumption as a law of nature 
might be a very natural and very minimal addition to the interpretation. 
These comments are only intended to identify a fruitful seeming area for 
future research, and do not amount to a well-developed argument. More 
work needs to be done to properly understand the full significance of 
medium decoherence within Bohmian mechanics and its relation to the use 
of effective wave functions. More work is also needed in examining the 
many variations of Bohmian mechanics, and how these different 
approaches would regard the incorporation of medium decoherence as a 
Humean law of nature. Superficially, however, it does seem that the 
relative ease with which some Bohmian interpretations could incorporate 
the medium decoherence assumption might represent a minor incentive in 
favour of a Bohmian rather than an Everettian interpretation24. 
                                                          
24 Of course, this advantage may possibly be offset by other disadvantages of the Bohmian 
interpretation. One example being that, like the GRW interpretation, it is more difficult 
than Everettian quantum mechanics to reconcile with relativity. 
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9.4 Final Remarks 
This thesis has investigated the nature and role of decoherence as the 
concept is used within interpretations of quantum mechanics. I have set 
out three different conceptions of decoherence and done my best to make 
clear the relations between them. There is further work to be done in 
mathematically pinning down just how a definition of decoherence in 
terms of a reduced density matrix relates to definitions of decoherence 
given in terms of history spaces, but the general nature of their relation to 
one another is already clear. The weakest of these criteria, diagonalisation 
of a reduced density matrix, is empirically well confirmed and, I have 
argued, conceptually well founded within a variety of interpretational 
frameworks. The strongest of these criteria, on the other hand, is medium 
decoherence, which is conceptually well defined, but troublingly 
disconnected from both empirical evidence and the linear quantum 
formalism. 
The conception of decoherence which plays a role in modern Everettian 
and Bohmian interpretations of quantum mechanics is this strongest form, 
raising the questions of why this strong conception of decoherence is 
needed, and how such a strong conception can be justified. In this thesis I 
have focused primarily on Wallace's Everettian quantum mechanics, and I 
have argued that this strong conception of decoherence is essential to 
providing a branching structure of approximately isolated worlds, and 
allowing the functional identification of Born rule probabilities. 
I have considered a variety of concerns relating to the use of decoherence 
in Everettian interpretations of quantum mechanics. I have argued that, as 
long as medium decoherence, and the branching structure it provides, are 
assumed, these concerns can be answered within Wallace's 
interpretational framework. I have subsequently raised my own concern, 
however, about how the assumption of medium decoherence can be 
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justified. I have considered a wide variety of candidate justifications and 
argued that most are unpersuasive, and others amount to bold 
cosmological claims which themselves stand in need of justification. Finally, 
I have proposed the indispensability of the medium decoherence 
assumption to an otherwise powerful and appealing interpretation as the 
best justification for accepting medium decoherence. Depending on this 
assumption is a significant cost for Wallace's interpretation, which aims to 
be nothing more than an interpretation of robust patterns which arise 
within the linear quantum formalism without any additional formalism or 
assumption. Overall however, I believe that Wallace's interpretation is 
sufficiently appealing to make the addition of this assumption worthwhile. 
In this chapter I have turned back to look at the role of decoherence in 
other interpretations. I have examined other interpretations to see if any 
of them are able to offer a similarly appealing interpretation which does 
not rely on the medium decoherence assumption. If such an interpretation 
could be found, it would undermine the claim that the assumption of 
medium decoherence is really indispensable. I have argued that the only 
candidate for such an interpretation is some form of GRW collapse 
interpretation, and that it is far from clear that such interpretations can 
really match the appeal of Wallace's Everettian interpretation. 
Finally, I have offered some preliminary observations regarding the role 
that medium decoherence appears to play within Bohmian quantum 
mechanics, and possible means of justifying it. I have suggested that these 
may be significantly different from the situation of medium decoherence 
within Everettian quantum mechanics. 
I hope that future work may be done to examine medium decoherence 
within Bohmian mechanics, and that in the future more consideration may 
be given to the conception of decoherence at play in arguments which rely 
upon it. 
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